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iiiivAbstract
Interaction protocols establish how di®erent computational entities can interact with
each other. The interaction can be ¯nalized to the exchange of data, as in communi-
cation protocols, or can be oriented to achieve some result, as in application protocols.
Moreover, with the increasing complexity of modern distributed systems, protocols
are used also to control such a complexity, and to ensure that the system as a whole
evolves with certain features. However, the extensive use of protocols has raised some
issues, from the language for specifying them to the several veri¯cation aspects.
Computational Logic provides models, languages and tools that can be e®ectively
adopted to address such issues: its declarative nature can be exploited for a protocol
speci¯cation language, while its operational counterpart can be used to reason upon
such speci¯cations.
In this thesis we propose a proof-theoretic framework, called SCIFF, together
with its extensions. SCIFF is based on Abductive Logic Programming, and pro-
vides a formal speci¯cation language with a clear declarative semantics (based on
abduction). The operational counterpart is given by a proof procedure, that allows
to reason upon the speci¯cations and to test the conformance of given interactions
w.r.t. a de¯ned protocol. Moreover, by suitably adapting the SCIFF Framework,
we propose solutions for addressing (1) the protocol properties veri¯cation (g-SCIFF
Framework), and (2) the a-priori conformance veri¯cation of peers w.r.t. the given
protocol (AlLoWS Framework). We introduce also an agent based architecture, the
SCIFF Agent Platform, where the same protocol speci¯cation can be used to program
and to ease the implementation task of the interacting peers.
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Introduction
A protocol speci¯es the \rules of encounter" governing a dia-
logue between two or more communicating agents.
Rosenschein and Zlotkin, [126]
Protocols have been used since the beginning of the Computer Science discipline to
rule the way di®erent entities interact with each other. Initially, the most common
type of protocols where the communication protocols: they were strict and manda-
tory rules that de¯ned how the exchange of data should happen between two peers.
The goal of such type of protocols is to allow the exchange of data while guaran-
teeing certain properties related to the exchange process itself (e.g., the detection
of transmission errors, or data losses). The peers involved in the communication
could be homogeneous in software and hardware, as well as heterogeneous systems:
in the latter case, protocols had also the role of solving incompatibilities due to the
heterogeneity.
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More recently, protocols have been used also at a higher abstraction level (w.r.t.
communication protocols), as a way for achieving tasks more complex than the
exchange of data. Application protocols have been widely used in almost every
computer-related sector, as a mean for ruling the interaction between complex peers,
like for example the Post O±ce Protocol for the email sending/retrieving. Also pro-
tocols of this class are still de¯ned in terms of strict rules that the peers must respect
in order to complete the interaction.
In the Multi Agent System paradigm, protocols have been object of ulterior inter-
est: if the agent paradigm (and the Multi Agent Systems paradigm, MAS) have been
used as good method for modeling systems of increasing complexity, protocols (inter-
action protocols) have been used as a tool for controlling such complexity. Nowadays,
interaction protocols are the most used mechanism (and probably the most \imme-
diate" one) to achieve collaboration between distributed entities, and to ensure that
complex systems does indeed exhibit certain characteristics.
Note that the word entity is no referred only to the concept of agent, but also to a
broader class of software components whose task is to perform or to provide some
functionality. E.g., Service Oriented Architectures (SOA) propose a solution address-
ing the interaction issues, and sketch several di®erent proposals for regimenting the
whole set of interactions, thus de¯ning a protocol (orchestration, choreography ap-
proaches).
Hence, protocols are used to serve many di®erent purposes; to cite some:
1. to give the possibility to the peers of interacting with each other and, by this
way, achieving a certain goal; e.g., the communication protocols used in the
Internet;3
2. to regulate (in a normative sense) the interactions that can happen between
di®erent peers. E.g., in a typical e-commerce scenario, the agents enjoy some
freedom, in the sense that they can freely choose to perform several di®erent
actions. An agent could decide to agree to a deal or to reject it; however, the
act of performing some actions could limit such a freedom. A protocol could
state that once a deal has been reached between two agents, then they should
ful¯ll the obligations that are enlisted in the deal;
3. to ensure that all the interactions that are compliant with the protocol, enjoy
some properties (peculiar to the protocol domain itself). E.g., a protocol for
securely exchanging data between two peers aims to guarantee that anyone that
is not the intended recipient cannot access the data. A e-commerce protocol
could aim to guarantee the \good atomicity" property.
When speaking of protocols, two major aspects must be considered:
1. How to specify them?
2. How to verify them?
In the following Sections 1.1 and 1.2 we will try to introduce the reader to the
problem of specifying the protocols, and to the problem of verifying them.
1.1 Speci¯cation Issues
The problem of specifying a protocol can be re-formulated as the problem of ¯nding
a language that indeed allows to specify such a protocol. Of course, such a language
should be:4
² expressive enough to \capture" all the protocol peculiarities;
² at the same time, general as much as possible to get reused in several application
domains;
² simple enough to be used by a protocol developer, and to be understood by
other developers;
² not ambiguous;
² possibly based on a declarative approach, with a clear and formal semantics;
A feature that has been at the center of recently research ativities is the exe-
cutability. Protocol speci¯cations should be machine-understandable and support it
in some degree. With the executability term we mean the possibility of using such a
speci¯cation to directly implement one or more peers involved in the protocol. Such
a possibility mainly depends on the used language, and in some part, it also depends
on how the protocol has been de¯ned by the developer. By \directly implement",
we mean the possibility of using the protocol speci¯cation as a base for developing
the peers that uses such a protocol. Of course, implementing such peers would re-
quire some e®orts. Intuitively, such e®ort could be intended as a measure of the
executability of the speci¯cation language.
To make clearer such concepts, let us present some examples. The Transfer Con-
trol Protocol (TCP, [124]) speci¯es the rules that two peers should follow in order to
establish a connection and exchange (transfer) data in a controlled way. The spec-
i¯cation of TCP describes the rules by means of a Finite State Automata, whose
transitions and states are (unfortunately) expressed using natural language. Hence5
the software developer is left alone, to read the speci¯cation, to interpret it and to
code the software in the way he consider to be the more appropriate. Such a de-
velopment process is prone to the introduction of several bugs, mainly due to the
interpretation process applied by the developer to the natural language description.
To cite another example, the Business Process Execution Language (BPEL, [20])
is used to specify business process as the set of interactions between one main process
(the orchestrator) and other process (the orchestrated processes). A BPEL speci¯-
cation is composed of the Abstract Process speci¯cation and the Executable Process
speci¯cation. While the Executable Process speci¯cation de¯nes how the orchestrator
should treat the data and other low-level details, the Abstract Process speci¯cation
enlists all the interactions that should happen, in the speci¯ed order, between the
orchestrator and the other peers. The conjunction of both can be provided as a input
to a BPEL engine, that will execute the process as speci¯ed. Hence an Abstract Pro-
cess speci¯cation can serve both the purposes of being a description of the interaction
rules, and of being (a part of) an executable prototype.
1.2 Veri¯cation Issues
Guerin and Pitt [89] distinguish three possible types of veri¯cation, depending on the
available information about the protocol players:
Type 1: verify that an agent will always comply. This type of veri¯cation can
be performed at design time: given a representation of the agent, by means of some
proof technique (such as model checking [111]) it is possible to prove that the agent
will always exhibit the desired behaviour. Unfortunately, this type of veri¯cation
make the assumption that the peer' internals are accessible.6
Type 2: verify compliance by observation. Its goal is to check that the actual
peer behaviour being observed is compliant to some speci¯cation. It does not require
any knowledge about the internals, but only the observability of the peer behaviour.
Since it is based on the observation, this type of veri¯cation can be performed at
runtime (or possibly later on some logs).
This type of veri¯cation is of the uttermost importance in real systems, where
the heterogeneity and the complexity is such that protocols must allow some freedom
degrees in order to be e®ective enough in ruling the interactions: too much strict rules
would risk to be useless (see, at this purpose, [44]). In more open scenarios then it
becomes of the utmost importance being able to separate \good" interactions from
the not compliant ones.
Type 3: verify protocol properties. This type of veri¯cation instead can be
performed at design time, and aims to prove that some property will hold for all the
interactions that correctly follow the protocol (i.e., they respect the protocol rules).
This type of veri¯cation is of a crucial importance: with the rasing complexity of
the protocols, it is harder (if not impossible) to manually verify that a protocol does
indeed guarantee a certain property. Protocol Speci¯cation Languages should o®er
(or at least support) tools for expressing such properties, as well as for verifying that
such properties are entailed by the protocol. I.e., automatic tools are needed in order
to prove that if an interaction is compliant w.r.t. a protocol speci¯cation, then the
property is true for that interaction.7
1.3 Advocating the use of Computational Logic
We consider the interacting peers as autonomous computational entities, autonomous
in the sense that their inner activity is not externally controlled. They have their own
knowledge, capabilities, resources, objectives and rules of behavior. Each peer typi-
cally has only a partial, incomplete and possibly inaccurate view of the environment
and of the other peers, and it might have inadequate resources or capabilities to
achieve its objectives.
In our approach, we believe that the knowledge and technologies acquired so
far in the area of Computational Logic provide a solid ground to build upon. In
particular, at the interaction level, the role of Computational Logic is to provide both
a declarative and an operational semantics to interactions. The advantages of such
an approach are to be found:
(i) in the design and speci¯cation of complex systems composed of many heteroge-
nous interacting peers, based on a formalism which is declarative and easily
understandable by the user;
(ii) in the possibility to statically analyze the behavior of the whole system and of
its individuals, based on the properties that such a framework allows to prove;
(iii) in the possibility to detect undesirable behavior, through on the °y control of the
system based on the peers' observable behavior (communication exchanges) and
to dynamically check the conformance of such behaviour with the constraints
posed by the protocols regulating the overall system;
(iv) in the possibility to understand its own limits and potential, through the study8
of veri¯ed properties which will help to de¯ne the application domains of our
results.
1.4 Aim of this thesis
This thesis work started within the SOCS project (Societies Of Computees, EU IST-
32530), where a speci¯cation language and veri¯cation tools were de¯ned for protocols
in the Multi Agent Systems scenario. The aim of this thesis is on one side to contribute
to such language and tools, and on the other to extend the language for addressing
the executability, other veri¯cation types, and to extend its application to several
di®erent scenarios.
In particular, within the SOCS project a declarative language has been de¯ned,
with a formal declarative semantics based on Abductive Logic Programming, and
tools for the Type 2 veri¯cation
Then, starting from the obtained results, a further research activity has been con-
ducted, in order to address the remaining issues of Type 1 and Type 3 veri¯cation, as
well as the executability property of speci¯cation given using the language. Moreover,
the proposed approach has been extended to di®erent application domains, in order
to fully understand its advantages and limits.
Summarizing, this thesis demonstrate how a single framework, based on Com-
putational Logic, can be used for specifying interactions protocols, and to perform
several veri¯cations (Type 1, 2 and 3) on the speci¯ed protocols. Moreover, it shows
also how the protocol speci¯cation (given in terms of the framework language) can
be usefully exploited to ease the development process of the interacting peers.9
1.5 How this thesis is organized
This thesis is organized in the following way. Chapter 2 introduces the SCIFF Frame-
work, together with the language for specifying interactions protocols, its declarative
semantics, the proof procedure for reasoning upon the interactions (given a speci¯ca-
tion of the protocol), and with some formal properties.
Chapter 3 shows how we exploit the SCIFF Framework, in order to address the
Type 2 veri¯cation on conformance of observed behaviours w.r.t. a given protocol
speci¯cation. Some performances consideration are reported, and some examples of
the veri¯cation process are documented.
Chapter 4 address the Type 3 veri¯cation, by suitably extending the framework
introduce in Chapter 2. The new g-SCIFF Framework is presented, with its speci¯ca-
tion language, its declarative and operational semantics, and some formal properties.
Examples of how the g-SCIFF can be used for verifying protocol properties conclude
the chapter.
Chapter 5 instead address the Type 1 veri¯cation, by assuming that the peers
make public a description of their behaviour (such description is often known as the
behavioural interface. The AlLoWS framework, obtained by using both the SCIFF
and the g-SCIFF framework, shows how the a-priori conformance of such peers can
be proved w.r.t. a given protocol speci¯cation.
Chapter 6 instead presents an agent platform where, beside using the SCIFF
framework to verify on the °y that agents behave as prescribed, the protocol speci¯-
cation can be directly used to develop the interacting peers.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarize the result presented in this thesis, and some con-
siderations about future research directions are given.10Chapter 2
Specifying Interaction Protocols:
The SCIFF Framework
The Social Constrained IF-and-only-If framework (SCIFF) has been developed in
the context of the SOCS European project (IST-2001-32530, [139]): the focus of that
project was about the de¯nition of computational logic models for agents (Computees)
and Multi-Agent Systems (Societies of Computees).
The SCIFF framework was speci¯cally developed to address the issues related
to agent interactions, i.e. the protocols regulating these interactions. In particular,
the research activity focussed on the issues of specifying such protocols and to verify
agents behaviours against such speci¯cations. The problem of specifying a protocol
has been tackled by means of computational logic, and in particular by exploiting the
Abductive Logic Programming (ALP).
The SCIFF Framework has addressed the Type 2 veri¯cation (Section 1.2) for the
MAS settings. However, the framework has been designed to be suitable for more
general application domains, and its use is not restricted to the multi agent systems.
Generally speaking, SCIFF can be used to specify and reason about any interaction
1112
process. E.g., SCIFF has been successfully used to reason about communication pro-
tocols like TCP [124], security communication protocols like the Needham-Schroeder
[9, 114], Web Services interactions within a Choreography Speci¯cation [7].
The SCIFF framework is made up of several components:
The SCIFF Speci¯cation Language A language for specifying the interaction
protocols, by means of rules that relate events with other events (in the agent
domain, communicative acts with other communicative acts). Moreover, it pro-
vides also the possibility of expressing a knowledge base that can be used when
reasoning about the interactions. The focus of the SCIFF Speci¯cation Lan-
guage is on the events: when an event happens, the rules specify if other events
are expected to happen or are expected not to happen (both in the past and in
the future w.r.t. to the happened event).
The SCIFF Declarative Semantics A declarative semantics for the SCIFF Lan-
guage, based on abduction and on Abductive Logic Programs (ALP, [95]).
The SCIFF Proof Procedure An abductive proof procedure, that is used within
the framework for reasoning about the interactions logs, and about their com-
pliance w.r.t. a protocol speci¯cation.
Moreover, a fourth component, the SOCS-SI software tool, is part of the SCIFF
Framework: however, this component is presented in Chapter 3, together with some
application examples of the framework applied to the veri¯cation issues.
Contributions of the author. The author participated to the SOCS project for
the ¯nal two years over three and half years taken by the project. Although the author13
didn't participate directly to the speci¯cation of the computational logic model (done
in the very beginning of the project), he has actively contributed in the de¯nition,
development and implementation of all the parts composing the SCIFF framework.
Chapter organization. This chapter is organized as follows: we begin by intro-
ducing some key concepts about the entities (events and expectations, Section 2.1)
and by clarifying some terms and assumptions we make (Section 2.2).
In Section 2.3 we formally de¯ne the SCIFF Language and its parts, while in
Section 2.4 we provide also a declarative semantics.
In Section 2.5 we introduce the SCIFF Proof Procedure and brie°y present its
implementation; in Section 2.5 instead we enunciate its formal properties (soundness,
termination and completeness).
The chapter is concluded by a discussion about related works.14
2.1 Events, Happened Events and Expectations
about Events
The de¯nition of Event greatly varies, depending on the application domain. For
example, in the healthcare domain, an event could be the fact that a laboratory has
communicated the results of blood analysis to the patient who requested it; in a
communication protocol like the TCP, an event could be the fact that a peer has sent
a syn message; in the Web Service domain, an event could be the fact that a certain
web service has been invoked. Moreover, within the same application domain there
could be several di®erent notions of events, depending on the assumed perspective,
the granularity, etc.
The SCIFF framework abstracts completely from the problem of deciding \what
is an event", and rather lets the developers decide which are the important events
for modeling the domain, at the desired level of detail and granularity. Each event
that can be described by a Term, can be used in SCIFF. For example, in a peer-to-
peer communication system, an event could be the fact that someone communicates
something to someone else (i.e., a communicative action has been performed):
tell(alice;bob;msgContent)
Another event could be the fact that a web service has updated some information
stored into an external database, or that a bank clerk, upon the request of a customer,
has provided him/her some money. Of course, in order to perform some reasoning
about such events, accessibility to such information is a mandatory requirement.
In the SCIFF framework, similarly to what has been done in [39], we distinguish15
between the description of the event, and the fact that the event has happened. Typ-
ically, an event happens at a certain time instant; moreover the same event could
happen many times. In our approach the happening of identical events at the same
time instant are considered as if only one event happens; if the same event happens
more than once, but at di®erent time instants, then they are indeed considered as
di®erent happenings. We will always use the term Event as a synonym of its de-
scription, while happened events (i.e. the fact that the event described by Event has
happened) will be represented as atoms
H(Event;Time)
where Event is a Term, and Time is an integer, representing the discrete time point
in which the event happened.
One innovative contribution of the SCIFF framework is the introduction of ex-
pectations about events. Indeed in the framework, beside the explicit representation
of \what" happened and \when", it is possible to explicitly represent also \what"
is expected, and \when" it is expected. The notion of expectation plays a key role
when de¯ning global interaction protocols, choreographies, and more in general any
dynamically evolving process: it is quite natural, in fact, to think of such processes
in terms of rules of the form \if A happened, then B should be expected to happen".
Expectations about events have the form
E(Event;Time)
where Event and Time can be variables, or they could be grounded to a particular
Term/value. Constraints, like Time > 10, can be speci¯ed over the variables: in the
given example, the expectation is about an event (described by Event) to happen at16
a time greater than 10 (hence the event is expected to happen after the time instant
10).
Strictly related to the expectations about the happening of events (positive expec-
tations), there are the expectations about events that should not happen (negative
expectations). The SCIFF framework allows to directly represent such negative ex-
pectations, in the form:
EN(Event;Time)
where the parameters have the same meaning as for the positive expectations. How-
ever, the variables that possibly appears in the negative expectations are ruled by
di®erent quanti¯cation rules w.r.t. the positive expectations. We provide here an
intuition, while the details will be discussed in Section 2.3. Typically, a positive ex-
pectation is about a certain event to happen: e.g., writing E(tell(alice;bob;hello);T1)
in the SCIFF framework means that there is an expectation about the happening of
the event, at a non speci¯ed time T1. In this case, T1 is a variable whose quanti¯cation
is existential. Di®erently, writing EN(tell(alice;bob;gossip);T2) means that there is
an expectation that the event will not happen at any time T2. In this case, T2 is
quanti¯ed universally.
Given the notions of happened event and of expected/expected not event, two fun-
damental issues arise: ¯rst, how it is possible to specify the link between these two
notions. Second, how it is possible to verify if all the expectations have been e®ec-
tively satis¯ed. The ¯rst issue is fundamental in order to easy the de¯nition of an
interaction protocol, and it will be addressed in the the Section 2.3. The second issue,
instead, is inherently related to the problem of establishing if a software component,17
given its observable external behaviour, does indeed respect a given protocol speci¯-
cation: the solution proposed by the SCIFF framework is presented in Sections 2.4
and 2.5.18
2.2 The terms \Open" and \Closed" in the SCIFF
Framework
In the SCIFF framework, the adjectives open and closed are used in several di®erent
contexts, referring sometimes to some di®erent concepts. In order to easy the com-
prehension of the framework, we try here to provide an intuitive (and very informal)
description of the cases where open and close adjectives are used.
2.2.1 Open vs. Closed Histories
We call history a set of happened events, that represents somehow the trace (or
the log) of an interaction instance. The same interaction instance (i.e., the grounded
instance of a generic interaction de¯ned by a protocol) can be considered as a synonym
of the term \history".
The SCIFF framework has been thought in order to be able to perform reasoning
at run-time, i.e. when the interaction is taking place. At every instant, the SCIFF
Proof Procedure can reason upon the actual history (the log of the events happened
until that precise instant): hence, it can reason upon a partial and incomplete version
of the whole history.
However, one of the key features of the SCIFF Proof Procedure is the ability to
reason also upon dynamically happening events without re-considering the reasoning
on the past events: in this way, each time a new event happens, the reasoning pro-
cess is not performed reconsidering again all the history. Instead, the partial result
obtained from the previous reasoning is used as a starting point in order to perform
further reasoning.
This very powerful mechanism however has a limit: in order to perform some19
types of reasoning, it is necessary to know if more (newer) events can still happen or,
instead, if no more events can happen anymore. E.g., suppose an absolute prohibition
of performing a certain action has been hypothesized:
EN(perform(Perfomer;aCertainAction);Time)
In order to establish if this prohibition has been respected or not by a certain
history, it is necessary to know if the interaction represented by the history has
terminated (and no more events can happen anymore) or not. If no more events
can happen in a certain interaction instance, we say that the representing history is
closed. Is newer vent can still happen (in the context of the same interaction), we say
that the history is still open.
The distinction between open and closed histories is formalized in Section 2.4.2 (
De¯nitions 2.4.2 and 2.4.3), and has also some practical consequences on the prop-
erties of the proof procedure, as well as on the proof procedure itself (e.g., a speci¯c
transition called Closure, see Section 2.5.4).
2.2.2 Open vs. Closed Interactions Models
Open and Closed are used also in a di®erent context, with a completely di®erent
meaning, if related to the Interaction Models (often abbreviated to Interactions).
Typical protocols assume a \closed interaction model": every event that happens
in the interaction must be explicitly allowed by the interaction speci¯cation (by the
protocol).
E.g., the TCP protocol [124] de¯nes, for every interaction stage, which are the
messages that can be uttered if the interaction is in that particular stage. All the20
messages not explicitly listed, are implicitly prohibited. If a peer utters a message
not explicitly envisaged by the protocol speci¯cation, the interaction is automatically
considered as faulty, and the other peer reset the connection. 1
Another interesting example is provided instead by the recent Business Pro-
cesses/SOA scenario: due to the openness degree of the environment where business
processes are envisaged to be employed (wide local networks/internet, with hardware
and software heterogeneity of the peers), the \reset connection" behaviour might re-
sult in a too strong reaction; moreover, the fault tolerance of the whole system could
result undermined. Although not speci¯ed as a principle, the choice of many ser-
vice engine vendors is to discard unwanted messages, and to keep a high °exibility
on the decision of elaborating messages not explicitly envisaged by some choreogra-
phy/orchestration speci¯cation.
With the term closed interaction model, we mean an interaction speci¯cation (a
protocol speci¯cation) where only events explicitly envisaged by the protocol can
happen, and where the happening of any other event is considered as prohibited and
a violation of the protocol itself. With the term open interaction model instead we
mean those protocols that allows for some freedom degrees in the allowed interaction
instances. Peers that perform an action or utter a message not envisaged by the pro-
tocol do not automatically violates the protocol speci¯cation, unless that particular
action or message weren't already explicitly prohibited.
The SCIFF framework, as already stated previously, has been developed to pro-
vide a logic-based formalization for interaction in the MAS scenarios. Multi Agent
1Although the behaviour in case of wrong messages is not clearly speci¯ed by the TCP speci-
¯cation [124], the reset action has been chosen as default behaviour by the majority of the TCP
implementation stacks.21
systems are implicitly heterogeneous both for the hardware as well for the software
aspects. Moreover, as discussed by Singh in [44], close interaction models could not
be expressive enough in order to capture the complexity of interactions in the agent
models.
For these reasons, in the SCIFF Framework it is possible to explicitly specify
which are the expected events, and which are the prohibited ones. Events that are not
expected, nor prohibited, can happen. However, please note that this characteristic
does not guarantee that the happened event will not generate some violation due,
e.g., to some inconsistency with previous happened events.
2.2.3 Open vs. Closed Agent Societies
The agent paradigm has raised several problems: the architecture of the various
agents, the interactions amongst the agents, the social organization, the rules, the
roles of the agents in the society, to cite some. In particular the Multi Agent Sys-
tems paradigm has stressed the society related issues, raising questions about the
\openness" degree that such societies should entail.
According to Davidsson [54], there can be four types of societies:
Closed societies are prede¯ned societies, in which no agent can enter. Only the
designer of the society can create new agents in the society itself.
Semi-closed are societies in which agents cannot enter, but they can nominate or
spawn representatives in the society.
Semi-open are societies in which there exists one agent taking the role of gatekeeper,
which receives the requests for entering the society. A potential member applies22
at the gate, can provide some credentials, and can possibly be admitted in the
society by the gatekeeper.
Open are societies in which any agent can enter without restriction.
The classi¯cation by Davidsson is based on rules for entering the society, as this
is the most pressing issue. Leaving the society could be done by considering a leaving
protocol (in semi-open or semi-closed societies), or, in some cases, it can be a way to
punish misbehaving agents: when an agents does not comply to the rules, it is ejected
from the society. In open societies, there are no given protocols to exit: agents may
leave at any time without restriction.
Clearly, open societies are the most °exible, but can also be very unstable. The
set of members is not ¯xed, nor even computable in general, as new agents may join
anytime, and current members could leave without any noti¯cation. Also openness
µ a la Davidsson implies heterogeneity: any agent may join, so they are not required
to share concepts such as beliefs, intentions, knowledge bases, or architectures. Some
agents may exhibit powerful reasoning capabilities, while others may only be able
to react to stimuli with prede¯ned patterns. Foreign agents can join the society
without restrictions and pro¯t from interacting with the agents in the society. On
the other hand, malicious agents could enter and disrupt the harmonious evolution
of the society, threatening the usability of the whole MAS. Thus, mastering open
societies in order to drive them to a coherent, useful global behaviour is a challenge.23
2.3 The SCIFF language
The language is composed of entities for expressing happened events, expectations
about events, hypotheses, and relationships between happened events and expecta-
tions/hypotheses. The ¯nal goal of the SCIFF language is to provide a way for
specifying agent societies.
A Social speci¯cation, i.e, a speci¯cation of an agent society in the SCIFF frame-
work, is composed of the following elements:
² a knowledge base, often named Social Knowledge Base, (SOKB);
² a set of Integrity Constraints (ICs);
² possibly a society goal, i.e. a result that the whole society, through the interac-
tion of its member, should manage to achieve.
We provide meaning to a social speci¯cation by means of Abduction (see Section
2.4): since the SCIFF framework has been designed to be general enough to be use
for generic interaction protocols, we will use the term Abductive Speci¯cation for
general cases, and Social Speci¯cation to indicate an abductive speci¯cation in the
MAS context.
2.3.1 Syntax of Happened Events and Expectations
Hapened events are the abstraction used to represent the actual observations.
De¯nition 2.3.1 An Happened Event is an atom:
² with predicate symbol H;
² whose ¯rst argument is a ground term; and24
² whose second argument is an integer.
Intuitively, the ¯rst argument is meant to represent the description of the hap-
pened event, according to application-speci¯c conventions, and the second argument
is meant to represent the time at which the event has happened:
Example 2.3.1
H(tell(alice;bob;query ref(phone number);dialog id);10) (2.3.1)
could represent the fact that alice asked bob his phone number with a query ref mes-
sage, in the context identi¯ed by dialog id, at time 10.
A negated happened event is an event with the unary pre¯x operator not applied
to it. 2 We will call history a set of happened events, and denote it with the symbol
HAP.
While happened events represent the observed facts, Expectations are the abstrac-
tion we use to represent the desired events. In a MAS setting, they would represent
the ideal behaviour of the system, i.e., the actions that, once performed, would make
the system compliant to its speci¯cations. Our choice of the terminology \expecta-
tion" is intended to stress that observations cannot be enforced, but only expected,
to be as we would like them to be. Expectations are of two types:
² positive: representing some event that is expected to happen;
² negative: representing some event that is expected not to happen.
De¯nition 2.3.2 A positive expectation is an atom:
2not represents default negation (see declarative semantics of the SCIFF framework, Sect. 2.4).25
² with predicate symbol E;
² whose ¯rst argument is a term; and
² whose second argument is a variable or an integer.
Intuitively, the ¯rst argument is meant to represent an event description, and the
second argument is meant to tell for what time the event is expected.
Example 2.3.2 The atom
E(tell(bob;alice;inform(phone number;X);dialog id);Ti) (2.3.2)
could represent that bob is expected to inform alice at some time Ti that the value
for the piece of information identi¯ed by phone number is X, in the context identi¯ed
by dialog id.
A negated positive expectation is a positive expectation with the explicit negation
operator : applied to it.
As the example shows, expectations can contain variables, as it might be desir-
able to leave the expected behaviour not completely speci¯ed. Variables in positive
expectations will be existentially quanti¯ed, supporting the intuition, as we have seen
in Ex. 2.3.2.
De¯nition 2.3.3 A negative expectation is an atom:
² with predicate symbol EN;
² whose ¯rst argument is a term; and
² whose second argument is a variable or an integer.26
Again, the ¯rst argument is meant to represent an event description, and the second
argument is meant to tell for what time the event is expected not to happen.
Example 2.3.3 The atom
EN(tell(bob;alice;refuse(phone number);dialog id);Tr) (2.3.3)
could represent that bob is expected not to refuse to alice his phone number, in the
context identi¯ed by dialog id, at any time.
A negated negative expectation is a negative expectation with the explicit negation op-
erator : applied to it. Note that :E(tell(bob;alice;refuse(phone number);dialog id);Tr)
is di®erent from EN(tell(bob;alice;refuse(phone number);dialog id);Tr). The intu-
itive meaning of the former is: no refuse is expected by Bob (if he does, we simply
did not expect him to), whereas the latter has a di®erent, stronger meaning: it is
expected that Bob does not utter refuse (by doing so, he would frustrate our ex-
pectations). As the example shows, variables in negative expectations are naturally
interpreted as universally quanti¯ed (Bob should never refuse). However, the same
variable may occur in two distinct expectations, one of which positive, the other neg-
ative. In that case, the quanti¯cation will be existential (i.e., the convention adopted
for positive expectations will prevail). This follows the intuitions, as we can see in
the following example.
Example 2.3.4 It is expected that (at least one) agent A performs task t1, and that
no other agent B interrupts A:
E(perform(A;t1));EN(interrupt(B;A)):
Variable A is existentially quanti¯ed, while B is quanti¯ed universally.27
Table 2.3.1 Syntax of events and expectations
EventLiteral ::= [not]Event
Event ::= H(GroundTerm;Integer)
ExpLiteral ::= PosExpLiteral j NegExpLiteral
PosExpLiteral ::= [:]PosExp
NegExpLiteral ::= [:]NegExp
PosExp ::= E(Term;Variable j Integer)
NegExp ::= EN(Term;Variable j Integer)
ExistLiteral ::= PosExpLiteral j AbducibleLiteral j Literal
NbfLiteral ::= not Atom j not AbducibleAtom
Literal ::= [not]Atom
AbducibleLiteral ::= [not]AbducibleAtom
The syntax of events and expectations is summarised in Tab. 2.3.1, and it will
be used as such by the subsequent Tab. 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. We also introduce, for ease
of presentation, the syntactic element ExistLiteral, that lists the literals that are
existentially quanti¯ed. Again, for simplifying the following presentation, we de¯ne
NbfLiteral, that intuitively indicates negative literals with negation by failure. By
AbducibleAtom we mean an atom built on an abducible predicate (i.e., a predicate in
the set Ab; see Sect. 2.4).
2.3.2 Speci¯cation of the Social Knowledge Base
The Social Knowledge Base (SOKB) is a set of Clauses in which the body can
contain (besides de¯ned and abducible literals), expectation literals and constraints.
Intuitively, the SOKB is used to express declarative knowledge about the speci¯c
application domain.
The syntax of the Knowledge Base is given in Tab. 2.3.2, and it will be used as28
Table 2.3.2 Syntax of the Knowledge Base
SOKB ::= [Clause]?
Clause ::= Head Ã Body
Head ::= Atom
Body ::= ExtLiteral [ ^ ExtLiteral ]? j true
ExtLiteral ::= Literal j AbducibleLiteral j ExpLiteral j Restriction
such also in Tab. 2.3.3.
Allowedness conditions
The operational semantics (see Section 2.5) will require some syntactic restrictions,
which we will now introduce. In the sequel and throughout this thesis, we will assume
that such restrictions hold in all cases we consider. As usual in Logic Programming,
we need to avoid °oundering of variables in negative literals [108]:
De¯nition 2.3.4 A clause Head Ã Body is allowed if and only if every variable that
occurs in a NbfLiteral in Body, also occurs in the Head or in at least one ExistLiteral.
Variable quanti¯cation and scope
The quanti¯cation and scope of variables is implicit. In each clause, the variables are
quanti¯ed as follows:
² universally with scope the Clause if they occur in the Head or in at least one
ExistLiteral;
² otherwise (if they occur only in negative expectations and possibly restrictions)
universally, with scope the Body.29
This means that clauses will be quanti¯ed as in most other abductive logic program-
ming languages, and in particular, in the language interpreted by the IFF proof-
procedure, except for negative expectations. Variables that occur only in a negative
expectation will be universally quanti¯ed with scope the Body. Let us see an example:
Example 2.3.5 In order to have a task completed, it is expected that an agent
performs it, and no agent is expected to interrupt the agent performing that task.
completed(Task) Ã E(perform(A;Task));EN(interrupt(B;A)):
The quanti¯cation of the variables is most intuitive:
(8Task;8A) (
completed(Task) Ã E(perform(A;Task));(8B) ( EN(interrupt(B;A)) )
):
De¯nition 2.3.5 A Clause is restriction allowed if the variables that are universally
quanti¯ed with scope the body do not occur in quanti¯er Restrictions, and each variable
that occurs in a restriction also occurs in at least one positive expectation PosExp, or
in AbducibleLiteral in the body. 3
For example, the clause:
p Ã EN(X);X < 10
is not restriction allowed, because it contains a variable X that is universally quan-
ti¯ed with scope the Body, and that is also in a quanti¯er restriction. Similarly, the
3Def. 2.3.5 is needed for a correct handling of de¯ned predicates literals in the integrity constraints.
In fact, it turns out that unfolding a clause which is not restriction allowed could generate an integrity
constraint which is not restriction allowed (see Def. 2.3.7). Note that if there is no chance a predicate
will appear in the body of an integrity constraint, then the restriction allowedness condition could be
safely relaxed.30
clause:
p Ã a(Y );Y < 10
is not restriction allowed, because it contains an existentially quanti¯ed variable Y ,
with scope the Body, which does not appear in any PosExp literal (E) in the Body.
Goal
Thanks to the abductive interpretation, goal-directed societies are possible in the
SCIFF framework; non-goal directed societies are also supported, by considering
the atom true as goal. The syntax of the goal is the same as the body of a clause
(Tab. 2.3.2). In order to avoid °oundering, variables in the goal cannot occur only in
NbfLiteras. The quanti¯cation rules are the following:
² All variables that occur in an ExistLiteral are existentially quanti¯ed.
² All remaining variables are universally quanti¯ed.
Note that these rules are equivalent to those of the variables in the body of a clause
(Sect. 2.3.2), considering that 8X:(H Ã B) is equivalent to H Ã (9X:B) when X
does not occur in H.
2.3.3 Syntax of the Integrity Constraints
Integrity Constraints (also ICs, for short, in the following) are implications that, op-
erationally, are used as forward rules, as will be explained in Sect. 2.5. Declaratively,
they relate the various entities in the SCIFF framework, i.e., expectations, happened
events, abducibles, and constraints/restrictions, together with the predicates in the
knowledge base.31
Table 2.3.3 Syntax of Integrity Constraints (ICs)
ICS ::= [IC]?
IC ::= Body ! Head
Body ::= (EventLiteral j ExpLiteral j AbducibleLiteral) [ ^ BodyLiteral ]?
BodyLiteral ::= EventLiteral j ExtLiteral
Head ::= HeadDisjunct [ _ HeadDisjunct ]? j false
HeadDisjunct ::= ExtLiteral [ ^ ExtLiteral]?
The syntax of ICs is given in Tab. 2.3.3: the Body of ICs can contain conjunctions
of all elements in the language (namely, H, E, and EN literals, de¯nite and abducible
literals and restrictions), and their Head contains a disjunction of conjunctions of all
the literals in the language, except for H literals. Let us now consider an interaction
protocol taken from the MAS literature:
Speci¯cation 2.3.1 Integrity Constraints and Knowledge Base for the query ref
speci¯cation.
H(tell(A;B;query ref(Info);D);T) ^
qr deadline(TD)
! E(tell(B;A;inform(Info;Answer);D);T1) ^
T1 < T + TD
_ E(tell(B;A;refuse(Info);D);T1) ^
T1 < T + TD
H(tell(A;B;inform(Info;Answer);D);Ti)
! EN(tell(A;B;refuse(Info);D);Tr)
qr deadline(10):
Example 2.3.6 Tab. 2.3.1 shows the ICs for the query ref [76] speci¯cation. Intu-
itively, the ¯rst IC means that if agent A sends to agent B a query ref message, then32
B is expected to reply with either an inform or a refuse message by TD time units
later, where TD is de¯ned in the Knowledge Base by the qr deadline predicate. The
second IC means that, if an agent A sends an inform message, then it is expected
not to send a refuse message about the same Info, to the same agent B and in the
context of the same interaction D at any time.
Variable quanti¯cation and scope
All variables in an integrity constraint should occur in an EventLiteral, ExpLiteral, or
AbducibleAtom. The rules of scope and quanti¯cation for the variables in an integrity
constraint Body ! Head are as follows:
1. Each variable that occurs both in Body and in Head is quanti¯ed universally,
with scope the integrity constraint.
2. Each variable that occurs only in Head cannot occur only in NbfLiterals and
² if it occurs in at least one ExistLiteral is existentially quanti¯ed and has
as scope the disjunct where it occurs;
² otherwise it is quanti¯ed universally.
3. Each variable that occurs only in Body is quanti¯ed with scope Body as follows:
(a) existentially if it occurs in at least one ExistLiteral or Event;
(b) universally, otherwise.
The given quanti¯cation rules let the user write integrity constraints without
explicitly stating the quanti¯cation of the variables, and typically capture the intuitive
meaning of the rules in protocols. Let us show it with an example.33
Example 2.3.7 Consider the following example:
H(p(X;Y ));not H(q(Z;X)) ! E(r(X;K));EN(f(Y;J))
Variables X and Y occur both in the body and in the head. Coherently with the
literature in abduction, they will be universally quanti¯ed with scope the whole IC.
Variables K and J occur only in the Head. The quanti¯cation rules for those variables
are the same as for the Goal (see Sect. 2.3.2), i.e., existential for K and universal for
J. Finally, :H(q(Z;X)) means that, if no event happens matching q(Z;X), then the
IC's head should be true. For instance, if the set of happened events is
H(p(2;1));H(q(3;2))
it is quite natural to understand the Body as false (the second event makes not H(q(Z;X))
false). So, the existence of one atom (H(q(3;2)) in the example) is enough for making
not H(q(Z;X)) false. This means that the IC should be read as \if H(p(X;Y )) and
for all values Z, H(q(Z;X)) is false, the Head must hold". Variable Z should be
quanti¯ed as follows:
[8Z :::;not H(q(Z;X))] ! :::
thus, the quanti¯cation rules give the quanti¯cation
8X;Y 9Z;K8J: H(p(X;Y ));not H(q(Z;X)) ! E(r(X;K));EN(f(Y;J))
Allowedness conditions
As in the case of the Knowledge Base syntax, the following syntactic restrictions are
motivated by the operational semantics, and will be supposed to hold throughout the34
paper. A variable cannot occur in an IC only in NbfLiterals. If it does occur in a
literal with negation by failure, it necessarily has to appear in the same IC also in at
least another literal within predicate symbol H, E, EN, or an abducible atom. Since
variables in positive expectations are existentially quanti¯ed, integrity constraints
should not entail universally quanti¯ed positive expectations. For example,
not H(p(A)) ! E(q(A))
would entail in an empty history that 8A:E(q(A)): We avoid such situations with the
following allowedness condition.
De¯nition 2.3.6 An Integrity Constraint Body ! Head is quanti¯er allowed if
² each variable that occurs in an ExistLiteral in Head either does not occur in
Body, or it occurs in the Body in at least one Event or in a PosExpLiteral, or
in an AbducibleAtom;
² each variable that occurs in a NbfLiteral in Body also occurs in at least one
Event or PosExpLiteral or in an AbducibleAtom in Body4.
De¯nition 2.3.7 An integrity constraint is restriction allowed if
² all the variables that are universally quanti¯ed with scope Body do not occur in
Restrictions;
² the other variables (that occur only in Head, or both in Head and in Body) can
occur in Restrictions. Each Restriction occurring in the integrity constraint
should:
4This rule descends from the previous one, considering that not(A);B ! C is equivalent to
C ! A _ B.35
{ either involve only variables that also occur in PosExpLiterals, Events or
AbducibleAtom (in the same disjunct, or in the body),
{ or involve one variable that also occurs in at least one NegExpLiteral, and
possibly other variables which only occur in Events.
Abductive Speci¯cation
Given a Knowledge Base SOKB and a set ICS of Integrity Constraints, we can de¯ne
an Abductive Speci¯cation:
De¯nition 2.3.8 (Abductive Speci¯cation). An Abductive Speci¯cation is the
pair:
S = hSOKB;ICSi
and will be indicated with the symbol S.
De¯nition 2.3.9 An abductive speci¯cation S = hSOKB;ICSi is quanti¯er allowed
if all the integrity constraints in ICS are quanti¯er allowed. S is restriction allowed
if all the clauses in SOKB and all the integrity constraints in ICS are restriction
allowed. S is allowed if it is quanti¯er allowed and restriction allowed, and SOKB
is allowed.
As a recap on allowedness conditions, we have the following table. For all the
three syntactic elements (Clauses, Goal, and ICs), variables cannot occur only in
NbfLiterals. Besides, the following conditions must hold in order for Clauses/ICs to
be restriction-/quanti¯er-allowed:36
Clause Integrity Constraint
if no QR appears in 8 vars with
is restriction- if QRs only appear on vars scope Body
allowed in 9 abducibles and QRs do not involve more
than one 8 var
if ExistLiterals in Head do not
is quanti¯er- always contain vars that occur in the
allowed Body only in not H, [:]EN
and all vars of NbfLiterals in
Body also occur in other H,
[:]E, or abducibles in Body37
2.4 SCIFF Declarative Semantics
2.4.1 Background
We assume the reader has a basic familiarity with logics and logic programming; a
good introduction is the book by Lloyd [108]. As will be clear soon, the SCIFF
framework is based on Abductive Logic Programming and on Constraint Logic Pro-
gramming; we introduce the two concepts in an intuitive way, and provide pointers
to the formal parts.
Abduction
Abduction is a powerful mechanism for hypothetical reasoning in the presence of in-
complete knowledge, that is handled by labelling some pieces of information as \ab-
ducibles". Abducibles can be viewed as possible hypotheses which can be assumed,
provided that they are consistent with the current knowledge base. The abduction
process is typically applied when looking for an explanation for some observation.
Starting from some observed facts, possible causes are hypothesised (they are ab-
duced). Then it is possible to con¯rm the hypotheses by performing some additional
observation: for example, the scientist postulates some theory, and then develops new
experiments to con¯rm (or discon¯rm) such theory. Another common application of
abduction is diagnosis: the physician, by observing the symptoms, formulates some
alternative hypothesis about the disease. The physician tries to ¯nd more facts by
prescribing a patient another test, that will possibly support a smaller set of explana-
tions. Some of the previously made hypotheses could be discarded because they are
now incompatible with the new facts, or because some pairs of explanations cannot
be assumed at the same time. Formally, an abductive logic program (ALP) [96] is a38
triple hP;Ab;ICi where:
² P is a (normal) logic program, i. e., a set of clauses of the form
A0 Ã A1;:::;Am;not Am+1;:::;not Am+n
where m;n ¸ 0, each Ai (i = 1;:::;m + n) is an atom, and all variables are
implicitly universally quanti¯ed with scope the clause. A0 is called the head
and A1;:::;Am;not Am+1;:::;not Am+n is called the body of any such clause;
² Ab is a set of abducible predicates, p, such that p is a predicate in the language
of P which does not occur in the head of any clause of P;
² IC is a set of integrity constraints, that is, a set of formulae in the language of
P.
Given an abductive logic program hP;Ab;ICi and a formula G, the goal of abduction
is to ¯nd a (possibly minimal) set of ground atoms ¢ (the abductive explanation),
with ¢ µ Ab, and which, together with P, entails G, and satis¯es IC:
P [ ¢ j= G (2.4.1)
P [ ¢ j= IC (2.4.2)
The notion of entailment j= depends on the semantics associated with the logic pro-
gram P. Several abductive proof procedures can be found in the literature (like the
Kakas-Mancarella [97], limited to ground literals, SLDNFA [57], that can abduce liter-
als with existentially quanti¯ed variables, ACLP [3] and A-system [99], that integrate
constraints, to cite some). The SCIFF proof procedure (Section 2.5) is an extension
of the If-and-only-If (IFF) abuctive proof procedure [82]. The integrity constraints,39
in the IFF proof procedure, are expressed as a set of implications of the form:
B1 ^ ¢¢¢ ^ Bn ! A1 _ ¢¢¢ _ Am
where all variables are universally quanti¯ed, Ai and Bi are atoms (can be abducibles
or de¯ned predicates), but they cannot be the negation of an atom.
Constraint Logic Programming
Constraint Logic Programming [91, 92] (CLP) is a class of programming languages
that extend logic programming by giving an interpretation to some of the symbols. In
classical Logic Programming, the symbols are not interpreted, so the term 2+3 does
not mean 5, but simply a structure whose functor is + and whose terms are 2 and 3.
Uni¯cation performs a syntactical operation, and does not provide any interpretation,
so the term 5 will not unify with the term 3+2, and the goal 5=3+2 simply fails.
In Constraint Logic Programming, a subset of the terms and atoms are given a
standard interpretation: the symbol 5 stands for the number ¯ve and the symbol +
represent the addition operation. Uni¯cation is extended, and treated as a constraint.
For example, the goal 5 = A + 3 succeeds in CLP, providing the answer A = 2.
This behaviour is obtained by identifying syntactically the set of interpreted atoms,
called constraints, and inserting them into a constraint store instead of applying
resolution. The constraints in the store are then evaluated by a constraint solver,
that detects possible failures and infers new constraints. Each language of the CLP
class is identi¯ed by a domain, representing the set of values that a variable subject
to constraints can assume, the set of constraints, the set of interpreted symbols. For
example, CLP(R) [93] is the instance of CLP that works on the reals; this means
that a variable in CLP(R) can have a real value, and it can be subject to constraints40
on the reals. Current implementations typically employ the simplex algorithm as
constraint solver. CLP(FD) is the specialisation of CLP on the Finite Domains [64].
Variables are initially assigned a domain through the predicate V ariable :: Domain:
For instance X :: [red;green;blue] states that X can take only the values red, green
or blue. On numeric values, CLP(FD) languages typically interpret the symbols <,
·, =, 6=, etc., plus the usual operations +, ¡, ¤, =. In CLP(FD), imposing constraints
typically deletes inconsistent values from the domains of the variables; for example, if
A :: [0::10], B :: [1::5], A < B would remove the values that cannot satisfy the imposed
constraint, in this case the values greater than 4 in the domain of A. When a domain
becomes empty, there cannot be an assignment for the corresponding variable, so the
system fails. Various languages and e±cient solvers have been developed [64, 137, 4].
Such languages have been successfully used for hard combinatorial problems, such as
scheduling [36], planning [29], bioinformatics [118], and many others. These solvers
typically deal only with problems that contain existentially quanti¯ed variables.
2.4.2 ALP Interpretation of a Society Speci¯cation
De¯nition 2.4.1 (Abductive Instance). An instance SHAP of a society/abductive
speci¯cation S is represented as an ALP, i.e., a triple hP;E;ICSi where:
² P is the SOKB together with the history of happened events HAP;
² E is the set of abducible predicates of S;
² ICS are the social integrity constraints of S.
In this way, our social framework (and its dynamic counterpart, as instance of a
society) has been smoothly given an abductive interpretation.41
If the society is goal driven, then there exists a goal G at the society level (which
is simply true if the society is not goal driven).
De¯nition 2.4.2 Given two instances, SHAP and SHAP0, of a society S, SHAP0 is a
proper extension of SHAP if and only if HAP ½ HAP
0.
De¯nition 2.4.3 Given an instance, SHAP, of a speci¯cation S, the instance is closed
i® it has no proper extensions. We denote a closed instance as SHAP.
In the following, we indicate a closed history by means of an overline: HAP.
Notice that in a closed instance, we assume that no further event might occur (i.e.,
the instance has no further extensions and the history is closed under CWA).
2.4.3 Declarative Semantics
We describe then the (abductive) declarative semantics of the SCIFF framework,
which is inspired by other abductive frameworks, but introduces the concept of ful-
¯lment, used to express a correspondence between the expected and the actual ob-
servations. The declarative semantics of an abductive/social speci¯cation is given for
each speci¯c history.
In this way, SHAPi, SHAPf will denote di®erent instances of the same abductive
speci¯cation S, based on two di®erent histories: HAP
i and HAP
f. We adopt an
abductive semantics for the society instance. The abductive computation produces a
set ¢ of hypotheses, which is partitioned in a set ¢A of general hypotheses and a set
EXP of expectations. The set of abduced literals should entail the goal and satisfy
the integrity constraints.
De¯nition 2.4.4 (Abductive Explanation).42
Given an abductive speci¯cation S = hSOKB;ICSi, an instance SHAP of S, and a
goal G, ¢ is an abductive explanation of SHAP if:
Comp(SOKB [ HAP [ ¢) [ CET [ TX j= ICS (2.4.3)
Comp(SOKB [ ¢) [ CET [ TX j= G (2.4.4)
where Comp represents the completion of a theory, CET is Clark's Equational Theory
[48], and TX is the theory of constraints [92].
The symbol j= is interpreted in three valued logics, as it is in the IFF Proof Procedure.
We also require consistency with respect to explicit negation [21] and between positive
and negative expectations.
De¯nition 2.4.5 A set EXP of expectations is :-consistent if and only if for each
(ground) term p:
fE(p);:E(p)g 6µ EXP and fEN(p);:EN(p)g 6µ EXP: (2.4.5)
De¯nition 2.4.6 A set EXP of expectations is E-consistent if and only if for each
(ground) term p:
fE(p);EN(p)g 6µ EXP (2.4.6)
The following de¯nition establishes a link between happened events and expec-
tations, by requiring positive expectations to be matched by events, and negative
expectations not to be matched by events.
De¯nition 2.4.7 Given a history HAP, a set EXP of expectations is HAP-ful¯lled
if and only if
8E(p) 2 EXP ) H(p) 2 HAP 8EN(p) 2 EXP ) H(p) 62 HAP (2.4.7)43
Otherwise, EXP is HAP-violated.
When all the given conditions (2.4.3-2.4.7) are met, we say that the goal is achieved
and HAP is compliant to SHAP with respect to G, and we write SHAP j=¢ G. In
the remainder of this thesis, when we simply say that a history HAP is compliant to
an abductive speci¯cation S, we will mean that HAP is compliant to S with respect
to the goal true. We will often say that a history HAP violates a speci¯cation S to
mean that HAP is not compliant to S. When HAP is apparent from the context,
we will often omit mentioning it.
Example 2.4.1 Consider the query ref abductive speci¯cation S = hSOKB;ICSi,
where SOKB and ICS are de¯ned in Tab. 2.3.1. The history
fH(tell(alice;bob;query ref(phone number);dialog id);10);
H(tell(bob;alice;inform(phone number;5551234);dialog id);12)g
(2.4.8)
is compliant to S.44
2.5 The SCIFF Proof Procedure
The operational semantics of SCIFF is given by an abductive proof procedure. Since
the language and declarative semantics of the SCIFF framework are closely related
with the IFF abductive framework [82], the SCIFF proof procedure has also been
inspired by the IFF proof procedure. However, some modi¯cations were necessary.
As a result, SCIFF is a substantial extension of IFF, and the main di®erences between
the frameworks are, in a nutshell:
² SCIFF supports the dynamical happening of events, i.e., the insertion of new
facts in the knowledge base during the computation;
² SCIFF supports universally quanti¯ed variables in abducibles;
² SCIFF supports quanti¯er restrictions;
² SCIFF supports the concepts of ful¯lment and violation (see Def. 2.4.7).
2.5.1 Data Structures
The SCIFF proof procedure is based on a rewriting system transforming one node to
another (or to others). In this way, starting from an initial node, it de¯nes a proof
tree.
A node can be either the special node false, or de¯ned by the following tuple
T ´ hR;CS;PSIC;¢A;¢P;HAP;¢F;¢V i: (2.5.1)
We partition the set of expectations EXP into the con¯rmed (¢F), discon¯rmed
(¢V ), and pending (¢P) expectations. The other elements are:45
² R is the resolvent: a conjunction, whose conjuncts can be literals or disjunctions
of conjunctions of literals
² CS is the constraint store: it contains CLP constraints and quanti¯er restric-
tions
² PSIC is a set of implications, called partially solved integrity constraints
² ¢A is the set of general abduced hypotheses (the set of abduced literals, except
those representing expectations)
² HAP is the history of happened events, represented by a set of events, plus a
open/closed attribute (see transition closure in the following)
If one of the elements of the tuple is false, then the whole tuple is the special node
false, which cannot have successors. In the following, we indicate with ¢ the set
¢A [ ¢P [ ¢F [ ¢V .
2.5.2 Initial Node and Success
A derivation D is a sequence of nodes
T0 ! T1 ! ¢¢¢ ! Tn¡1 ! Tn:
Given a goal G, a set of social integrity constraints ICS, and an initial history
HAP
i, we build the ¯rst node in the following way:
T0 ´ hfGg;;;ICS;;;;;HAP
i;;;;i
i.e., the resolvent R is initially the query (R0 = fGg) and the set of partially solved
integrity constraints PSIC is the set of integrity constraints (PSIC0 = ICS).46
The other nodes Tj;j > 0, are obtained by applying the transitions that we will
de¯ne in the next section, until no further transition can be applied (we call this last
condition quiescence).
De¯nition 2.5.1 Given an instance SHAPi of an abductive speci¯cation S = hSOKB;ICSi
and a set HAP
f ¶ HAP
i there exists a successful derivation for a goal G i® the
proof tree with root node hfGg;;;ICS;;;;;HAP
i;;;;i has at least one leaf node
h;;CS;PSIC;¢A;¢P;HAP
f;¢F;;i
where CS is consistent, and ¢P contains only negations of expectations :E and
:EN. In such a case, we write:
SHAPi `
HAPf
¢ G:
From a non-failure leaf node N, answers can be extracted in a very similar way to the
IFF proof procedure. Answers of the SCIFF proof procedure are called expectation
answers. To compute an abductive answer, a substitution ¾0 is computed such that
² ¾0 replaces all variables in N that are not universally quanti¯ed by a ground
term
² ¾0 satis¯es all the constraints in the store CSN.
If the constraint solver is (theory) complete [92] (i.e., for each set of constraints c,
the solver always returns true or false, and never unknown), then there will always
exist a substitution ¾0 for each non-failure leaf node N. Otherwise, if the solver is
incomplete, ¾0 may not exist. The non-existence of ¾0 is discovered during the answer47
extraction phase. In such a case, the node N will be marked as a failure node, and
another success node can be selected (if there is one).
De¯nition 2.5.2 (Abductive Answer). Let ¾ = ¾0jvars(G) be the restriction of ¾0
to the variables occurring in the initial goal G. Let ¢N = (¢F N [ ¢P N [ ¢AN)¾0.
The pair (¢N;¾) is the abductive answer obtained from the node N.
2.5.3 Variables Quanti¯cation and Scope
Concerning variable quanti¯cation, SCIFF di®ers from IFF in the following aspects:
² in IFF, all the variables that occur in the resolvent or in abduced literals are
existentially quanti¯ed, while the others (that occur only in implications) are
universally quanti¯ed; in SCIFF, variables that occur in the resolvent or in
abducibles can be universally quanti¯ed (as EN expectations can contain uni-
versally quanti¯ed variables);
² in IFF, variables in an implication are existentially quanti¯ed if they also occur
in an abducible or in the resolvent, while in SCIFF variables in implications
can be existentially quanti¯ed even if they do not occur elsewhere.
For these reasons, in the SCIFF proof procedure the quanti¯cation of variables is
explicit.
The scope of the variables di®ers depending on where they occur:
² if they occur in the resolvent or in abducibles, their scope is the whole tuple
representing the node (see Sect. 2.5.1);
² otherwise they occur in an implication; their scope, in such a case, is the impli-
cation in which they occur.48
In the ¯rst case, we say that the variable is °agged. In the following, when we want
to make explicit the fact that a variable X is °agged (when it is not clear from the
context), it will be indicated with ^ X, while if we want to highlight that it is not
°agged, it will be indicated with · X.
Copy of a formula Since the SCIFF syntax allows for abducibles with both ex-
istentially and universally quanti¯ed variables, the classical concept of renaming of a
formula should be extended. Intuitively, universally quanti¯ed variables are renamed,
in a sense, doubling the original formula, while existentially quanti¯ed variables are
not. Let us call this operation copy of the formula.
When making a copy of a formula, we keep into account the scope of the variables
it contains by means of their °agging status, as follows.
De¯nition 2.5.3 Given a formula F, we call copy of F a formula F 0 where the
universally quanti¯ed variables and the non °agged variables are renamed. We write
F
0 = copy(F):
For example,
9^ Y8 ^ X0>508 · Z0E(p(^ Y )) ^ EN(q( ^ X0; ^ Y )) ^ [EN(r(^ Y ; · Z0)) ! 9 · K0E(p( · K0))]
is a copy of the formula:
9^ Y8 ^ X>508 · ZE(p(^ Y )) ^ EN(q( ^ X; ^ Y )) ^ [EN(r(^ Y ; · Z)) ! 9 · KE(p( · K))]
Notice that, by De¯nition 2.5.3, if F contains only °agged existentially quanti¯ed
variables, then copy(F) ´ F (so, for instance, the selected literal of SLD resolution49
would not be renamed, as in SLD resolution), while a universally quanti¯ed formula
would be renamed (for instance, a clause would be renamed, as in SLD resolution).
Intuitively, by copying a formula we obtain a new fresh copy (unrelated to previous
ones) of universally quanti¯ed variables and non °agged variables.
2.5.4 Transitions
The transitions are based on those of the IFF proof procedure, enlarged with those
of CLP [91], and with speci¯c transitions accommodating the concepts of ful¯lment,
dynamically growing history and consistency of the set of expectations with respect
to the given de¯nitions (Defs. 2.4.5, 2.4.6 and 2.4.4).
Here, for sake of completeness of the presentation of the SCIFF Framework, we
will brie°y cite and de¯ne the transitions of the Proof Procedure. The interested
reader can refer to [15] for the complete and detailed presentation of the transitions.
IFF-like transitions
The IFF proof-procedure. The IFF is based on rewriting. It starts with a formula
(that replaces the concept of resolvent in logic programming) built as a conjunction
of the initial query and the ICs. Then it repeatedly applies one of its inference rules.
By such rules, each node is always translated into a (disjunction of) conjunctions of
atoms and implications; e.g., it can look like:
(A1 ^ A2 ^ [A3 Ã B1 ^ B2] ^ [A4 Ã B3 ^ B4])
_ (Ai ^ Aj ^ Ak ^ [Az Ã By] ^ [false Ã B5])
The atoms have a similar meaning to those in the resolvent in LP, while the impli-
cations are (partially solved) integrity constraints. Given a formula, its variables'
quanti¯cation is de¯ned by the following rules:50
² if a variable is in the initial query, then it is free;
² else if it occurs in an atom, it is existentially quanti¯ed;
² else (it occurs only in implications) it is universally quanti¯ed.
A negated atom not A is rewritten as false Ã A. Notice that this does not change
the existential quanti¯cation of the atom because of the allowedness condition. A
variable can occur in a negated atom only if it also occurs in a positive atom. A
variable is universally quanti¯ed only if it occurs only in implications. Thus, if an
implication false Ã A was generated by the transformation of a negated atom not A,
the variables in A necessarily occur also in a positive atom, and must be considered
existentially quanti¯ed. The inference rules which IFF is based on are: Unfolding,
Propagation, Splitting, Case analysis, Factoring, Rewrite rules for equality, Logical
simpli¯cations. In the following, we will show how these IFF transitions are adapted
for the purposes of SCIFF.
Unfolding. Is adapted from the IFF proof-procedure. Let Li be the selected literal
in the resolvent Rk = L1;:::;Lr. Suppose that Li is a predicate de¯ned in the SOKB
of the social speci¯cation. Unfolding generates a child node for each of the de¯nitions
of Li; in each node, Li is replaced with its de¯nition.
Moreover, as in the IFF proof procedure, unfolding is also applied to a de¯ned
atom in the body of an implication. In this case, only one child node is generated,
which contains a new implication for each de¯nition of the atom.
Abduction. Since the SCIFF proof procedure (di®erently from the IFF) keeps the
set of abducibles separate from the resolvent, a transition has been introduced for51
abduction which, intuitively, moves an abducible from the resolvent to the set of
abduced atoms (¢A [ ¢P).
Propagation. Given a partially solved PSIC and a literal A (an happened event
or an abducible) that uni¯es with a literal Li in the body of the PSIC, a new node
is generated where an equality constraint is imposed between A0 and Li, and a new
PSIC0 is added (where Li has been removed). A0 is the copy of A, (A0 = copy(A)),
and the equality will be handled by transition Case Analysis.
Splitting. Given a node where the resolvent Rk contains a disjunction, two new
child nodes are generated, each one containing only one of the disjunct atoms of the
parent node.
In the SCIFF proof procedure, disjunctions may appear also in the constraint
store. Depending on the type of underlying Constraint Solver, clever reasoning can be
possible. For instance, when using a CLP(FD) solver, constructive disjunction [148]
or the cardinality operator [147] can be used to handle disjunctions of constraints. If
the adopted constraint solver does not provide such facilities, Splitting can be applied
also to disjunctions in the store.
Case Analysis. Given a node with an implication
PSICk = PSIC
0 [ fA = B;L1;:::;Ln ! H1 _ ¢¢¢ _ Hjg
the node is replaced by two identical nodes, except for the following: in Node 1 we
hypothesize that the equality A = B holds, while in Node 2, we hypothesize the
opposite. Since our proof procedure also needs to deal with constraints in the body,
we also extend case analysis to such situation.52
Factoring. In the IFF proof procedure, transition factoring separates answers in
which abducible atoms are merged from answers in which they are distinct. It is
important for keeping the set of assumptions small (ideally, minimal). It generates
two nodes: in one node two hypotheses unify, in the other one a constraint is imposed
in order to avoid the uni¯cation of the hypotheses.
In the SCIFF proof procedure, abducibles can contain universally quanti¯ed vari-
ables; it is not reasonable to unify atoms with universally quanti¯ed variables, because
we would lose some of the information given by the abduced atoms.
For this reason, we apply factoring only if the two atoms only contain existentially
quanti¯ed variables. Notice that this coincides with the factoring transition of the
IFF proof procedure.
Equivalence Rewriting. The equivalence rewriting operations are delegated to
the constraint solver. Note that a constraint solver works on a constraint domain
which has an associated interpretation. In addition, the constraint solver should
handle the constraints among terms derived from uni¯cation. Therefore, beside the
speci¯c constraint propagation on the constraint domain, we assume that the con-
straint solver is equipped with further inference rules for coping with uni¯cation.
Moreover, we also have to consider that our language is more expressive than that
of the IFF proof-procedure, as we can abduce atoms with universally quanti¯ed vari-
ables. For this reason, we introduced °agged variables, and we deal with them in the
theory of uni¯cation.
Logical Equivalence. Intuitively, when the body of a PSIC becomes true, then
a new child node is generated, where PSIC is removed and its head is added to the53
resolvent R. Moreover, also all the logic equivalence rules of the IFF are considered
in this transition.
Dynamically growing history
This set of transitions deals with a dynamically growing history HAP. The transi-
tions are used to reason upon the happening (or non-happening) of events.
Closure. In order to reason about non-happening of events, we adopt Closed World
Assumption (CWA, [123]) on the set of currently happened events. Of course, this
assumption is not acceptable if other events will happen in the future. For this reason,
we non-deterministically assume that no other event will happen, i.e., we generate
two child nodes. In the ¯rst we assume that no other events will happen, in the
second that there will be other events. The open/closed attribute of the history (see
Sect. 2.5.1) records if closed world is assumed on the happening of events.
Transition Closure is only applicable when no other transition is applicable. In
other words, it is only applicable at the quiescence of the set of the other transitions.
Happening of Events. The happening of events is handled by a transition Hap-
pening. This transition takes an event H(Event) from an external queue and puts
it in the history HAP; the transition Happening is applicable only if an Event such
that H(Event) 62 HAP is in the external queue.
Non-Happening. The Non-Happening transition can be considered an application
of constructive negation. Constructive negation is a powerful inference that is partic-
ularly well suited in CLP [141].54
Rule Non-Happening applies when the history is closed and a literal not H is in
the body of a PSIC. Given a node where:
² PSICk = fnot H(E1);L2;:::;Ln ! H1 _ ¢¢¢ _ Hmg [ PSIC0
² closed(HAPk) = true
Non-Happening produces a new node. Intuitively, we hypothesise that all the events
matching with E1 that are not in the history, do not happen at all. Intuitively, we
hypothesise that every event that would be able to match with E1, and is not in the
current history, will not happen. This can be seen as abducing an atom nonH(E0
1)
where all the variables are substituted with universally quanti¯ed variables. We im-
pose that the hypothesis holds in all cases except those already in the HAPk; we
can state this by means of the quanti¯er restrictions, i.e., we impose that the hypoth-
esis nonH(E0
1) does not unify with any of the happened events. This is equivalent
to imposing a conjunction (for all the events in the history that match with E0
1) of
a disjunction (for all the variables appearing in E0
1) of non uni¯cation restrictions
(written 6=).
Ful¯lment and Violation
These transitions nondeterministically try and match expectations with events. In
general, these transitions generate two child nodes: in one we assume that one expec-
tation and one event match, while in the other we assume they will not match.
Violation EN. Given a node N with the following situation:
² ¢P k = ¢P
0 [ fEN(E1)g
² HAPk = HAP
0 [ fH(E2)g55
Violation EN produces two nodes N1 and N2, where N1 is as follows:
² ¢V
1
k+1 = ¢V k [ fEN(E1)g
² CS1
k+1 = CSk [ fE1 = E2g
and N2 is as follows:
² ¢V
2
k+1 = ¢V k
² CS2
k+1 = CSk [ fE1 6= E2g
Ful¯lment E. Starting from a node N as follows:
² ¢P k = ¢P
0 [ fE(Event1)g
² HAPk = HAP
0 [ fH(Event2)g
Ful¯lment E builds two nodes, N1 and N2, that are identical to their father except
for the following: in node N1 we hypothesise that the expectation and the happened
event unify; in node N2 instead we hypothesise that the two will not unify.
Violation E. Violation of an E expectation can be proven only if there will not
be an event matching the expectation. It is possible when we assume that no other
event will happen; i.e., either when the transition Closure has been applied, or when
a deadline has expired. The E atom that is violated is then added to the ¢V set in
the new child node.
Ful¯lment EN. Symmetrically to violation E, we can prove ful¯lment of EN ex-
pectations, either when the history HAP is closed, or when a deadline has expired
and the correspondent event didn't happen at all.56
Consistency
E-Consistency. In order to ensure E-consistency (see Def. 2.4.6) of the set of ex-
pectations, we impose the following integrity constraint:
E(T) ^ EN(T) ! false (2.5.2)
:-Consistency. In order to ensure :-consistency (see Def. 2.4.5) of the set of
expectations, we impose the following integrity constraints:
E(T) ^ :E(T) ! false
EN(T) ^ :EN(T) ! false
(2.5.3)
CLP
The SCIFF proof-procedure inherits the same transitions of CLP [91]. We suppose
that the symbols = and 6= are in the constraint language and the theory behind them
is, for equality, the same used by the Equivalence Rewriting transition. Concerning
6=, we will again suppose that it is possible to syntactically distinguish the CLP-
interpreted terms and atoms; the solver will perform some inference on the interpreted
terms (typically, depending on the CLP sort, e.g., by deleting inconsistent values from
domains in CLP(FD)), and will moreover contain the rules for uninterpreted terms.
The constraint solver deals also with quanti¯er restrictions. If a quanti¯er restric-
tion (due to uni¯cation) gets all the variables existentially quanti¯ed, then we replace
it with the corresponding constraint.
Constrain. Given a node with
² Rk = L1;:::;Lr57
and the selected literal, Li is a quanti¯er restriction, Constrain produces a node with
² Rk+1 = L1;:::;Li¡1;Li+1;:::;Lr
² CSk+1 = CSk [ fLig
Infer. Given a node, the transition Infer modi¯es the constraint store by means of
a function infer(CS). This function is typical of the adopted constraint sort. E.g.,
the function infer in a FD (Finite Domain) sort will typically compute (generalised)
arc-consistency.
² CSk+1 = infer(CSk)
Consistent. Given a node, the transition Consistent will check the consistency of
the constraint store (by means of a solver of the domain) and will generate a new
node. The new node can either be a special node fail or a node identical to its father.
Again, this transition is typical of the chosen constraint solver: in CLP(FD), for
example, failures are discovered when a domain is empty.
2.5.5 Implementation of the SCIFF Proof Procedure
As its ancestor, the IFF proof procedure [82], the SCIFF proof-procedure is a transi-
tion system that rewrites logic formulae into equivalent logic formulae. Each formula
is a Node of the proof-procedure, and can be rewritten into one or more nodes, logi-
cally in OR (so building an OR-tree). The SCIFF proof-procedure has more features:
it accepts dynamically incoming events (H), uses a constraint solver, generates ex-
pectations (E, EN). For these reasons, elements in a formula (node) are arranged
in a tuple which is more structured than the node of the IFF, and that carries the58
following information:
T ´ hR;CS;PSIC;¢P;HAP;¢F;¢V i (2.5.4)
where R is the resolvent, CS is the constraint store (as in CLP), PSIC is a set of
implications (initially set as the set of all integrity constraints), HAP is the current
history, ¢P, ¢F, and ¢V are, respectively, the set of pending, ful¯lled, and vio-
lated expectations. For the implementation of the SCIFF proof-procedure, SICStus
PROLOG [137] has been chosen.
As the IFF proof-procedure, the SCIFF proof-procedure speci¯es a mechanism for
building proof trees, leaving the search strategy to be de¯ned at implementation level.
The implementation is based on a depth-¯rst strategy. This choice, enabling us to
tailor the implementation for the built-in computational features of PROLOG, allows
for a simple and e±cient implementation of the proof-procedure. Experiments in a
practical application (namely, combinatorial auctions) show that the proof-procedure
is scalable enough to address real-life size situations. The PROLOG-Constraint Han-
dling Rules (CHR, [81]) module implements the transitions of the proof-procedure.
The data structures of the proof-procedure (e.g., PSIC, ¢P) are implemented as CHR
constraints, so the transitions can be straightforwardly implemented as CHR rules.
For example, each happened event is represented by means of a h/2 CHR constraint,
whose (ground) arguments are the content and the time of the event. An example of
event is:
h(request(seller,buyer,give(10e),1),10am)
Expectations are represented by means of CHR constraints e for E expectations and
en for EN expectations. CHR interfaces easily with other constraint solvers, so we59
can impose constraints on the variables, such as:
e(do(buyer,seller,give(10e),1),T), T<5pm
and this expectation will not match with (and be ful¯lled by), for example, a happened
event
h(do(buyer,seller,give(10e),1),8pm):
Given this representation, the SCIFF transitions can be mapped into CHR rules, in a
sense de¯ning a new constraint solver for the resolution of expectations. For example,
we have a transition of E-consistency, that ensures that the ¯nal derivation node does
not contain both the expectations of an event to happen and to not happen:
e_consistency @
e(E1,T1), en(E2,T2)
==>
reif_unify((E1,T1),(E2,T2),0).
Such a rule, for each pair (E(E1;T1);EN(E2;T2)), imposes the dis-uni¯cation con-
straint (E1;T1) 6= (E2;T2) (reif_unify(T1;T2;B) is a constraint that imposes uni-
¯cation between two terms T1 and T2 according to a boolean variable B: the logical
reading is (T1 = T2) , (B = 1)). The ful¯llment rule is also rather straightforward:
fulfilment @
h(HEvent,HTime), e(EEvent,ETime)
==>
may_unify(HEvent,EEvent)
|
renaming((EEvent,ETime),(EEvent1,ETime1)),
case_analysis_fulfilment((HEvent,HTime),(EEvent1,ETime1)).
The rule is applied when an event and a pending expectation whose content have the
same functor and arity (checked by the may_unify/2 predicate in the guard of the60
rule) are in the CHR store. In this case, a renaming is made of the expectation5 and
the case_analysis_fulfillment/2 predicate is called. Two nodes are created by
case_analysis_fulfillment/2:
² a ¯rst node where uni¯cation is imposed between the expectation and the event,
the e(EEvent,ETime) constraint for the expectation is removed from the con-
straint store and the fulf(e(EEvent,ETime)) CHR constraint is imposed (im-
plementing the fact that the expectation is moved from the set ¢P of pending
expectations to the ¢F one of ful¯lled expectations);
² and a second node where dis-uni¯cation between the expectation and the event
is imposed.
5This step is necessary because some expectations may contain universally quanti¯ed variables.
The issue is discussed in detail in a technical report [14].61
2.6 Properties of the SCIFF proof procedure
2.6.1 Soundness of the SCIFF Proof Procedure
Here we will report only the main results about the soundness of the SCIFF Proof
Procedure. The interested reader can refer to [85] for the complete and detailed proofs
of soundness.
Premises and de¯nitions
First of all, we need to distinguish between closed histories and open histories (see
Def. 2.4.2 and Def. 2.4.3). This distinction re°ects upon the concepts of a goal G
achievable or achieved. In particular:
De¯nition 2.6.1 Goal achievability Given an open instance of an abductive spec-
i¯cation, SHAP, and a ground goal G, we say that G is achievable (and we write
SHAP¼¢G) i® there exists an (open) admissible set of abducibles ¢ (and whose
EXP µ ¢ is also ful¯lled) such that:
SOKB [ HAP [ ¢ ² G (2.6.1)
(which is a shorthand for Comp(SOKB [ ¢) [ HAP [ CET j= G).
De¯nition 2.6.2 Goal achievement Given a closed instance of an abductive spec-
i¯cation, SHAP, and a ground goal G, we say that G is achieved (and we write
SHAP ²¢ G) i® there exists a (closed) admissible set of abducibles ¢ (and whose
EXP µ ¢ is also ful¯lled) such that:
SOKB [ HAP [ ¢ ² G (2.6.2)62
(i.e., Comp(SOKB [ HAP [ ¢) [ CET j= G).
Recalling the dei¯nitions of open/closed successfull derivation of the proof, we are
now ready to enunciate the main soundness results.
Soundness Properties of the SCIFF Proof Procedure
The following theorem relates the operational notion of open successful derivation
with the corresponding declarative notion of goal achievability.
Theorem 2.6.1 Open Soundness. Given an open instance SHAPi, if
SHAPi»
HAPf
¢ G
with abductive answer (¢;¾) then
SHAPf¼¢¾G¾
The theorem above states that if there exists an open successful derivation for a goal
G starting from an initial history HAP
i and leading to the (open) instance SHAPf
with abduced set ¢, and with expectation answer (¢;¾), then G¾ is achievable in
SHAPf (with the abduced set ¢¾).
In the closed case, the soundness property is stated as follows, relating the opera-
tional notion of closed successful derivation with the corresponding declarative notion
of goal achievement.63
Theorem 2.6.2 Closed Soundness. Given a closed instance S
HAPf, if
SHAPi `
HAPf
¢ G
with abductive answer (¢;¾) then
S
HAPf j=¢¾ G¾
Soundness in the closed case states that if there exists a closed successful derivation
for a goal G starting from an initial history HAP
i and leading to the closed instance
S
HAPf with abduced set ¢, and with abductive answer (¢;¾), then G¾ is achieved
in S
HAPf (with the abductive set ¢¾).
2.6.2 Termination of the SCIFF Proof Procedure
As already states previously, the SCIFF Proof Procedure is an extension of the IFF
Proof Procedure [82]. The termination property for the IFF was proven by Xanthakos
[154], by establishing su±cient conditions on the IFF program for guaranteeing the
termination of the proof procedure. Here we will present a set of restrictions that, if
applied to a SCIFF program, are indeed a su±cient condition for the termination.
Then, we will enunciate the termination property that holds under such restrictions.
The interested reader can refer to [85] for the detailed proof.
New restrictions on the SCIFF Proof Procedure
We give here the equivalent of the restrictions proposed by Xanthakos.
Splitting Citing Xanthakos:64
The ¯rst new restriction we enforce is the (exhaustive) application of
splitting on any disjunctions in a node (i.e. whenever possible, split-
ting should be applied after an unfolding, propagation, case analysis,
or previous splitting step). Then, any execution tree is an or-tree
where any node is a conjunction of literals, implications and at most
one disjunction D1_¢¢¢_Dn, where each Di is a conjunction of literals
and implications.
Equality rewriting and logical simpli¯cation Citing Xanthakos[154]:
The second restriction that we pose is that we give logical simpli¯ca-
tion and equality rewrite rules the highest priority, i.e. they should
be applied whenever possible.
Equality rewriting is substituted in the SCIFF proof-procedure by more general
transition rules, called Constraint Solving. We impose that Constraint Solving
transitions are applied (together with logical simpli¯cation) before the other
transitions (i.e., they have highest priority).
Case Analysis Citing Xanthakos [154]:
Some equalities in the body of implications are not dealt with by
equality rewrite rules, but by case analysis. Our third restriction is
that case analysis is given the highest priority (after equality rewriting
and logical simpli¯cation have been performed) when an implication is
selected. Similarly to equality rewriting, we enforce that the left-most
equality is selected ¯rst. This restriction simpli¯es the implications
in a node and may also reduce the computational cost.65
We take the same restriction proposed by Xanthakos. Notice that in the SCIFF
proof-procedure, Case Analysis can also be applied to a constraint in the body
of an implication.
Assumptions on the Constraint Solver
As in Constraint Logic Programming [91], the Constraint Solving is not completely
speci¯ed in the SCIFF proof procedure. In order to prove termination, we need to
make some assumption on the Constraint Solver.
De¯nition 2.6.3 Assumptions on the Constraint Solver
² The constraint solving process always terminates
² The constraint solving process cannot generate an in¯nite constraint store
² If the constraint solving process generates a disjunction of constraints CS =
(c1 _ cj) ^ CS0 then splitting can be applied. We require that the alternation of
Constraint Solving and splitting always terminates.
² The constraint solving process will not change the quanti¯cation of a variable
(a variable universally quanti¯ed will not become quanti¯ed existentially and
vice-versa).
² The constraint solving process can change a literal L into L0, but the new version,
L0 must be an instance of the previous version, L.
Thanks to these assumptions, we can now state the following lemma:
Lemma 2.6.1 Constraint Solving steps cannot cause other transitions, except66
² Case Analysis
² failing transitions.
Moreover, an in¯nite sequence of case analysis and constraint solving steps is impos-
sible.
Acyclicity for SCIFF programs
De¯nition 2.6.4 Given a SOKB, an atom L depends on a literal M w.r.t. SOKB if
² an instance of a clause in SOKB is Lµ Ã K ^ M, or
² an instance of a clause in P is Lµ Ã K ^ N and N depends on M
where K is a conjunction of literals, possibly true, and Lµ is an instance of L.
Given a logic program P, an atom L weakly depends on a literal M wrt SOKB if
² L is M, or
² L depends on M wrt SOKB.
Note that, since we interpret a speci¯cation S by means of an abductive logic program
(see Sect. 2.4.2, Def. 2.4.1), the logic program P is the union of the SOKB and of
the set HAP of happened events.
We report here some de¯nitions given by Xanthakos, adapted to our terminology.
De¯nition 2.6.5 Given a SOKB, two literals L, M are related w.r.t. an atom N if
an instance of a clause in P is Nµ Ã K;L0;M0 (where K is a conjunction of literals,
possibly true, and Nµ is an instance of N) and L0 weakly depends on L and M0 weakly
depends on M.67
Intuitively, two literals are related w.r.t. a goal, if a sequence of unfolding steps for
the goal can lead to the introduction of a node with both literals.
De¯nition 2.6.6 Given a SOKB, a level mapping jj is a function that maps all
ground atoms in BSOKB (where BSOKB is the Herbrand base of the logic program
SOKB) to N n f0g and false to 0. Also, jj is extended to map a ground negative
literal :A to jAj, where A 2 BSOKB.
Given the de¯nitions above, we can introduce the de¯nition of acyclic implication,
properly restated in our terminology:
De¯nition 2.6.7 (Acyclic implication) Given a society with SOKB acyclic w.r.t. a
level mapping jj, a ground implication, say L1;:::;Ln ! H1 _ ¢¢¢ _ Hm, is called
acyclic w.r.t. SOKB and jj, if for every non-constraint atom Li, i = 1;:::;n, for
every ground atom K which Li weakly depends upon w.r.t. SOKB,
² jKj > jHrj, r = 1;:::;m and
² jKj > jNj, for every non constraint atom N such that some Lj, j = 1;:::;i ¡
1;i + 1;:::;n depends upon the negative literal :N and
² jKj > jNj, for every non equality atom N such that K is related to :N wrt Li.
An implication is called acyclic w.r.t. SOKB and jj if every ground instance of it
is acyclic w.r.t. jj. An implication is called acyclic w.r.t. SOKB if it is acyclic
w.r.t. some level mapping.
The de¯nition of Acyclic Implication considers CLP constraints as an extension
of the concept of uni¯cation (as is usual in CLP [91]). In other words, constraints are68
not assigned a level; this is reasonable, because they do not depend upon de¯nitions,
nor upon integrity constraints, but their semantics is de¯ned only by the underlying
constraint theory.
We now extend the notion of acyclicity to the society knowledge (which is the
de¯nition of acyclic ALP [154, Def 4.2.5 pag 65] rewritten in our terminology)
De¯nition 2.6.8 Acyclic Society Speci¯cation
² Given a logic program P that is acyclic w.r.t. a level mapping jj, a negative
de¯ned literal :N is called acyclic w.r.t. P and jj if the implication N ! false
is acyclic w.r.t. P and jj. A negative de¯ned literal is called acyclic w.r.t. P if
it is acyclic w.r.t. some level mapping.
² An Abductive Speci¯cation S is acyclic w.r.t. a level mapping jj if
1. SOKB is acyclic w.r.t. jj
2. all negative de¯ned literals in SOKB are acyclic w.r.t SOKB and jj
3. every implication in ICS is acyclic wrt SOKB and jj.
S is called acyclic if it is acyclic w.r.t. some level mapping.
² A query G to an abductive speci¯cation S where the S is acyclic w.r.t. some
level mapping jj, is called acyclic w.r.t. S and jj if every negative de¯ned literal
in G is acyclic w.r.t. SOKB and jj. S and G are then called acyclic w.r.t. jj.
An abductive speci¯cation S and a query G are called acyclic if they are acyclic
w.r.t. some level mapping.
Notice that the de¯nition of acyclic negative literal is slightly di®erent from the
IFF, because the SCIFF proof procedure does not rewrite all negative literals :N69
to N ! false, but only the negative de¯ned literals, while abducibles have explicit
negation [86], and constraints depend on the solver (for example, :(A < B) is typi-
cally rewritten as A ¸ B). Thus, literals :E, :EN and :c (where c is a constraint)
are always acyclic.
Termination properties
We state the theorem of termination for a \static version of SCIFF proof-procedure,
i.e., for a version of SCIFF that does not have Happening, non-Happening, and
closure transitions. In other words, we proved termination for a version of SCIFF
provided with a static history.
Theorem 2.6.3 (Termination of static SCIFF).
Let G be a query to a society S, where SOKB, ICS and G are acyclic w.r.t. some
level mapping, and G and all implications in ICS bounded w.r.t. the level-mapping.
Then, every SCIFF derivation for G, where transitions Happening, non-happening,
and closure are not applied, for each instance of S is ¯nite.
The termination for the dynamic case (i.e., where happening events can happen
dynamically at run-time, and hence happening/non-happening transitions can be
applied in any order), we need to assert two further assumptions. The ¯rst states
that the new events will arrive only when the SCIFF is in a stable state (i.e., new
events are considered only if no other transition is applicable).
De¯nition 2.6.9 A SCIFF derivation has a slow happening rate if happening tran-
sitions apply only if no other transition is applicable.70
Non happening transitions are applicable only after closure of the history. We will
assume that after closure of the history, non happening is applied as soon as possible
(this can be seen as a preprocessing):
De¯nition 2.6.10 A SCIFF derivation has non happening high priority if, whenever
non happening is applicable, it is indeed applied.
We can now state our termination theorem for SCIFF:
Theorem 2.6.4 (Termination of SCIFF). Let G be a query to a society S, where
SOKB, ICS and G are acyclic w.r.t. some level mapping, and G and all implications
in ICS bounded w.r.t. the level-mapping.
Then, every SCIFF derivation with high priority for non happening and with slow
happening rate for G, starting from an initial history HAP
i ending in a (possibly
closed) ¯nite ¯nal history HAP
f is ¯nite.
2.6.3 Completeness of the SCIFF Proof Procedure
In the following we state the completeness results that have been achieved, respec-
tively for the open and closed case. We do not present the proofs: the interested
reader can refer to [83].
Theorem 2.6.5 (Open Completeness).
Given an open society instance SHAP, and a (ground) goal G, for any set of ground
abducibles, ¢ = EXP[¢A, such that SHAP¼¢G then 9¢0 such that S;»HAP
¢0 G with
an expectation answer (¢0;¾) such that ¢0¾ µ ¢.71
Completeness in the open case states that if goal G is achievable in an open
society instance under the abducible set ¢, then an open successful derivation can
be obtained for G, possibly computing a set ¢0 of the abducibles whose grounding
(according to the expectation answer) is a subset of ¢.
Theorem 2.6.6 (Closed Completeness).
Given a closed society instance SHAP, a (ground) goal G, for any set of ground
abducibles, ¢ = EXP [ ¢A such that SHAP j=¢ G then 9¢0 such that S; `HAP
¢0 G
with an expectation answer (¢0;¾) such that ¢0¾ µ ¢.
Completeness in the closed case states that if goal G is achieved in a closed society
instance under the abducible set ¢, then a closed successful derivation can be obtained
for G, possibly computing a set ¢0 of the abducibles whose grounding (according to
the expectation answer) is a subset of ¢.72
2.7 Related Works
In this section we relate the SCIFF framework with other relevant work of literature.
We will focus on other ALP frameworks and on other applications of computational
logic to multi-agent systems. We do not intend to give an exhaustive account of the
work done, but we will only touch the most closely related proposals and focus on
the di®erences with respect with our own work.
2.7.1 ALP frameworks
By reading Kakas and colleagues' survey on ALP [96], one will be impressed by the
amount of work done on this topic. We will try to relate our work with some of the
most in°uential proposal of literature, although we are aware that many others will
have to be left out.
Kakas and Mancarella [97] de¯ne a proof procedure (herein and below referred
to as KM) for ALP, building on previous work by Eshghi and Kowalski [72]. KM
assumes that the integrity constraints are in the form of denials, with at least one
abducible literal in the conditions.6 The semantics given by KM to the integrity
constraints is that at least one of the literals in the integrity constraint must be false
(otherwise, procedurally, false is derived). The procedure starts from a query and a
set of initial assumptions ¢i and results in a set of consistent hypotheses (abduced
literals) ¢o such that ¢o ¶ ¢i and ¢o together with the program P entails the
query. The proof procedure uses the notion of abductive and consistency derivations.
Intuitively, an abductive derivation is a standard SLD-derivation suitably extended
6The syntax of integrity constraints varies from framework to framework; while some frameworks
require integrity constraints to be denials of literals, this is not true of other frameworks, such as
SCIFF, and IFF, as we will see.73
in order to consider abducibles. As soon as an abducible atom ± is encountered which
does not already occur in the current set of hypotheses, it is added to the current
set of hypotheses, and it must be proved that any integrity constraint such that ±
uni¯es with an abducible in it is satis¯ed. For this purpose, a consistency derivation
for ± is started. Since the integrity constraints are denials only (i.e., queries), this
corresponds to proving that every such query fails to hold. Therefore, ± is removed
from all the denials with which it uni¯es, and it is proved that all the resulting queries
fail. In this consistency derivation, when an abducible is encountered, an abductive
derivation for its complement is started in order to prove the abducible's failure, so
that the initial integrity constraint is satis¯ed.
Operationally, in KM abducibles must be ground when they are considered by the
proof, and the procedure °ounders if a selected abducible is not ground. Moreover,
it treats constraint predicates, such as <;·;6=;:::, as ordinary predicates, thus being
unable to use specialized constraint solvers for such predicates. Therefore, extensions
to KM have been proposed to cope with such limitations. Notably, ACLP [98] ex-
tends KM to deal with non-ground abduction and with constraints. ACLP programs
can contain constraints on ¯nite domains. ACLP interleaves consistency checking of
abducible assumptions and constraint satisfaction.
Denecker and De Schreye [57, 59] introduce a proof procedure for normal abduc-
tive logic programs by extending SLDNF resolution to the case of abduction. The
procedure is called SLDNFA and it is correct with respect to the completion seman-
tics, and interestingly, it presents a crucial property: the treatment of non-ground
abductive queries. [57] does not consider general integrity constraints, but only con-
straints of the kind a;not a ) false. In later work [58], they propose adding integrity74
constraints by extending the program with rules false Ã :F, for each integrity con-
straint F; the literal :false is then added as an extra literal to the query. SLDNFA
has been extended towards CLP constraints handling, giving rise to SLDNFA(C)
[149].
The A-System [99] is a merger of ACLP and SLDNFA(C), but it di®ers from
them by its explicit treatment of non-determinism, which permits to perform heuristic
search with di®erent types of heuristics. Also A-System, like SCIFF, copes with non-
ground abduction.
The Active-KM proof procedure by Terreni et al. [110] integrates in the origi-
nal abductive computational scheme a limited but powerful type of implicative-form
integrity constraints. It supports forward reasoning via integrity constraints (implica-
tions) which ¯re when their conditions (body) are satis¯ed. However, this procedure
does not deal with non-ground abducibles.
The KM proof-procedure has been also used and extended in the context of MAS.
In particular, Ciampolini et al.'s ALIAS framework [46] and the LAILA language [47]
de¯ne mechanisms for the coordination of agent reasoning based on it.
Surely the most related abductive framework to SCIFF is Fung and Kowalski's
IFF proof-procedure [82], on which SCIFF is based. The IFF proof procedure uses
backward reasoning with the selective Clark completion [48] of the logic program7
to compute abductive explanations for given queries. Forward reasoning is applied
based on the conjunction of queries plus integrity constraints, which is done at the
beginning of the abductive process. The integrity constraints can be any (closed)
implications. The authors describe IFF as a sort of \hybrid of the proof procedure
7The term \selective" refers to the fact that IFF does completion, but only of non-abducible
predicates.75
of Console et al. [51] and the SLDNFA procedure of Denecker and De Schreye (see
[57])," mainly due to its use of the Clark completion semantics and because neither
of them requires a safe selection rule for abducibles and negation.
IFF has been used to model the rational part of logic-based agents, since Kowalski
and Sadri's seminal paper [102], and in further developments and re¯nements [103,
131, 106]. SCIFF also applies ALP to the context of MAS, but di®erently from other
work it does it at the social level, its initial purpose being to perform the compliance
check of externally observable agent behaviour.
Recently, IFF has been re¯ned to deal with negation as failure in integrity con-
straints [130], and extended with the de¯nition of frameworks that treat abducibles
and constraints uniformly [105, 69]. This last work also presents an implementation
of IFF (the only one published, to the best of our knowledge), based on a meta-
interpreter. Although these extensions improve IFF in several aspects, none of them
handles universally quanti¯ed variables in abducible predicates, and of course do
not deal with expectations. Finally, SCIFF is implemented in CHR with attributed
variables, which is a considerably e±cient technology.
Given the CHR-based implementation of SCIFF, we will also mention Abden-
nadher and Christiansen's work [2], which further developed into the HYPROLOG
system [45]. HYPROLOG is not limited to abduction, but also encloses assump-
tive logic programming features. The abductive part of HYPROLOG, however, is
much more restrictive in scope than SCIFF: it has a limited use of negation, and
integrity constraints cannot involve de¯ned predicates (but only abducibles and built-
ins). Thanks to these simpli¯cations, the necessary machinery is much simpler than
the one used by SCIFF. A subset of the SCIFF language based on ideas similar to76
HYPROLOG has been implemented at the beginning of the SOCS project: this is
documented in [84, 11].
Finally, related to our work on ALP are the abductive query evaluation method
proposed by Satoh and Iwayama [134], and Abdual [16]: a system to perform abduc-
tion from extended logic programs grounded on the well-founded semantics. Abdual,
which relies on tabled evaluation inspired to SLG resolution [43], handles only ground
programs.
A little bit outside of ALP, but related to our work, Sergot [135] proposed a frame-
work, query-the-user, in which some of the predicates are labelled as \askable"; the
truth of askable atoms can be asked to the user. Our E predicates may be under-
stood as information asking, while H atoms may be considered as new information
provided during search. However, di®erently from Sergot's query-the-user, SCIFF
is not intended to be used interactively, but rather to provide a means to generate
and to reason upon generated expectations, be them positive or negative. Moreover,
SCIFF presents expectations in the context of an abductive framework (integrating
them with other abducibles). Hypotheses con¯rmation was studied also by Kakas
and Evans [74], where hypotheses can be corroborated or refuted by matching them
with observable atoms: an explanation fails to be corroborated if some of its logical
consequences are not observed. The authors suggest that their framework could be
extended to take into account dynamic events, possibly, queried to the user: \this
form of reasoning might bene¯t from the use of a query-the-user facility". In a sense,
our work can be considered as a merger and extension of these works: it has con¯r-
mation of hypotheses, as in corroboration, and it provides an operational semantics
for dynamically incoming events, as in query-the-user.77
Also related to reasoning with dynamic incoming events are two additional works,
which we brie°y mention before we conclude this roundup. Speculative Computation
[133] is a propositional framework for a multi-agent setting with unreliable commu-
nication. When an agent asks a query, it also abduces a default answer; if the real
answer arrives within a deadline, the hypothesis is (dis-)con¯rmed; otherwise the com-
putation continues with the default. In our work, expectations can be con¯rmed by
events, with a wider scope: they are not only questions, and they can have variables,
possibly constrained. The dynamics of incoming events can be seen as an instance
of an Evolving Logic Program [17]. In EvoLP, the knowledge base can change both
because of external events or because of internal results. SCIFF does not generate
new events, but only expectations about external events. Our focus is more on the
expressivity of the expectations than on the evolution of the knowledge base.
2.7.2 Computational Logic and societies of agents
To the best of our knowledge, the SOCS approach to agent societies, upon which
SCIFF found its main motivations, is the ¯rst attempt to use ALP to reason about
agent interaction at a social level. Many other logics have been proposed to repre-
sent richer social and institutional entities, such as normative systems and electronic
institutions. Here also the literature is broad, and slightly aside of the focus of this
thesis. However, our work shares some concepts with normative systems, being E
related with the O (obligation) operator of deontic logic [132], and EN with the F
(forbidden) operator.8 We enucleate similarities and di®erences in [12], and comment
8The reduction of deontic concepts such as obligations and prohibitions has been the subject of
several past works: notably, by [19] (according to which, informally, A is obligatory i® its absence
produces a state of violation) and by [112] (where, informally, an action A is prohibited i® its being
performed produces a state of violation).78
on the main di®erences between our approach and others based on social semantics
in a number of published papers [10, 13, 8]. Below we will only give a very synthetic
and by no means exhaustive account of work based on computational logic, applied
to agent interaction and social agent systems in the broader sense.
The social approach to the semantic characterization of agent interaction is adopted
by many researchers to allow for °exible, architecture-independent and veri¯able
protocol speci¯cation. Prominent schools, including Castelfranchi's [41], Singh et
al.'s [138, 155], and Colombetti et al.'s [79, 49, 50] indicate commitments as ¯rst class
entities in social agents, to represent the state of a®airs in the course of social agent
interaction. The resulting framework is more °exible than traditional approaches
to protocol speci¯cation, as it does not necessarily de¯ne action sequences, nor it
prescribes initial/¯nal states or necessary transitions.
In [155], a variant of the Event Calculus [71] is applied to commitment-based pro-
tocol speci¯cation. The semantics of messages (i.e., their e®ect on commitments) is
described by a set of operations whose semantics, in turn, is described by predicates
on events and °uents; in addition, commitments can evolve, independently of com-
municative acts, in relation to events and °uents as prescribed by a set of postulates.
Similarly, [79] de¯nes an operational speci¯cation of an ACL in an object-oriented
framework by means of the commitment class. A commitment represents an obliga-
tion for its debtor towards its creditor. A commitment is described by a ¯nite state
automaton, whose states (which can take the values of empty, pre-commitment, can-
celed, conditional, active, ful¯lled and violated) can change by application of methods
of the commitment class, or of rules triggered by external conditions. The semantics
of communicative acts is speci¯ed in terms of methods to be applied to a commitment79
when a communicative act is issued. The use of the SOCS framework for the social
semantic speci¯cation of agent interaction protocols has been discussed in [10].
Artikis et al. [24] present a theoretical framework for providing executable speci¯-
cations of particular kinds of multi-agent systems, called open computational societies,
and present a formal framework for specifying, animating and ultimately reasoning
about and verifying the properties of systems where the behaviour of the members
and their interactions cannot be predicted in advance. Three key components of
computational systems are speci¯ed, namely the social constraints, social roles and
social states. The speci¯cations of these concepts is based on and motivated by the
formal study of legal and social systems (a goal of the ALFEBIITE project), and
therefore operators of Deontic Logic are used for expressing legal social behaviour of
agents [153, 145]. ALFEBIITE has investigated the application of formal models of
norm-governed activity to the de¯nition, management and regulation of interactions
between info-habitants in the information society. Their logical framework comprises
a set of building blocks (including doxastic, deontic and praxeologic notions) as well
as composite notions (including deontic right, power, trust, role and signalling acts).
Di®erently from [24] (and from other work on normative systems), we do not
explicitly represent concepts such as institutional power of the society members and
validity of action. Instead, permitted are all social events that do not determine
a violation, i.e., all events that are not explicitly forbidden are allowed. Permission
instead, if explicitly needed, is mapped the negation of a negative expectation (:EN).
[129] provides a ¯rst-order framework of deontic reasoning that can model and
compute social regulations and norms, and among the organizational models, [60, 62,
61] exploit deontic logic to specify the society norms and rules. Several papers discuss80
\sub-ideal" situations, i.e., how to manage situations in which some of the norms are
not respected. For instance, [146] show the relation between diagnostic reasoning
and deontic logic, importing the \principle of parsimony" from diagnostic reasoning
into their deontic system, in the form of a requirement to minimize the number
of violations. [121] proposes a solution to the problem and paradoxes stemming
from earlier logical representations of contrary-to-duty obligations, i.e., obligations
that become active when other obligations are violated. The Interactive Maryland
Platform for Agents Collaborating Together (IMPACT) [22, 67] also uses deontic
operators: not to describe social stances, but to program intelligent agents.Chapter 3
Verifying Compliance by
Observation: the SOCS-SI tool
In this Chapter we present how the components of the SCIFF Framework have been
exploited to practically apply the Type 2 veri¯cation (Section 1.2) to Multi Agent
Systems (MAS).
In particular, we present the SOCS-SI software tool (SI stands for Society Infras-
tructure): developed within the SOCS project, it has been extended to cope also with
other scenarios than the initial MAS setting.
The key aspect of Type 2 Veri¯cation is that in heterogenous systems (like the
ones we are considering), it is not reasonable to assume that agents/peers internals
are accessible. Therefore any veri¯cation process should be made on the observable
behaviour, from an external viewpoint. The SCIFF Proof Procedure (Section 2.5)
already considered this viewpoint by taking in account the dynamic happening of
events. The SOCS-SI tool uses the proof procedure to perform the reasoning (for the
veri¯cation purposes), and provide monitoring facilities for accessing the external,
observable behaviour.
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Contribution of the author. The author contributed in a substantial way to the
content of this chapter, and in particular to the development of the SOCS-SI tool.
all the performances test on the SCIFF Proof Procedure and on the SOCS-SI have
been done in collaboration with Marco Alberti. Finally, the examples presented at
the end of the chapter are the result of the collaboration with all the research group.
Chapter organization. The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 we
describe the software SOCS-SI, while in Section 3.2 we discuss some performances
results obtained through experimentation, on the proof procedure alone and in con-
junction with the SOCS-SI tool.
Finally, in Section 3.3 we present few application examples of conformance veri¯-
cation on the observable behaviour of peers.83
3.1 The SOCS-SI tool
The implementation of the SOCS-SI tool for compliance veri¯cation of agent inter-
action is composed of an implementation of the proof-procedure described in Section
2.5, interfaced to a Graphical User Interface and to a component for the observa-
tion of agent interaction. The SOCS-SI software application is composed of a set of
modules. All the components except the proof-procedure have been implemented in
the JAVA language. The core of SOCS-SI is composed of three main modules (see
Fig. 3.1), namely:
² Event Recorder: fetches events from di®erent sources and stores them inside
the History Manager.
² History Manager: receives events from the Event Recorder and composes them
into an \event history".
² Social Compliance Veri¯er: fetches events from the History Manager and passes
them on to the proof-procedure in order to check the compliance of the history
to the speci¯cation. It receives the expectations from the proof-procedure and
visualizes them in the GUI.84
In our model, agents communicate by exchanging messages, which are then trans-
lated into H events. The Event Recorder fetches events and records them into the
History Manager, where they become available to the proof-procedure (see Section
2.5). As soon as the proof-procedure is ready to process a new event, it fetches one
from the History Manager. The event is processed and the results of the computa-
tion are returned to the GUI. The proof-procedure then continues its computation
by fetching another event if there is any available, otherwise it suspends, waiting for
new events.
A fourth module, named Init&Control Module provides for initialisation of all
the components in the proper order. It receives as initial input a set of protocols
de¯ned by the user, which will be used by the proof-procedure in order to check the
compliance of agents to the speci¯cation.
The JAVA-PROLOG Interface
The main task of the JAVA portion of the Social Compliance Veri¯er is to interact
with the proof-procedure. The SICStus Runtime libraries are accessed from JAVA
using the Jasper package and native interfaces. All data exchanged between the
JAVA side and the PROLOG program is translated into String objects. In order to
process and ¯lter the String objects, JAVA regular expressions are extensively used.
These expressions are de¯ned in a con¯guration ¯le, loaded at initialisation time.
Our software application can deal with di®erent proof-procedure implementations
and with di®erent ACL performatives, without any a priori assumption about the
format of the exchanged parameters. It is su±cient to properly re-de¯ne the regular
expressions in the con¯g ¯le, and a new proof-procedure can be easily integrated into
the software application.85
The Recorder Interface
The Event Recorder fetches events from the external world using modules, each mod-
ule being specialised for a speci¯c source. We developed modules for interfacing with
various agent platforms, starting with PROSOCS [37]. We are currently experiment-
ing with other platforms: we had some successful experiments with JADE [32] and
TuCSoN [125], and with checking compliance of e-mail messages. For testing and
debugging purposes, we also developed modules to interact with the user prompt,
as well as with the ¯le system; it is possible to add as many specialised modules as
desired, provided that they implement the interface RecorderInterface. In order to
integrate our application with an already existing platform the user should:
1. create a JAVA class that implements the RecorderInterface
2. select it as message source during the application con¯guration (either through
the con¯guration GUI, or by modifying the con¯g ¯le).
The RecorderInterface that we propose de¯nes three methods, where the class
SOCSEvent is our internal representation of events:
² public SOCSEvent listen(). Returns an instance of the SOCSEvent class if a
message is available, or it waits (suspends) until a message arrives.
² public long speak(SOCSEvent aMsg). Gives our application the capability
to communicate with agents, by sending a message. It returns the time the
message is sent.
² public long getTime(). Returns the current time. It is used to check tem-
poral deadlines.86
Figure 3.1: A screenshot of the application
The RecorderInterface has originally been de¯ned as a subset of the low level
communication API de¯ned in the PROSOCS platform, which is used to perform
controlled experiments in the context of global computing applications, within the
SOCS project. However, one of the design speci¯cations we strove to obtain was
to have an interface general enough to allow integration with most agents platforms
currently available.
The Graphical User Interface
The Graphical User Interface is implemented by using the Swing graphic library,
and implements the Model-View-Control programming pattern. The main window is
composed of three areas (or sub-windows), and of a button bar containing the con-
trols (Figure 3.1). The bottom area contains the list of all the messages received by
the SOCS-SI: the next message to be processed by the proof-procedure is empha-
sised (in Fig. 3.1 it is the third row, which is darker). The area on the left contains87
the list of agents known by the society, i.e., agents that have performed at least one
communicative action (coherently with the notion of openness by Davidsson [54]).
The larger frame on the right contains the proof state, i.e., the results of the com-
putation, returned by the proof-procedure. These results are expressed in terms of
society expectations about the future behaviour of agents, and also in terms of ful-
¯lled expectations and violations of social rules. By selecting an agent from the left
pane, it is possible to restrict the information shown on the larger pane to be only
that which is relevant to that particular agent. Among other features, it is possible to
execute the application step-by-step, so that it elaborates one message at a time and
then waits for a user acknowledge (similarly to debugger interfaces). Protocols are
loaded into the tool by means of a button; they are simply provided as text ¯les with
a syntax strictly adherent to the formal one presented earlier. Finally, a tree-view of
the whole computation is provided (Figure 3.2); interestingly, the shown tree bears
both an operational and a logical interpretation. The operational interpretation is
an intuitive graphical form of a log-¯le, showing the most signi¯cant computational
steps, useful for debugging purposes. The logical meaning is an or-tree of the possible
derivations timed by the incoming events. For each incoming event that enriches the
knowledge base, the frontier of the explored proof-tree (which is a logical disjunction,
as in various proof-procedures [82]) is shown. The user can inspect each of the nodes,
and see in the main window the state of the computation, i.e., the tuple given in
Eq. (2.5.4). The tuple is logically a conjunction of logical formulae of the types in
the SCIFF language: abducibles, constraints, literals, implications. Presentation of
the frontier of the derivation tree is important for explanation reasons. Typically,
logic languages can provide two types of answers: a success/failure answer and an88
Figure 3.2: The Logic OR-Tree
explanation answer. In case of success, logic languages explain why: PROLOG re-
turns simply a binding for the variables in the goal, CLP can return also constraints,
and ALP (Abductive Logic Programming) returns a set of abducibles, just to name a
few. But in case of failure, there is typically no explanation. The tree-view provides
information also in case of failure: the set of failing nodes. In each node, the GUI
shows underlined the cause of failure (e.g., a violated expectation or an unsatis¯able
CLP constraint).89
3.2 Performances of SCIFF and SOCS-SI
In this section we present some tests e have conducted, in order to better understand-
ing the computational time required by SCIFF/SOCS-SI to process some simple pro-
tocols and histories.The aim of this group of tests is not to establish absolute values
about performances, but rather to understand how the computation time required
to provide an answer is a®ected by changes in the length of the history processed
(Section 3.2.1), and by changes in the alternatives dialogues allowed by the protocol
(Section 3.2.2). The last experiment in particular roughly corresponds to increasing
the breadth of the search tree explored by SCIFF, whether the former corresponds
to increasing the depth of the tree.
The output considered is only the computational time required to elaborate an
answer. For test instances of certain dimension (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2), it was not
possible to achieve the completion of the test, mainly for limitations of the hardware.
This condition is expressed by placing a question mark in the results tables, instead
of a value.
Qualitatively, the computational complexity of SCIFF can be evaluated as follows.
Each SCIFF computation produces a search tree whose depth and breadth determine
the total number of nodes, and thus the time needed to explore the (whole) tree. As
the proof tree is explored by SCIFF in a depth-¯rst fashion, the depth of the tree,
together with the size of a single node, also impacts on space requirements. For both
time and space, the worst case is when each branch leads to failure, because in this
case the whole tree is explored in search of a success node.
Intuitively, the depth of the search tree depends on the total number of events
(the facts added dynamically to the knowledge base).90
The breadth of the search tree, instead, is in°uenced by both the number of dis-
juncts in the head of the SCIFF integrity constraints, and the alternative branches
arising in several of the SCIFF transitions. For example, one of the branches gen-
erated by the transition Ful¯llment can be safely pruned, provided that the set ICS
respects some syntactic conditions, whose discussion is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. In such cases, it is possible to optimize the performance of SCIFF by reducing
the number of generated branches. In this paper, we call this optimized SCIFF be-
haviour f-deterministic, as opposed to the f-non-deterministic, which does not perform
the pruning.
In the following, we present three tests: the ¯rst and the second test (Sections
3.2.1 and 3.2.2) uses meaningless protocols speci¯cation, with the only purposes of
understanding how the depth and the breadth of the search tree a®ect the required
computational time. In Section 3.2.3 instead a third test is presented, where a mean-
ingful protocol speci¯cation (a combinatorial auction) is taken as the playground for
stressing the SCIFF Proof Procedure. All the tests were designed to provide a posi-
tive answer by the SCIFFProof Procedure, and were executed on a PC with a 2 GHz
Pentium IV CPU, 512 MB of RAM, Windows XP Professional Edition and SICStus
Prolog 3.10.1.
3.2.1 Increasing the depth of the explored derivation tree
In order to evaluate the impact of histories of various length on the SCIFF Proof
Procedure and on SOCS-SI, we have considered a very simple protocol, presented in
the Speci¯cation 3.2.1, along with the history used to test it. The considered results,
presented in Table 3.1, are the time required to the proof procedure and to SOCS-SI
respectively to elaborate the histories of various length, and to provide the expected91
positive answer. The used protocol does not contain any alternative (disjunction) in
the head of the rule: each time an appropriate event is processed, a new expectation is
generated and, if possible, ful¯lled. The parameter varied was the number of messages
(events) composing each history, and results are shown in Table 3.1.
Speci¯cation 3.2.1 The protocol and the histories used for testing when increasing
the depth of the search tree.
IC1 :
H(tell(A;B;aQuestion(aParameter);D);T)
! E(tell(B;A;anAnswer(aParameter);D);T1) ^
T1 ¸ T
HAP :
tell(a;b;aQuestion(aParameter);d1;1)
tell(b;a;anAnswer(aParameter);d1;1)
tell(a;b;aQuestion(aParameter);d2;2)
tell(b;a;anAnswer(aParameter);d2;2)
:::
tell(a;b;aQuestion(aParameter);dx;x)
tell(b;a;anAnswer(aParameter);dx;x)
Due to the simplicity of the protocol used it is not correct to assume the results as
meaningful in their absolute values. However, the test shows two signi¯cant aspects
about the behavior of the proof and of SOCS-SI. First of all, the time required to
elaborate longer histories increases in an almost quadratic way, as it is possible to
observe in Figure 3.3. Secondly, the SOCS-SI has a big impact on performances,
with respect to SCIFF running without a GUI. Not only does SOCS-SI lower the
maximum number of processable events before an \Out{of{Memory" error, but also
the performances are worsened, with a factor that is not constant, but that tends to
increase.92
Table 3.1: Testing performances of SCIFF Proof Procedure and SOCS-SI while in-
creasing the depth of the search tree.
No. of Messages SOCS-SI Time(sec.) SCIFF Proof Time(sec.)
2 0,13 0,42
4 0,18 0,43
20 0,68 0,51
30 0,98 0,51
50 1,82 0,57
100 6,13 0,76
150 13,13 0,97
200 21,68 1,35
250 33 1,62
300 47,05 1,99
400 82,47 3,00
1000 ? 12,16
2000 ? 41,21
3000 ? 92,56
4000 ? 165,89
5000 ? 259,02
Figure 3.3: Performances with histories of increasing length.
3.2.2 Increasing the breadth of the exploration tree
The purpose of this test is to understand how the performance of the SCIFF Proof
and SOCS-SI changes if the breadth of the search tree increases. Here we vary the93
Speci¯cation 3.2.2 The protocol and the history used for testing when increasing
the breadth of the derivation tree.
IC1 :
H(tell(A;B;aQuestion(aParameter);D);T)
! E(tell(B;A;answer1(aParameter);D);T1) ^
T1 ¸ T
_ E(tell(B;A;answer2(aParameter);D);T2) ^
T2 ¸ T
_ :::
_ E(tell(B;A;end(aParameter);D);Tx) ^
Tx ¸ T
HAP :
tell(a;b;aQuestion(aParameter);d1;1)
tell(b;a;end(aParameter);d1;2)
close history.
protocol de¯nition by increasing the number of disjuncts in the head of an Integrity
Constraint; the history used, instead, is of a ¯xed length. The protocol, presented in
Speci¯cation 3.2.2, is again a simple one: a subscript x indicates the total number of
disjuncts. The history has been thought in order to ful¯ll the protocol only w.r.t. the
expectation presented in the last disjunction. Since the SCIFF Proof explores the
search tree by expanding the possible branches following the order of occurrence of the
disjuncts in the integrity constraint, this history forces the SCIFF Proof Procedure
to explore all the tree. The results obtained are presented in the Table 3.2.
Again, the absolute values are not really meaningful, due to the to simplicity of
the protocol used. However, the results show that the time requirements increase with
a almost quadratic coe±cient w.r.t. the increasing of the disjunctions in the protocol.
In Figure 3.4 it is possible to appreciate the overhead introduced by the SOCS-SI,94
suggesting how much the GUI impacts on the overall performances.
Table 3.2: Testing performances of the SCIFF Proof Procedure and SOCS-SI while
increasing the depth of the derivation tree.
No. of Messages SOCS-SI Time(sec.) SCIFF Proof Time(sec.)
2 0,032 0,015
5 0,047 0,016
10 0,093 0,031
20 0,219 0,063
30 0,375 0,109
40 0,578 0,188
50 0,859 0,282
100 2,813 0,921
200 10,968 3,360
300 25,423 7,516
400 46,390 12,937
500 71,496 19,875
1000 ? 111,750
Figure 3.4: Performances with protocols with increasing number of alternatives.
We did not test how performances could have changed using the f-deterministic
version of SCIFF. In fact, in this dummy scenario, it has no sense to introduce95
knowledge about the domain, and thus it is not possible to take advantage of the
f-deterministic SCIFF.
3.2.3 Tests in a real scenario
In this section, we show some experimental results obtained applying the SCIFF Proof
Procedure to the veri¯cation of compliance to the combinatorial auction protocols
(described in [6]).
There exist di®erent kinds of auctions. For this test, we consider single unit
reverse auctions. In a single unit auction, the auctioneer wants to sell a set M of
goods/tasks maximizing the pro¯t. Goods are distinguishable. Each bidder j posts
a bid Bj where a set Sj of goods/tasks S µ M is proposed to be bought at the price
pj, i.e., Bj = (Sj;pj). The single unit reverse auction is a single unit auction where
the auctioneer wants to buy and bidders are suppliers. The protocol de¯nition for
the auction is given in Speci¯cation 3.2.3.
While not being an exhaustive experimentation, the results show the e®ect on the
time costs of SCIFF of the breadth and depth of the search tree. The tests have been
performed varying the following parameters:
1. SCIFF version (f-non-deterministic vs. f-deterministic);
2. the abductive program used. Speci¯cation 3.2.3 shows two versions of the IC
4, which are semantically equivalent (i.e., an agent behaviour that respects
one will respect the other, and vice-versa), but are veri¯ed by SCIFF in a
computationally di®erent way. IC4b expresses with a disjunction in the head
that the auctioneer can either declare a bid winning (¯rst disjunct) or declare
it losing (second disjunct). Instead in IC4a this alternative is expressed by96
Speci¯cation 3.2.3 Combinatorial Auction
IC1 :
H(tell(B;A;bid(ItemList;P);D);Tbid)
!E(tell(A;B;openauction(Items;Tend;Tdeadline);D);Topen)
^ Topen < Tbid ^ Tbid · Tend:
IC2 :
H(tell(A;B;openauction(Items;Tend;Tdeadline);D);T1)
^ H(tell(B;A;bid(ItemBids;P);D); )
^ not included(ItemBid;Items)
!E(tell(A;B;answer(lose;B;ItemBids;P);D); ):
IC3 :
H(tell(A;B;openauction(Items;Tend;Tdeadline);D);Topen)
!E(tell(A;B;closeauction;D);Tend):
IC4a :
H(tell(B;A;bid(ItemList;P);D);Tbid)
^ H(tell(A;B;openauction(Items;Tend;Tdeadline);D);Topen)
!E(tell(A;B;answer(X;S;ItemList;P);D);Tanswer)
^ Tanswer > Tend ^ Tanswer < Tdeadline ^ X :: [win;lose]:
IC4b :
H(tell(B;A;bid(ItemList;P);D);Tbid)
^ H(tell(A;B;openauction(Items;Tend;Tdeadline);D);Topen)
!E(tell(A;B;answer(win;S;ItemList;P);D);Tanswer)
^ Tanswer > Tend ^ Tanswer < Tdeadline
_E(tell(A;B;answer(lose;S;ItemList;P);D);Tanswer)
^ Tanswer > Tend ^ Tanswer < Tdeadline:
IC5 :
H(tell(A;B;answer(lose;S;ItemList;P);D); )
!EN(tell(A;B;answer(win;S;ItemList;P);D); ):
IC6 :
H(tell(A;B1;answer(win;B1;ItemList;P);D); )
^ H(tell(B2;A;bid(ItemList0;P);D);Tbid)
^ B1 6= B2 ^ intersect(ItemList;ItemList0)
!EN(tell(A;B2;answer(win;B2;ItemList0;P0);D); ):
SOKB :
included([]; ):
included([HjT];L) : ¡member(H;L);included(T;L):
intersect([Xj ];L) : ¡member(X;L):
intersect([ jTx];L) : ¡intersect(Tx;L):
means of a domain variable: intuitively, the auctioneer must declare each bid
Answer, where Answer can be either win or lose. Operationally, in the ¯rst case,97
two branches are generated by SCIFF; in the second case, only one branch is
generated and the binding of the domain variable is delayed.
In particular, we measure the computation time for sequences of auctions with dif-
ferent numbers of bidders in the two following implementations of the protocol:
1. f-non-deterministic SCIFF, protocol with disjunction (which we call the ¯rst
setup of SCIFF and protocol);
2. f-deterministic SCIFF, protocol with no disjunction (which we call the second
setup of SCIFF and protocol).
The protocols have been run by varying the number N of bidders, in two di®erent
cases.
² In each run of the ¯rst case:
1. the auctioneer sends an openauction message to each of the N bidders;
2. each of the N bidders places a bid;
3. the auctioneer issues a closeauction message to each of the N bidders;
4. the auctioneer noti¯es each of the N bidders with either a win or a lose
message,
thus resulting in 4N total messages exchanged.
² In each run of the second case, the last noti¯cation to one of the bidders is
missing, thus resulting in a violation of the protocol and 4N ¡1 total messages.98
Table 3.3: Combinatorial Auction case 1: Ful¯llment
f-non-deterministic,disjunction f-deterministic,domain
Bidders Time(sec.) Bidders Time(sec.)
5 1 5 1
10 1 10 1
15 2 15 2
20 3 20 6
25 4 25 8
30 6 30 10
35 9 35 15
40 10 40 18
45 12 45 23
50 21 50 30
Figure 3.5: Proof performance on a basic auction (compliant)
In case of ful¯llment (see Table 3.3), the ¯rst setup of SCIFF and protocol seems
to scale well with the number of bidders and, in fact, it achieves better execution
timing than the second (also shown in Fig. 3.5).
This is basically due to the fact that the chosen setup of interactions directly leads
to a successful SCIFF derivation, and only one branch of the tree is explored.99
Table 3.4: Combinatorial Auction case 2: Violation
f-non-deterministic,disjunction f-deterministic,domain
Bidders Time(sec.) Bidders Time(sec.)
3 7 3 0
4 55 4 0
5 ? 5 0
10 ? 10 1
15 ? 15 3
20 ? 20 4
25 ? 25 7
30 ? 30 10
35 ? 35 14
40 ? 40 17
45 ? 45 22
50 ? 50 26
In the case of violation (see Table 3.4), however, the ¯rst setup of SCIFF and
protocol explodes for a very small number of bidders. The experiment with 5 bidders
was suspended since this did not reach the answer of violation after several minutes
of computing time; no experiments were performed with a higher number of bidders,
which would have made things even worse. The second setup (also shown in Fig.
3.6), instead, scales very well also in case of violation. In this case, a CLP(FD) solver,
written in CHR, directly manages the two alternative values for variable Answer.
The di®erence between the two setups of SCIFF and protocol becomes apparent
in the worst case (i.e., the case of violation) when the whole tree is explored. With
the ¯rst setup, the choice points left open in case of ful¯llment and the disjunctions
in the head of the integrity constraint make the number of nodes in the proof tree
explode even for small number of bidders. With the second setup, instead, the tree
has only one branch, and is thus explored in a reasonable time when the number of
bidders increases.100
Figure 3.6: Proof performance on a basic auction (non compliant)
3.3 Applications of the Run-time Conformance Ver-
i¯cation
In the following we present some real cases where we have successfully applied the
SCIFF Framework, and in particular the SOCS-SI tool. Several other scenarios
have been studied and correspondent protocols have been speci¯ed using our formal-
ism. The interested reader can refer to http://wikiai.deis.unibo.it/index.php?
title=SOCS_Protocol_Repository for an online protocol repository.
3.3.1 The Opening phase of the Transmission Control Pro-
tocol
The Transmission Control Protocol [124] is one of the most known and used protocols
for the transmission of data over an Internet Connection (over the IP protocol). It101
has been published in the 1981, and since then several di®erent implementations of
the protocol stack have been proposed, developed and deeply tested.
Recently, with the advent of the \third generation" of mobile phones, the use of
the TCP protocol has been adopted for supporting application protocols over radio
connections, from the core network of the telecommunication providers to the user
terminals. Each phone maker has equipped its products with its own TCP imple-
mentation.
Since some details of the TCP protocol have not been completely speci¯ed, it can
happen that di®erent phones exhibit slightly di®erent behaviours when connecting
to the core networks of telecommunications providers. In collaboration with one
provider, we have formalized the opening phase of the TCP protocol, and we have
studied the logs of the connections with SOCS-SI. Main objective of the analysis was
to (possibly) identify non-compliances between the behaviour of the peers (traced in
the form of event logs) and the formalization (based on SCIFF) of the protocol.
We present here the ICs regarding the \three-way handshaking" open modality,
that can be summarized as follows:
1. a peer A sends to another peer B a syn segment;
2. B replies by acknowledging (with a ack segment) A's syn segment, and by
sending a syn segment;
3. A acknowledges B's syn segment with a ack segment, and starts sending data.
Speci¯cation 3.3.1 shows how the opening phase has been represented by means
of the SCIFF Language. In particular, IC1 says that if A sends to B a syn segment,
whose sequence number is NSynA, then B is expected to send to A an ack segment,102
Speci¯cation 3.3.1 The Three-way Handshake opening phase of the TCP Protocol
IC1 :
H(tell(A;B;tcp(syn;null;NSynA;AckNumber);D);T1)
!E(tell(B;A;tcp(syn;ack;NSynB;NSynAAck);D);T2)
^ NSynAAck = NSynA + 1 ^ T2 > T1:
IC2 :
H(tell(A;B;tcp(syn;null;NSynA;AckNumber);D);T1)
^ H(tell(B;A;tcp(syn;ack;NSynB;NSynAAck);D);T2)
^ T2 > T1 ^ NSynAAck = NSynA + 1
!E(tell(A;B;tcp(null;ack;NSynAAck;NSynBAck);D);T3)
^ T3 > T2 ^ NSynBAck = NSynB + 1:
IC3 :
H(tell(A;B;tcp(syn;null;NSynA;ANY );D);T1)
^ ta(TA)
!EN(tell(A;B;tcp(syn;null;NSynA;ANY );D);T2)
^ T2 < T1 ^ T2 > T1 ¡ TA:
SOKB :
ta(1000msec):
whose acknowledgment number is NSynA + 1, at a later time. Moreover (three way
handshake), B is expected to send (within the same message) a syn with another
sequence number NSynB.
IC2 says that, if the previous two messages have been exchanged, then A is expected
to send to B an ack segment acknowledging B's syn segment, and with acknowledge-
ment number is NSynB + 1, where NSynB is the sequence number of B's syn.
The opening phase (restricted to the three way handshake) would be completely
speci¯ed by the integrity constraints IC1 and IC2. However, within the collabora-
tion with a telecom provider, some domain experts explicitly required to focus our
attention on a problem they had previously spotted. The TCP protocol de¯nition
[124] explicitly states that if a ¯rst syn message has been sent and no ackmessage103
has been received, it is allowed to repeat the initial syn message. Unfortunately, the
speci¯cation does not specify the minimum time interval between each transmission
of a syn message.
As a consequence, the follow situation can happen: a fast peer A send a syn
message to a slower peer B. B's answer is delayed because its computational load
is very high. As a consequence, A starts to re-transmit the syn message, causing
problems to B (typically, a denial of service). In order to verify this hypothesis, the
integrity constraint IC3 has been added.
Speci¯cation 3.3.1 has been used to check the correctness of the interaction be-
tween mobile phones and a central server, taking the history from a log ¯le. Evidence
has been found that, after an initial syn message and no ack received, di®erent mobile
phones retransmit a syn with di®erent timings (depending on di®erent implementa-
tions). If the server does not answer rapidly enough, certain mobile phones repeats
the syn message causing a denial of service on the server side. The use of the SCIFF
tools to this scenario has provided two results:
1. it was proved on the logs that a behaviour of certain mobile phones was respon-
sible for the server problems (indeed human experts had already hypothesized
the problem, but a punctual proof was appreciated);
2. it allowed to identify which phones exhibited that particular behaviour, paving
the way for elaborating di®erent solutions;
3. it allowed to establish a minimum time interval between each syn transmission;
then this minimum time interval was used to de¯ne the Quality of Service (QoS)
for the core network.104
3.3.2 Run-Time Veri¯cation of Web Services Choreographies
Service Oriented Architectures (SOA) have recently emerged as a new paradigm for
structuring inter-/intra- business information processes. While SOA is indeed a set of
principles, methodologies and architectural patterns, a more practical instance of SOA
can be identi¯ed in the Web Services technology, where the business functionalities
are encapsulated in software components, and can be invoked through a stack of
Internet Standards.
The standardization process of the Web Service technology is at a good matura-
tion point: in particular, the W3C Consortium has proposed standards for developing
basic services and for interconnecting them on a point-to-point basis. These standards
have been widely accepted; vendors like Microsoft and IBM are supporting the tech-
nology within their development tools; private ¯rms are already developing solutions
for their business customer, based on the web services paradigm. However, the needs
for more sophisticated standards for service composition have not yet fully satis¯ed.
Several attempts have been made (WSFL, XLang, BPML, WSCL, WSCI), leading
to two dominant initiatives: BPEL [20] and WS-CDL [151].
Both these initiatives however have missed to tackle some important issues. We
agree with the view [28, 144] that both BPEL and WS-CDL languages lack of declar-
ativeness, and more dangerous, they both lack an underlying formal model and se-
mantics. Hence, issues like run-time conformance testing, composition veri¯cation,
veri¯cation of properties are not fully addressed by the current proposals. Also se-
mantics issues, needed in order to verify more complex properties (besides properties
like livelock, deadlock, leak freedom, etc.), have been left behind.
Some of these issues have been already subject of research: generally, a mapping105
between choreographed/orchestrated models to speci¯c formalisms is proposed, and
then single issues are solved in the transformed model. E.g., the composition veri¯-
cation is addressed in [27, 100]; process mining and a-posteriori conformance testing
are addressed in [143]; livelock, deadlock, etc. properties are tackled in [116, 127].
Taking inspiration by the many analogies between the Web Services research ¯eld
and the Multi Agent System (MAS) ¯eld [27], we have used the SCIFF Framework
for verifying at run-time (or a-posteriori using an event log) if the peers behave
in a conformant manner w.r.t. a given choreography. Global choreographies have
been de¯ned by means of abductive speci¯cations, and the conformance veri¯cation
(also called run-time behaviour conformance in [28]) of the interactions have been
performed by means of SOCS-SI.
To our purposes, let us consider a revised version of the choreography proposed in
[28]. The choreography (shown in Figure 3.7) models a 3-party interaction, in which
a supplier coordinates with its warehouse in order to sell and ship electronic devices.
Due to some laws, the supplier should trade only with customers who do not belong
to a publicly known list of banned countries.
The choreography starts when a Customer communicates a purchase order to the
Supplier. Supplier reacts to this request asking the Warehouse about the availabil-
ity of the ordered item. Once Supplier has received the response, it decides to cancel
or con¯rm the order, basing this choice upon Item's availability and Customer's
country. In the former case, the choreography terminates, whereas in the latter one a
concurrent phase is performed: Customer sends an order payment, while Warehouse
handles the item's shipment. When both the payment and the shipment con¯rmation106
Customer Supplier
Order Item
send PO to Supplier
Conﬁrm Order
send PO acceptance 
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Check Stock
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receive availability from Warehouse
OK not(OK)
Cancel Order
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Make Payment
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Get Shipment Details
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Conﬁrm Shipment
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Supplier
Receipt Delivery
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Figure 3.7: A Choreography example taken from [28]
are received by Supplier, it delivers a ¯nal receipt to the Customer. The speci¯ca-
tion of this choreography is given in Speci¯cation 3.3.2. The events are represented
in the form msgType(sender;receiver;content1;:::;contentn), where the msgType,
sender, receiver and contenti retain their intuitive meaning.
(IC1) speci¯es that, when Customer sends to Supplier the purchase order, includ-
ing the requested Item and his/her Country, Supplier should request Item's avail-
ability to Warehouse. Warehouse should respond within 10 minutes to Supplier's
request giving the corresponding quantity Qty (IC2). The deadline is imposed as a
CLP constraint over the variable Tqty, that represents the time in which the response
is sent.
After having received the requested quantity, Supplier decides whether to accept
or reject Customer's order (IC3). As we have pointed out, the decision depends107
Speci¯cation 3.3.2 De¯nition of the choreography shown in ¯gure 3.7
H(purchase order(Customer;Supplier;Item;Country);Tpo)
!E(check availability(Supplier;Warehouse;Item);Tca) ^ Tca > Tpo
(IC1)
H(check availability(Supplier;Warehouse;Item);Tca)
!E(inform(Warehouse;Supplier;Item;Qty);Tqty)
^ Tqty > Tca ^ Tqty < Tca + 10
(IC2)
H(purchase order(Customer;Supplier;Item;Country);Tpo)
^ H(inform(Warehouse;Supplier;Item;Qty);Tqty)
!E(accept order(Supplier;Customer;Item);Tao)
^ ok(Qty;Country) ^ Tao > Tpo ^ Tao > Tqty
_E(reject order(Supplier;Customer;Item);Tro)
^ :ok(Qty;Country) ^ Tro > Tpo ^ Tro > Tqty
(IC3)
H(accept order(Supplier;Customer;Item);Tao)
!E(shipment order(Supplier;Warehouse;Item;Customer);Tso)
^ E(payment(Customer;Supplier;Item);Tp) ^ Tso > Tao ^ Tp > Tao
(IC4)
H(shipment order(Supplier;Warehouse;Item;Customer);Tso)
!E(request details(Warehouse;Customer);Trd) ^ Trd > Tso
(IC5)
H(request details(Warehouse;Customer);Trd)
!E(inform(Customer;Warehouse;Details);Tdet) ^ Tdet > Trd
(IC6)
H(shipment order(Supplier;Warehouse;Item;Customer);Tso)
^ H(inform(Customer;Warehouse;Details);Tdet)
!E(confirm shipment(Warehouse;Supplier;Item);Tcs) ^ Tcs > Tso ^ Tcs > Tdet
(IC7)
H(payment(Customer;Supplier;Item);Tp)
^ H(confirm shipment(Warehouse;Supplier;Item);Tcs)
!E(delivery(Supplier;Customer;Item;Receipt);Tdel) ^ Tdel > Tcs ^ Tdel > Tp
(IC8)
SOKB :
ok( Qty, Country):-
Qty>0,
not banned_country( Country).
banned_country( shackLand).
banned_country( badLand).108
upon the quantity and the Country the Customer belongs to; Supplier may accept
the order only when Qty is positive and customer's Country is not in the list of
banned countries. This last condition has been expressed using a predicate de¯ned
in the KBchor, shown in Speci¯cation 3.3.2. If Supplier has accepted the purchase
order, then Customer is expected to pay for the requested Item and, at the same
time, Supplier will send a shipment order to Warehouse, communicating the involved
Item and Customer's identity (IC4). Warehouse will use Customer's identity in
order to communicate with him/her and asking for shipment details (IC5).
When Customer receives the request for details, then he/she is expected to re-
spond giving his/her own Details (IC6). After having received them, Warehouse
should sends to Supplier a shipment con¯rmation (IC7). Finally, (IC8) states that
when both the payment and the shipment con¯rmation actually happen Supplier is
expected to deliver a Receipt to Customer.
Example of Run-Time Conformance Veri¯cation
In our scenario, the criminal bankJob beagle wants to buy a device from the on-
line shop devOnline, whose warehouse is devWare. devOnline is quite greedy, and
therefore trades with everyone, without checking if the customer comes from one of
the banned countries. As a consequence, even if bankJob comes from shackLand,
one of the banned countries, devOnline sells him the requested device, thus violating
the choreography. Table 3.5 contains the log of the scenario from the viewpoint of
devOnline; note that messages are expressed in high level way, abstracting from the
SOAP exchange format.
When the ¯rst event (labeled m1 in Table 3.5) happens, (IC1) is triggered, and109
Table 3.5: Log of messages exchanged by devOnline in our scenario
Id message sender receiver content time
m1 purchase order bankJob devOnline [device,shackLand] 2
m2 check availability devOnline devWare [device] 3
m3 inform devWare devOnline [device,3] 10
m4 accept order devOnline bankJob [device] 12
m5 shipment order devOnline devWare [device,bankJob] 13
m6 con¯rm shipment devWare devOnline [device] 16
m7 payment bankJob devOnline [device] 19
m8 delivery devOnline bankJob [device,receipt] 21
an expectation about devOnline's behaviour is consequently generated:
¢P = f E(check availability(devOnline;Warehouse;device);Tca) ^ Tca > 2g
The happening of m2 full¯lls the pending expectation and matches with the body of
(IC2), generating a new one:
¢F = f E(check availability(devOnline;devWare;device);3)g
¢P = f E(inform(devWare;devOnline;device;Qty);TQty)
^Tqty > 3 ^ Tqty < 13g
The happening of m3 ful¯lls the current pending expectation respecting the deadline.
Moreover, it triggers (IC3), and two di®erent hypotheses are considered (acceptance
and rejection of the order). However, since the predicate ok(3,shackLand) is evalu-
ated by SCIFF to false, only the expectation about the order rejection is considered:
¢F = f E(check availability(devOnline;devWare;device);3);
E(inform(devWare;devOnline;device;3);10)g
¢P = f E(reject order(devOnline;bankJob;device);Tro)
^Tro > 3 ^ Tro > 10g110
As a consequence, when devOnline accepts the purchase order of bankJob sending the
message m4, the SCIFF proof procedure detects a violation, since m4 is not explicitly
expected.
3.3.3 Medical guidelines
Medical guidelines [88] are clinical behaviour's recommendations that are used to
support physicians in the de¯nition of the most appropriate diagnosis and/or therapy
within determinate clinical circumstances.
Unfortunately, guidelines are today described by using several formats, such as
°ow charts and tables, so that physicians are not properly supported in the detection
of possible errors and incompleteness: it is di±cult to evaluate who made an error
within the protocol's °ow and when. As a consequence, guideline's application often
loses its bene¯ts.
In the following we show that the logic-based formalism provided by the SCIFF
framework is general enough to allow us to formally describe medical protocols. The
main advantage of using ICs in the context of medical guidelines is the capability to
discover some forms of inconsistency and to perform an on-the-°y veri¯cation of the
protocol's application on a speci¯c patient.
In order to e®ectively test the potentialities of this approach, we formalized a mi-
crobiological guideline [38] which describes how to manage an infectious patient from
his arrival at a hospital's emergency room to his recovery and tested this guideline
on a set of clinical trials.
The guideline may be structured in seven phases: patient's arrival at the hospital's
emergency room; patient examination at the emergency room; possible admission in a111
speci¯c hospital ward and ¯rst therapy prescription made by the ward physician; re-
quest of a microbiological test (consisting of many sub-phases, involving both human
and arti¯cial actors); return of the microbiological test report to the ward physician,
who must decide the de¯nitive therapy; management of drugs by nurses; evaluation
of patient's health and, in case of symptoms persistence, new prescription of micro-
biological test. In order to formalize the guideline described before, we detected, ¯rst
of all, all the actors involved (e.g. the patient, wards physicians, the microbiological
laboratory, etc.) and secondly pointed out all the actions which should be executed
(or not, i.e. expected or not expected) for an appropriate patient's disease treatment.
Each actor has been then mapped into an agent with a speci¯c role, and actors actions
(e.g, examinations, analysis, etc) has been modeled as SOCS events. For example,
the following IC:
H(enter(Patient;emergency ward);Tent)
! E(examinate(Physician;Patient);Texam)
^Texam < Tent + 6 ¤ 60
(3.3.1)
expresses that when a patient arrives at the emergency room (at time Tent), we expect
that at least one physician would visit him (at time Texam) within the deadline of 6
hours. This deadline is expressed as a CLP constraint, which says that Texam should
be lower than Tent plus 6 hours. The complete speci¯cation of this protocol consists
of about 20 social ICs. It has been tested via the SOCS-SI software, using di®erent
set of events, compliant and not. For instance, a non compliant set is the following:
a patient (patientA) arrives at the hospital's emergency room at time 10, but no
physician visits him within 6 hours. The event
enter(patientA;emergency ward);10112
matches with the antecedent of (1), generating the expectation in the consequent
that a physician should visit patientA at time Texam, such that Texam < 10+6*60. No
event is afterward registered until this deadline, therefore a violation is raised by the
proof procedure.
In this way a simple medical guideline may be mapped into a set of integrity
constraints in the context of SCIFF infrastructure, thus enabling an on-the-°y veri-
¯cation about the compliance of the hospital sta® to it. We have successfully tested
this speci¯cation using the SOCS-SI tool with some set of events, compliant and not.
In literature, several formalisms have been proposed for representing medical pro-
tocols, like for example GLARE [142] and PROforma [80]. These are complete tool
capable to manage both guidelines acquisition and execution, but, to the best of our
knowledge, their are not able to verify compliance of actions and interactions of the
kind here presented.
3.3.4 E-learning by doing
E-learning is a new paradigm for the learning process, based on the growing availabil-
ity of technology resources such as personal computers and the Internet. The main
idea of e-learning consist of distributing the knowledge onto new media support like
cd, dvd, or directly through the internet. Around this idea a set of support technolo-
gies have been developed, such as content management systems and applications for
real-time streaming and interactions. Many advantages are o®ered by this paradigm:
just to mention the more evident, teacher and student are not constrained anymore
to be in the same place. Moreover, teacher and student can be decoupled also in the
time dimension: it is no longer needed that teacher and student attend the lesson at
the same time instant. The learning process can be adapted to each student's needs,113
taking into account previous knowledge, time availability, and learning capabilities of
the student himself.
Several e-learning paradigms have been developed, and amongst them, e-learning
\by doing" is one of the most promising in terms of the learning quality. The \by
doing" paradigm consists of teaching a topic by letting the student directly practice
the argument onto a real system, or a model that simulates the real system. This
approach can be applied also to the e-learning processes, and in particular to software
applications learning. Of course, the degree of interaction between the student and the
teacher, and the possibility to receive help when needed, are of the utmost importance
in such process. The student in fact must not be left alone during the learning process,
but rather he should be followed interactively, and he should receive help, hints and
feedback whenever it is opportune.
To support the e-learning by doing process, it is necessary to tackle several issues:
¯rstly, a mechanism for evaluating the acquired skills is needed, in order to be able
to proceed to advanced topics. The evaluation mechanism must provide support for
a-posteriori evaluation, as well as run-time evaluation to hint the student. Secondly,
it is quite common that the same learning goal can be achieved in more than one
way: the tutoring system must be able to evaluate all the options, and should adapt
in response to the student choices.
The SCIFF framework, and in particular the SOCS-SI application, are general
enough to be used also in the context of e-learning by doing. We have successfully
used our protocol de¯nition language for representing the action expected by the user
of a e-learning by doing system (a sort of a protocol where only one peer participate).
We have focussed our experiments on the learning process of a writing application114
within the o±ces program suites. We developed our prototype on two applications,
the MS Word program (part of the Microsoft O±ce Suite), and the Writer application
of the OpenO±ce suite. For both applications, a speci¯c ¯lter has been developed,
with the purpose of capturing the actions performed by the student. Those actions,
after a transformation process, are communicated to the SOCS-SI application, that
provide to check the conformance to a special protocol de¯nition. Such de¯nition can
be seen in the Speci¯cation 3.3.3, where it is de¯ned how the student can achieve the
goal of closing the application after printing a ¯le.
Speci¯cation 3.3.3 An e-learning goal represented through the SCIFF Language.
H(tell(U;S;keyboard event(print);DialogId);TPrint)
! E(tell(U;S;mouse event(menu File Close);DialogId);TClose)
^ TClose > TPrint
_ E(tell(U;S;mouse event(menu File Exit);DialogId);TExit)
^ TExit > TPrint
_ E(tell(U;S;keyboard event(quit);DialogId);TExit)
^ TExit > TPrint
_ E(tell(U;S;keyboard event(alt + f);DialogId);TFile)
^ E(tell(U;S;mouse event(menu File Close);DialogId);TClose)
^ TPrint < TFile ^ TFile < TClose
_ E(tell(U;S;keyboard event(alt + f);DialogId);TFile)
^ E(tell(U;S;mouse event(menu File Exit);DialogId);TExit)
^ TPrint < TFile ^ TFile < TExit
_ E(tell(U;S;close document;DialogId);TClose)
^ TClose > TPrint
_ E(tell(U;S;close office;DialogId);TClose)
^ TClose > TPrint
(3.3.2)
The IC 3.3.2 shows how it is possible to represent multiple solutions for solving
the learning goal. Seven di®erent alternatives are considered, from using the \File"
menu and the corresponding voice, to closing directly all the application.115
Once the learning goal has been de¯ned through IC, the SOCS-SI application can
use it in three di®erent ways:
1. the tool can be used as evaluator of the actions of the student: if at the end
of the practicing session, at least one expectation is not satis¯ed, then the goal
has not been achieved;
2. SOCS-SI can be used also as an on-the-°y checker: if the student perform an
action that will block him for reaching the goal, then it is possible to advice
him immediately, rather than waiting for the end of the exercise;
3. the tool can be ¯nally used as a suggesting system: if the student does not
know how to achieve the goal, it is possible to hint him the next action by
communicating the expectations about his future behavior.
Of course it is up to the teacher (or the e-learning content manager) to decide which
modality is more opportune.116
3.4 Related Works
The social approach to the de¯nition of interaction protocols has been documented
in several noteworthy contributions of the past years. Among them, Artikis et al. [24]
present a formal framework for specifying systems where the behaviour of the mem-
bers and their interactions cannot be predicted in advance, and for reasoning about
and verifying the properties of such systems. The framework relies upon a deontic
logic formalism, and on the concepts of permission, prohibition, and empowerment.
The paper also describes a Society Visualiser to demonstrate animations of protocol
runs in such systems. A noteworthy di®erence with [24] is that we do not explicitly
represent the institutional power of the members and the concept of valid action.
\Permitted" are all the events that do not determine a violation, i.e., all events that
are not explicitly \forbidden" are \allowed". Being detached from any deontic infras-
tructure, our framework can be used for a broader spectrum of application domains,
from intelligent agents to reactive systems.
Caire et al. [40] propose an agent-oriented CASE tool for implementing and testing
Multi-Agent Systems. The testing framework is divided into two steps: the agent test
and the society test. The agent test veri¯es the behaviour of the agent with regard to
the system requirements under the responsibility of that agent; the agents are checked
both in their black-box behaviour, and in a white-box checking of the behaviour of
their internal modules. The \agent society testing is a kind of integration testing":
the successful integration of the di®erent agents is veri¯ed. The testing is performed
automatically, without the need for intervention of the user.
Our work is devoted to testing on-the-°y the compliance of peers to protocol
rules, without having any knowledge on the internals of the entities. We provided a117
language, based on logics, to de¯ne the interaction protocols, and a proof-procedure,
based on abduction, to check the compliance. Our SOCS-SI tool can be used to
check the behaviour of Multi-Agent Systems that are open: members of the society
are not only the ones de¯ned by the MAS designer, but new agents, possibly malicious,
may unpredictably join the society, and interact with the other agents. As far as their
behaviour follows the society's prescriptions, such interactions may enrich the society,
but they must be checked for conformance in order to avoid abuses.
Yolum and Singh [155] apply a variant of the Event Calculus [104] to commitment-
based protocol speci¯cation. The semantics of messages (i.e., their e®ect on commit-
ments) is described by a set of operations whose semantics, in turn, is described
by predicates on events and °uents; in addition, commitments can evolve, indepen-
dently of communicative acts, in relation to events and °uents as prescribed by a
set of postulates. Such a way of specifying protocols is more °exible than traditional
approaches based on action sequences in that it prescribes no initial and ¯nal states
or transitions explicitly. It only restricts the agent interaction in that, at the end of
a protocol run, no commitment must be pending; agents with reasoning capabilities
can themselves plan an execution path suitable for their purposes, by means of an
Abductive Event Calculus planner. Our notion of expectation is more general than
that of commitment adopted by Yolum and Singh [155] or by other work, such as [79]:
it represents the expectation about a (past or future) event, without any reference to
speci¯c roles of agents (such as a commitment's debtor and creditor), and it does not
necessarily need to be brought about by a speci¯c agent.
Several other frameworks in the literature aim at verifying properties about the
behaviour of social agents at design time. Often, such frameworks de¯ne structured118
hierarchies, roles, and deontic concepts such as norms and obligations as ¯rst class
entities. Notably, ISLANDER [73] is a tool for the speci¯cation and veri¯cation
of interaction in complex social infrastructures, such as electronic institutions. IS-
LANDER allows for the analysis of situations, called scenes, and visualise liveness or
safety properties in some speci¯c settings. The kind of veri¯cation involved is static
and is used to help designing institutions.Chapter 4
Proving Protocol-speci¯c
Properties: the g-SCIFF
Framework
The recent and fast growth of network infrastructures, such as the Internet, is allowing
for a new range of scenarios and styles of business-making, secure data communica-
tion, and in general of interactions between di®erent peers. Protocols have become
one of the key design point through which such interactions can be somehow man-
aged. Protocols are used as a mean for assuring that the overall system exhibits the
desired behaviour.
Important key aspects of this behaviour are called properties, that are guaranteed
by the protocol. For example, a property of a protocol for a typical english auction
is that the winner is the bidder with the highest bid, provided that he submitted its
bid within a certain deadline (from the previous submitted bid).
Another example can be taken from the security protocol ¯eld: the use of such
protocols has become common practice in a community of users who often operate
in the hope (and sometimes in the trust) that they can rely on a technology which
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protects their private information and makes their communications secure and reli-
able. Such hypothesis of security and privacy are properties of the used protocol: a
large number of tools and formal methods has been developed in the research litera-
ture to explicitly address the security issues. To cite some, the model checking based
techniques [94] and the state of the art On-the-Fly Model Checker (OFMC, [30]).
In this chapter we focus on proving protocol properties, without restricting to any
speci¯c application domain. We propose the g-SCIFF Framework (where g stands
for generative), an extension of the SCIFF Framework presented in Chapter 2. Our
aim is to adopt a uni¯ed approach to both veri¯cation types 2 and 3 (as de¯ned in
Section 1.2).
The g-SCIFF Framework has been built as an extension of the SCIFF Framework,
and like the latter one, the former framework o®ers several components: a speci¯-
cation language, a declarative semantics, a proof procedure. All the components
have been de¯ned as extensions/modi¯cations of the respective original components,
pursuing (as much as possible) a uni¯ed approach for both the frameworks.
Contributions of the author. The author contributed in a substantial way to the
results presented in this chapter. The \proving properties" topic has been partially
addressed in the Ph.D. thesis of Marco Alberti. However, here it is possible to ¯nd a
more complete and comprehensive presentation of the topic and the results achieved.
Moreover, the results previously presented have been properly extended and reviewed,
and formal properties have been demonstrated.
Chapter organization. The chapter is organized as follow. In Section 4.1 we
introduce and formalize the concepts of property, and of proving them.121
In Section 4.2 and 4.3 we de¯ne the language used in the g-SCIFF Framework,
and its declarative semantics. Then we provide the de¯nition of the g-SCIFF Proof
Procedure, and compare it with the SCIFF one in Section 4.4.
Section 4.5 to the formal proof of the properties, while some example applications
are discussed in Section 4.6. The chapter is concluded with some remarks on related
works, in Section 4.7.122
4.1 Proving Properties
We ¯rst de¯ne what is a property in the g-SCIFF Framework:
De¯nition 4.1.1 (Protocol Property). A Protocol Property P in the g-SCIFF
Framework is a formula, expressed as a goal (in logic programming), with the same
syntactics restrictions and allowedness rules as for the Goal G as stated in Sect. 2.3.2.
For sake of completeness and to ease the comprehension:
² the syntax of P is the same as the body of a clause (Tab. 2.3.2);
² variables in P cannot occur only in NbfLiteras;
² All variables that occur in an ExistLiteral are existentially quanti¯ed.
² All remaining variables are universally quanti¯ed.
Example 4.1.1 Let be S = h;;fIC1;IC2gi an abductive speci¯cation as de¯ned
below:
[IC1] H(event1;T1)
! E(event2;T2) ^ E(eventx;Tx)
_ E(event3;T3) ^ E(eventx;Tx):
[IC2] H(eventx;Tx)
! E(event4;T4):
G = f E(Event1;T1) g
P1 =E(event4;T4)
P2 =E(event3;T3)123
the histories compliant with the protocol (w.r.t. G) are:
HAP1 = f H(event1;T1);
H(event2;T2);
H(eventx;Tx);
H(event4;T4)g
HAP2 = f H(event1;T1);
H(event3;T3);
H(eventx;Tx);
H(event4;T4)g
P1 holds in both the histories, while P2 holds only for history HAP2.
We then provide a de¯nition that a protocol speci¯cation (an abductive speci¯-
cation, as de¯ned in 2.3.8) S does indeed enjoy (or guarantee) a property P. In the
g-SCIFF framework, this is stated as follows:
De¯nition 4.1.2 (P holds for S w.r.t. G) Given an abductive speci¯cation S =
hSOKB;ICsi, and a goal G, a property P holds for S if and only if:
8HAP 8¢ : 8
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SOKB [ HAP [ ¢ j= ICS
SOKB [ HAP [ ¢ j= G
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(4.1.1)
The de¯nition simply states that a property P holds for a protocol if for each
history HAP that is compliant with the protocol, then such history (together with
every abductive explanation ¢i for the speci¯cation S, see 2.4.4) does indeed entail
the property P. Note that Equation 4.1.1 states that P must hold for every ab-
ductive explanation ¢i. In fact, a history HAP might be compliant to a protocol124
speci¯cation, w.r.t. to only some abductive answers
Moreover, a property P is always said to hold for a speci¯cation w.r.t. a speci¯c
goal. In fact, a property could hold for all the histories compliant with the protocol
speci¯cation, but di®erent goals could prevent this (see Example 4.1.2).
Example 4.1.2 Let be S = h;;IC1i an abductive speci¯cation as de¯ned below,
where p is an abducible predicate:
[IC1] H(Event1;T1)
! E(Event2;T2) ^ p
_ E(Event2;T2) ^ :p:
G = f E(Event1;T1) g
¢1 = f H(Event1;T1); H(Event2;T2); p g
¢2 = f H(Event1;T1); H(Event2;T2); :p g
P = f p g
¢1 and ¢2 are two abductive explanation for S w.r.t. goal G. The property P holds
if we consider ¢1, but does not hold for ¢2:
Properties as in De¯nition 4.1.2 are always referred as safety properties. Safety
properties state that something bad will not happen. Of course, peers are also free
to behave badly in an open environment, so trying to prove that violations will not
happen is indeed unrealistic. As stated earlier, however, there is a reaction to bad
behaviour of this type: the detection of violation. In our setting, we want to answer
formally to an even more subtle question: is there some undesirable property that
could happen even if there is no violation detected? In order to rely on a system, we
want, in all possible histories, either to ¯nd a violation (i.e., something bad happens,
but we can detect it on-line), or the system to be safe. Stated otherwise, in all
histories compliant to the protocol, the desired property must hold. Safety properties
are often stated with an empty initial history (HAP
i = ;).125
Disproving that a property P holds for a protocol amounts to disprove Eq. 4.1.1.
This can be done by looking for a set HAP of events such that an abductive answer
¢ exists and :P is entailed:
9HAP 9¢ :
8
> > <
> > :
SOKB [ HAP [ ¢ j= ICS
SOKB [ HAP [ ¢ j= (G ^ :P)
EXP is ful¯lled, :, E-consistent
(4.1.2)
A di®erent class of properties is that of liveness properties. Liveness means that
something good will happen, eventually in the future; it could also mean that given
an unpleasant situation, there is an escape: given an initial history (usually, not
very promising), there exists, nevertheless, an extension to such a history that entails
the desired property. Proving a liveness property P amounts to prove that, given
an initial history HAP
i, there exist a history HAP
f (HAP
i µ HAP
f) and an
abductive answer ¢i s.t. P holds. Such condition is the one expressed in Eq. 4.1.2.
Proving safety and liveness properties can be done by means of Equation 4.1.2:
this leads to the idea of proving automatically both types of properties in a uniform
way, with same proof methods and same language for formally de¯ning the requested
properties.126
4.2 The g-SCIFF Language
The language used in the g-SCIFF Framework is a subset of the language de¯ned in
the SCIFF Framework (see Section 2.3): here we will point out only the di®erences
and brie°y recall the common parts.
Entities of the language. As in the SCIFF Language (Sections 2.1 and 2.3.1, the
main entities of the language are:
² atoms representing the concept of Happened Events (by means of the functor
H);
² atoms representing Positive and Negative Expectations (functors E and EN).
However, we restrict the language in the following way: in the g-SCIFF Language it
is not possible to use the negation : in conjunction with an happened event H. This
restriction is motivated by the fact that, as it will be clearer later in Section 4.3, we
are going to abduce H atoms. As a consequence, the constructive negation applied
to H atoms is meaningless.
As a consequence, the syntax of events and expectations in the g-SCIFF Frame-
work is the same presented in Table 2.3.1, with the exceptions that the non- terminal
symbol EventLiteral is not allowed.
The Social Knowledge Base. The SOKB is de¯ned by the grammar shown in
Table 2.3.2 (same syntax as in the SCIFF Framework).
Integrity Constraints. The syntax of the Integrity Constraints in the g-SCIFF
Framework is pretty much the same of the one shown in Table 2.3.3. However, due to127
the restriction on :H atoms, the Body of an IC can not contain such negated atoms.
Hence, the re-writing rule of the non-terminal symbol Body of the grammar shown in
Table 2.3.3 is slightly di®erent. We report in Table 4.2.1 the modi¯ed syntax of the
Integrity Constraints in the g-SCIFF Framework.
Table 4.2.1 Integrity Constraints (ICs) in the g-SCIFF
ICS ::= [IC]?
IC ::= Body ! Head
Body ::= (Event j ExpLiteral j AbducibleLiteral) [ ^ BodyLiteral ]?
BodyLiteral ::= Event j ExtLiteral
Head ::= HeadDisjunct [ _ HeadDisjunct ]? j false
HeadDisjunct ::= ExtLiteral [ ^ ExtLiteral]?128
4.3 Declarative Semantics of g-SCIFF
In order to be able to hypothesize new happened events, in the g-SCIFF framework
H atoms are not considered anymore as facts (and then being part of the program P
in the abductive interpretation given in Section 2.4.2), but rather as abducibles (and
then belonging to the set E of predicates that can be abduced).
Although considering H atoms as abducibles is indeed an important extension
w.r.t. to the SCIFF framework, from a formal viewpoint the declarative semantics is
the same. Formally, the only di®erence is that H atoms now belongs to the abducibles
set, and that the abductive explanation ¢ (De¯nition 2.4.4) is de¯ned as:
¢ ´ hEXP;¢A;HAPi
where the set EXP is the set of all the expectations (positive and negative) that
have been hypothesized; ¢A is the set of abducibles predicates that have been hy-
pothesized; and HAP is the set of happened events that has been hypothesized for
disproving the property P (as explained in Section 4.1).
Note that, as it is in the SCIFF framework, also here SOKB, HAP, ¢A and
EXP are subject to the completion of the program (compare Equations 2.4.3 and
2.4.4, referred to SCIFF, with Equations 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, referred instead to g-SCIFF).
For the sake of comprehension, we report here the most important de¯nitions for
the declarative semantics of the g-SCIFF Framework.
De¯nition 4.3.1 Given an abductive speci¯cation S = hSOKB;ICSi and a history
HAP, SHAP represents the pair hS;HAPi, called the HAP-instance of S (or simply
an instance of S).129
De¯nition 4.3.2 An abductive speci¯cation S is represented as an ALP, i.e., a triple
hP;E;ICSi where:
² P is the SOKB;
² E is the set of abducible predicates of S (E, EN, H predicates and normal
abducibles predicates);
² ICS are the social integrity constraints of S.
Given the de¯nition of an abductive speci¯cation in the g-SCIFF framework, we
are now able to re-de¯ne the abductive explanation for the g-SCIFF:
De¯nition 4.3.3 Given an abductive speci¯cation S = hSOKB;ICSi, and a goal G,
¢ ´ hEXP;¢A;HAPi is an abductive explanation of S if:
Comp(SOKB [ ¢) [ CET [ TX j= ICS (4.3.1)
Comp(SOKB [ ¢) [ CET [ TX j= G (4.3.2)
where Comp represents the completion of a theory, CET is Clark's Equational Theory
[48], and TX is the theory of constraints [92].
The symbol j= is interpreted in three valued logics, as it is in the IFF Proof Procedure.
As for the SCIFF framework, we require consistency with respect to explicit
negation [21] and between positive and negative expectations.
De¯nition 4.3.4 A set ¢ of abducibles is :-consistent if and only if for each (ground)130
term p and for each abducible predicate q:
fE(p);:E(p)g 6µ EXP
fEN(p);:EN(p)g 6µ EXP
fq;:qg 6µ ¢A
(4.3.3)
De¯nition 4.3.5 A set EXP of expectations is E-consistent if and only if for each
(ground) term p:
fE(p);EN(p)g 6µ EXP (4.3.4)
Moreover, we require also that the speci¯cation S is ful¯lled (as for SCIFF in Def.
2.4.7), i.e.:
De¯nition 4.3.6 Given an abductive explanation ¢ (¢ = h¢A;EXP;HAPi), S is
ful¯lled if and only if
8E(p) 2 EXP ) H(p) 2 HAP
8EN(p) 2 EXP ) H(p) 62 HAP
(4.3.5)
When all the given conditions (4.3.1-4.3.5) are met, we say that the goal is
achieved, and we write
S j=¢A;EXP;HAP G
.131
4.4 g-SCIFF Proof Procedure
The g-SCIFF Proof Procedure is obtained by modifying the SCIFF one: in particular,
the modi¯cations a®ect mainly the set of transitions. Some transitions have been
removed, as a consequence of the syntactic restriction introduced in Section 4.2, while
a new transition has been added, in order to be able to generate new hypotheses about
happened events.
4.4.1 Data Structures
As in the SCIFF Proof Procedure, a node can be either the special node false, or
de¯ned by the following tuple
T ´ hR;CS;PSIC;¢A;¢P;HAP;¢F;¢V i: (4.4.1)
We partition the set of expectations EXP into the con¯rmed (¢F), discon¯rmed
(¢V ), and pending (¢P) expectations. The other elements are:
² R is the resolvent: a conjunction, whose conjuncts can be literals or disjunctions
of conjunctions of literals
² CS is the constraint store: it contains CLP constraints and quanti¯er restric-
tions
² PSIC is a set of implications, called partially solved integrity constraints
² ¢A is the set of general abduced hypotheses (the set of abduced literals, except
those representing expectations)
² HAP is the history of hypothesized happened events, represented by a set of
abducted atoms with functor H.132
If one of the elements of the tuple is false, then the whole tuple is the special node
false, which cannot have successors. In the following, we indicate with ¢ the set
¢A [ ¢P [ ¢F [ ¢V [ HAP.
4.4.2 Initial Node and Success
The de¯nitions of initial node, derivation and success/failure of such derivation are
exactly the same as shown in Section 2.5.2. Here we will brie°y recall that:
² let SHAPi be an abductive speci¯cation as in De¯nition 2.3.8, where the set of
abduced happened events is HAP
i (possibly the empty set);
² a derivation D is a sequence of nodes
T0 ! T1 ! ¢¢¢ ! Tn¡1 ! Tn:
² the ¯rst node of a derivation is de¯ned as
T0 ´ hfGg;;;ICS;;;;;HAP
i;;;;i
where the inital set of hypothesized happened events is HAP
i;
² the other nodes Tj;j > 0, are obtained by applying the transitions;
² if a successful derivation exists and a success node is reached (see De¯nition
2.5.1), s.t. SHAPf is a proper extension of SHAPi (De¯nition 2.4.2), then we
write:
SHAPi
g
`
EXP;¢A;HAPf G
² abductive answers can be extracted as for SCIFF from an abductive explana-
tion, by means of a substitution ¾ s.t. each existentially quanti¯ed variable of
any term in ¢¾ is ground (see 2.5.2).133
4.4.3 Removed Transitions
In Section 4.2 we have introduced some syntactic restriction (about :H literals).
Moreover, in Section 4.3 we have de¯ned the H atoms as abducible predicates. As a
consequence, some transitions de¯ned in the SCIFF Proof Procedure are not needed
anymore, hence simplifying the g-SCIFF Proof Procedure. In particular:
² Happening: since the happened events now are hypothesized and represented
by means of abducibles, transition Happenining is not needed anymore;
² Non-Happening: since the :H literals are not allowed anymore in the syntax,
the transition non-Happening can be safely removed;
It is worth to notice that the removed transitions were part of the transition group
introduced for coping with dynamically happening events. This is quite reasonable,
since in the g-SCIFF Framework happened events are only hypotheses made in order
to prove/disprove some property P.
4.4.4 Added Transition
In order to be able to produce new hypotheses, we have decided to de¯ne the H
atoms as abducibles. However, it is necessary to \guide" the process of generating
new hypotheses about the happened events, in order to ful¯ll all the positive/negative
expectations (possibly generated by the process of abducing happened events), as
given by De¯nition 4.3.6. For this reason, we have introduced in the g-SCIFF Proof
Procedure the following transition:
De¯nition 4.4.1 (Ful¯ller Transition). The g-SCIFF Proof Procedure extends the
SCIFF Proof Procedure by adding the following transition:134
Ful¯ller. Given a node Nk in which
² ¢P k = ¢P
0 [ fE(E;T)g
² closed(HAPk)= false
and Ful¯llment E transition is not applicable, transition Ful¯ller is applicable and
generates a node Nk+1 identical to Nk except:
² ¢P k+1 = ¢P
0
² ¢F k+1 = ¢F k [ fE(E;T)g
² HAPk+1 = HAPk [ fH(E;T)g
i.e., a new happened event is inserted in the history, ful¯lling the expectation.
Otherwise, given a state where
² closed(HAPk)= true
the transition Ful¯ller produces a single successor
false:
Note that the Ful¯ller transition must be applied only when Ful¯llment transition
is not applicable. This condition is not mandatory: we have introduce it in order to
preserve the minimality of the abductive explanation.
Example 4.4.1 Let a node Nk of a g-SCIFF derivation be as follow (see De¯nition
4.4.1):
² ¢P = E(p(X);T)135
² HAP = H(p(1);3)
² all the other sets empty.
If the transition Ful¯ller is applied ¯rstly, the following derivation is computed:
h¢P k = fE(p(X);T)g HAPk = fH(p(1);3)gi
¢P k+1 = ;
¢F k+1 = fE(p(X);T)g
HAPk+1 = fH(p(1);3);H(p(X);T)g
Although in HAPk there is an happened event that can ful¯ll the pending expec-
tation, the transition Ful¯ller generate (hypothesize) a new happened event. HAPk+1
is not minimal.136
4.5 g-SCIFF properties
4.5.1 Soundness
We prove the soundness property of the g-SCIFF Proof Procedure in a similar way
as it was proved for the SCIFF Proof Procedure [85]. As SCIFF was proved sound
relying on the soundness result of IFF, we prove soundness of g-SCIFF relying on
soundness result of SCIFF. Intuitively, we proceed in the following way: we ¯rst
show in Lemma 4.5.1 that an abductive answer ¢g extracted by a successful g-SCIFF
derivation is also a computed answer for a SCIFF program; then, based on this lemma,
we prove the soundness result.
Lemma 4.5.1 Let:
² SHAPi be hS;HAP
ii an abductive instance, where S = hSOKB;ICSi;
² (¢g;¾) be the abductive answer extracted from a successful derivation
(SHAPi
g
`
EXP;¢A;HAPf G) for an initial goal G and an initial abductive instance
SHAPi evolving to a proper extension S
HAPf, such that
{ ¢g = hEXP;¢A;HAP
fi ;
{ ¢SCIFF = hEXP;¢Ai
Then
(¢SCIFF;¾) is a SCIFF computed answer for G for the program
hSOKB [ HAP
f±;E;ICSi.
Proof. We construct a successful closed SCIFF derivation from the given successful
g-SCIFF derivation, by mapping every step except Ful¯ller onto itself.137
Let us consider then the new transition Ful¯ller. As described in De¯nition 4.4.1,
given a node ¢P k = ¢P
0 [ fE(E;T)g, it performs the following actions:
(i) ¢P k+1 = ¢P
0
(ii) ¢F k+1 = ¢F k [ fE(E;T)g
(iii) HAPk+1 = HAPk [ fH(E;T)g
The action (iii) constructs the HAP
f set of happened events that is provided
as de¯nition of the SCIFF equivalent program. It is directly mapped on the SCIFF
transition Happening.
Actions (i) and (ii) are almost equivalent to the Ful¯llment E transition (see
Section 2.5.4). In this particular case the selected happened event for ful¯llment has
exactly the same variables of the matching expectation. The only di®erence is about
the fact that Ful¯llment E generates two children nodes from the parent:
² in the ¯rst node N1
k+1 the actions (i) and (ii) are performed as in g-SCIFF.
Moreover, an equality constraint is added to CS1
k+1 between the variables of
the happened event and the variables of the expected event; in the Ful¯ller
transition this can be safely avoided since the variables are exactly the same
(and then the equality constraint is entailed).
² in the second node N2
k+1 the parent node is copied identically, and an inequality
constraint between the variables of the happened event and the variables of the
expected event is added to CS2
k+1. This second node is not generated in the
g-SCIFF proof.138
Since g-SCIFF generates only the ¯rst node, we can draw the conclusion that the
derivation tree of the g-SCIFF is a subset of the derivation tree of SCIFF. Note that
the choice of not generating the second node N2
k+1 in g-SCIFF has been made for
performances issues: in fact such a node would lead immediately to a failure, due
to the fact that the inequality constraint can not be satis¯ed (the variables of the
expected event and of the happened event are exactly the same by construction).
Note that any success node in the g-SCIFF derivation has a correspondent success
node in the SCIFF derivation, and that no other SCIFF transition can be applied
anymore to that success node. If a SCIFF transition (except Non-Happening and
Happening) could be applied to the success node, the correspondent g-SCIFF tran-
sition would be applicable to the success node too, and that node could not be a
success node (contradicting the initial hypothesis). Non-Happening transition could
not be applied because of the syntax limitations introduced in Section 4.2, while Hap-
pening transition would not applicable because we are considering a close derivation
for SCIFF.
Summarizing, since the derivation tree of g-SCIFF proof procedure is a subset of
the derivation tree of SCIFF proof procedure for the speci¯ed program, the answer
¢SCIFF¾ computed by g-SCIFF is an abductive answer for SCIFF.
We are now ready to state the soundness result for the case without universally
quanti¯ed variables:
Theorem 4.5.1 (Soundness). Given an instance SHAPi (i.e., the set of happened
events is set initially to HAP
i),if
SHAPi
g
`
EXP;¢A;HAPf G139
with abductive answer (¢;¾) (¢ = hEXP;¢A;HAP
fi),
then
S j=¢¾ G¾
Proof. As already done in the proofs for the SCIFF framework [85], we rely upon the
3-value completion [107] of SOKB and ¢. Let us consider the proof for an atomic
goal (the extension to other structures of the formula G is trivial).
Proving the latter condition stated in the theorem corresponds to prove the fol-
lowing ones, separately, w.r.t. the extensions introduced in Sect. 4.4:
(i) SOKB [ [HAP
f [ ¢F [ ¢P [ ¢A]¾ j= G¾;
(ii) SOKB [ [HAP
f [ ¢F [ ¢P [ ¢A]¾ j= ICS;
(iii) fE(p);:E(p)g 6µ [¢F [ ¢P]¾ (:-consistency for E atoms);
(iv) fEN(p);:EN(p)g 6µ [¢F [ ¢P]¾ (:-consistency for EN atoms);
(v) fq;:qg 6µ (¢A)¾ (:-consistency for generic abducible atoms);
(vi) fE(p);EN(p)g 6µ [¢F [ ¢P]¾ (E-consistency);
(vii) HAP
f [[¢F [¢P]¾[fE(p) ! H(p)g[fEN(p) ! :H(p)g 6² ? (ful¯llment).
Conditions (i)¡(vi) are guaranteed by Lemma 4.5.1. In particular these conditions
are exactly the same that are stated in the soundness of the SCIFF proof procedure
(Proposition 6.2, [85]). This is a consequence of the fact that the g-SCIFF and SCIFF
share the same declarative semantics. From Lemma 4.5.1, we have that a computed
answer for a g-SCIFF derivation is also a computed answer for SCIFF derivation,
and as a consequence of the soundness result of the SCIFF, conditions (i)¡(vi) hold.140
Condition (vii) holds because: (1) the ful¯llment of the negative expectations (EN
atoms) is still guaranteed by the Ful¯llment EN transition; and (2) the ful¯llment of
the positive expectations instead is enforced by the Ful¯ller transition itself, that is
applied whenever a positive expectation (E atoms) is pending and still not ful¯lled
(i.e., it still belongs to the set ¢P).141
4.6 Application Examples
4.6.1 Needham-Schroeder Public Key Security Protocol
The Needham-Schroeder Public Key Security Protocol (NSPK,[114]) aims to allow
two peers, A and B, to exchange two secret numbers (nonces), while mutually au-
thenticating each other. The protocol consists of seven steps, but { as other authors
have previously done { we focus on a simpli¯ed version consisting of only three steps,
which are the kernel of the protocol. In support of the authentication procedure,
peers rely on the well-known public key encryption technology. The three messages
of the protocol that we consider in this example are those listed in Figure 4.1. Ba-
sically, with the simpli¯ed version, we assume that all the agents know the public
key of the other agents, and that no previous stages for discovering the public keys
is needed. Thanks to the public/private key technology, a peer is able to generate
(1) A ! B : fNA;Agpub key(B)
(2) B ! A : fNA;NBgpub key(A)
(3) A ! B : fNBgpub key(B)
Figure 4.1: The Needham-Schroeder protocol (simpli¯ed version)
two keys, a public key which is made available to the others, and a private key which
must remain undisclosed. A sequence of bytes encrypted using the public key can be
decrypted only by using the corresponding private key. The idea of the protocol is
to challenge the fellow peer in a communication session (conversation), to make sure
that he is actually the holder of the private key associated with his public key.
During the authentication phase, peers can generate some special items of data142
called nonces. Therefore, during the conversation, if peer A sends a nonce NA gener-
ated by himself to B, and if A sends NA encrypted with the public key of B, only B
will be able to decrypt NA and send it back to A. A will then know that the peer to
whom he sent NA is actually the holder of B's private key.
As shown in Fig. 4.1, by message (1) A challenges B to decrypt his nonce NA
encrypted using B's public key. By message (2) B responds to A's challenge, by
attaching to NA a new nonce NB, which he generated himself, and encrypting the
whole set of two nonces using A's public key, thus challenging A to decrypt NB and
prove to be the holder of A's private key. By message (3) A responds to B's challenge.
The security property of the NSPK protocol has been stated under the assump-
tions of perfect cryptography, insecure communication channels and the intruder I
able to intercept/generate messages. Practically, we assume that:
1. when a peer sends a message to another peer, the sender has no way to know if
the message has been received or not;
2. when a peer receives a message, there is no way to be sure about the sender,
unless this information is somehow coded into the payload;
3. the content of a message could be compromised someway;
4. there is no way a peer can guess the content of a message encrypted with the
public key of another agent;
5. there is no way a peer can guess the nonce that another agent has generated
(unless it was explicitly communicated).143
Lowe's attack on the protocol
It turns out that (at least) one situation may occur in which B trusts that he is
proving his own identity to another agent A, by following this protocol, but in fact
a third agent I (standing for intruder) manages to successfully pretend that he is A
and authenticate himself as A with B. This attack was suggested by Lowe [109], and
it consists of the messages listed in Figure 4.2.
(1) A ! I : fNA;Agpub key(I)
(2) I(A) ! B : fNA;Agpub key(B)
(3) B ! I(A) : fNA;NBgpub key(A)
(4) I ! A : fNA;NBgpub key(A)
(5) A ! I : fNBgpub key(I)
(6) I(A) ! B : fNBgpub key(B)
Figure 4.2: Lowe's attack on the Needham-Schroeder protocol
It is a nesting of the Needham-Schroeder protocol, in which A happens to start a
conversation with I, thus transmitting him his nonce NA. Instead of answering to the
challenge with a new nonce NI, I exploits the information contained in A's request
for authentication (namely, its nonce) to handcraft a message to send to B. Such a
message (2) will be encrypted using B's public key, and will contain A's name along
with A's nonce NA. I therefore sends this message pretending that he is A (we use the
notation I(A) for this purpose). B will reply to the challenge contained in message
(2) by generating a nonce NB and encrypting NA and NB together using A's public
key. Since I is unable to decrypt a message encrypt with another agent's public key,
I simply forwards B's message to A. This is understood by A as the continuation of144
the protocol initiated with message (1). In this way, I manages to receive back from
A the nonce NB encrypted using his own public key (message 5), and to respond to
B with message (6).
Messages (1), (4) and (5) represent a conversation between A and I, while (2), (3),
and (6) represent a conversation between I(A) and B; both conversations happen to
be compliant to the protocol. But, as we have seen, a combination of two compliant
conversations generates a situation in which an agent (I) authenticates himself with
an identity (I(A)) which is not his own.
It is important to stress that in the attack proposed by Lowe it is never the case
that an intruder manages to guess a nonce or a private key. In particular, initially
only agent A knows the content of its own nonce NA and only B knows the content
of its own nonce NB, and an agent knows the content of a nonce if either he initially
knows it or if it is sent to him encrypted in his own public key.
Formalizing peers's authentication
In the idea of the NSPK protocol, an agent trusts the identity of the agent with whom
he is communicating by associating his name with his public key and receiving back
a nonce that he forged, encrypted in his own public key. If we had to de¯ne the idea
of an agent B `trusting' that he is communicating with A, we could do it by using a
combination of messages in which an agents responds to a challenge posed by another
agent and successfully decrypts a nonce.
De¯nition 4.6.1 B trusts that agent X, he is communicating with, is indeed A,1 and
we write trustB(X;A) once two messages have been exchanged at times T1 and T2,
1We restrict ourselves to only one communication session, all the de¯nitions will therefore have
as a scope the session.145
T1 < T2, having the following sender, recipient, and content:
(T1) B ! X : fNB;:::gpub key(A)
(T2) X ! B : fNB;:::gpub key(B)
where NB is a nonce generated by B.
Note that B is unable to judge whether NA is a nonce actually generated by X
or not, therefore no condition is posed on the origin of such nonce.
Symmetrically, we can consider, from A's viewpoint, messages (1) and (2) as those
that prove the identity of B. We therefore implement Def. 4.6.1 in Def. 4.6.2, where
messages are expressed using the notation of the SCIFF language, namely as events
which are part of some \history" HAP. The content of messages will be composed
of three parts, the ¯rst showing the public key used to encrypt it, the second and
third containing agent names or nonces or nothing (in particular, the last part may
be empty).
De¯nition 4.6.2 Let A, B and X be agents, KA and KB respectively A's and B's
public key, NB a nonce produced by B, and let HAP1 and HAP2 be two sets of
events each composed of two elements, namely:
HAP1 = f
H(send(B;X;content(key(KA);agent(B);nonce(NB)));T1);
H(send(X;B;content(key(KB);nonce(NB);nonce(:::)));T2)
g, and
HAP2 = f
H(send(B;X;content(key(KA);nonce(:::);nonce(NB)));T1);146
H(send(X;B;content(key(KB);nonce(NB);empty(0)));T2)
g. Then, trustB(X;A) holds if and only if HAP1 µ HAP or HAP2 µ HAP.
Speci¯cation by means of ICs of the scenario assumptions
The assumptions about perfect cryptography , etc. stated previously, can be stated
as ICs that rules which messages can/can not be sent between peers. Taking this
perspective, we can sat for example that an agent X can send to another agent Y a
message containing a nonce NX which he does not initially know only if one of the
following two cases hold: either (i) X received NX from another agent, encrypted in
X's own public key, or (ii) X received a message containing NX and encrypted with
a public key KY, in which case X can forward exactly the same message, without
operating any modi¯cation on it.
Such integrity constraints about the impossibility to guess a nonce are shown
in Spec. 4.6.1. In order to maintain relevant information about the ownership of
public keys and nonces, we de¯ne a number of predicates in the Social Organization
Knowledge Base, ash shown in Spec. 4.6.1.
Needham-Schroeder protocol speci¯cation
The relevant ICs are shown in Spec. 4.6.2. The IC1 of Spec. 4.6.2 expresses that if a
message is sent from X to B, containing the name of some agent A and some nonce
NA, encrypted together with some public key KB:
H(send(X;B;content(key(KB);agent(A);nonce(NA)));T1) 2 HAP;
then a message is expected to be sent at a later time (and by some deadline TMax)
from B to X , containing the original nonce NA and a new nonce NB, encrypted with147
Speci¯cation 4.6.1 ICs and SOKB expressing that an agent cannot guess the content
of a nonce
ICs:
[ICA1] H(send(X;Y;content(key(KY );agent(W);nonce(NX)));T1) ^
X ! = Y ^ notIsNonce(X;NX)
! E(send(V;X;content(key(KX);agent(V );nonce(NX)));T0) ^
isAgent(V ) ^ X ! = V ^ isPublicKey(X;KX) ^ isNonce(V;NX) ^
T0 < T1 ^ T0 > 0
_
:::
[ICA2] H(send(X;Y;content(key(KY );nonce(NX);nonce(NY )));T1) ^
X ! = Y ^ notIsNonce(X;NX)
! E(send(Z;X;content(key(KX);agent(V );nonce(NX)));T0) ^
isAgent(V ) ^ isAgent(Z) ^ X ! = V ^ Z ! = X ^ isPublicKey(X;KX) ^
T0 < T1 ^ T0 > 0
_
:::
[ICA3] H(send(X;Y;content(key(KY );nonce(NX);empty(0)));T1) ^
X ! = Y ^ notIsNonce(X;NX)
! E(send(Y;X;content(key(KX);nonce(NW);nonce(NX)));T0) ^
isPublicKey(X;KX) ^ isNonce(NW) ^ NW ! = NX ^
T0 < T1 ^ T0 > 0
_
E(send(Z;X;content(key(KX);nonce(NX);empty(0)));T0) ^
isPublicKey(X;KX) ^ isAgent(Z) ^ X ! = Z ^ Y ! = Z ^
T0 < T1 ^ T0 > 0
_
:::
SOKB:
isPublicKey( PK) :-
isPublicKey( _, PK).
isPublicKey( i, ki).
isPublicKey( b, kb).
isPublicKey( a, ka).
isMaxTime( 7).
isAgent( i).
isAgent( a).
isAgent( b).
isNonce( N) :-
isNonce( _, N).
isNonce( A, N) :-
checkIfNonce( A, N).
notIsNonce( A, NB) :-
\+( checkIfNonce( A, NB)).
checkIfNonce( b, nb).
checkIfNonce( a, na).148
the public key of A:
E(send(B;X;content(key(KA);nonce(NA);nonce(NB)));T2)
is therefore generated and put into ¢P.
The IC2 of Fig. 4.6.2 expresses that if a message of the protocol is sent from X
to B, containing the name of some agent A and some nonce NA, encrypted together
with some public key KB:
H(send(X;B;content(key(KB);agent(A);nonce(NA)));T1) 2 HAP;
and a message is sent at a later time from B to X, containing the original nonce NA
and a new nonce NB, encrypted with the public key of A:
H(send(B;X;content(key(KA);nonce(NA);nonce(NB)));T2) 2 HAP;
then a third message is expected to be sent from X to B, containing NB, and en-
crypted with the public key of B:
E(send(X;B;content(key(KB);nonce(NB);empty(0)));T3)
is therefore generated and put into ¢P.
Generation of compliant histories
A ¯rst result that we obtain by running the g-SCIFF is that, given as a social goal the
expectation about some event, the proof-procedure is able to generate a compliant
(and complete) history which includes such event. For instance, given the goal g1
representing the start of a protocol run between a and i:
g1 Ã E(send(a;i;content(key(ki);agent(a);nonce(na)));1);149
Speci¯cation 4.6.2 Social Integrity Constraints de¯ning the Needham-Schroeder
protocol
[IC1] H(send(X;B;content(key(KB);agent(A);nonce(NA)));T1) ^
! E(send(B;X;content(key(KA);nonce(NA);nonce(NB)));T2) ^
isPublicKey(A;KA) ^ isNonce(NB) ^ NA ! = NB ^
isMaxTime(TMax) ^ T2 > T1 ^ T2 < TMax:
[IC2] H(send(X;B;content(key(KB);agent(A);nonce(NA)));T1) ^
H(send(B;X;content(key(KA);nonce(NA);nonce(NB)));T2) ^
T2 > T1
! E(send(X;B;content(key(KB);nonce(NB);empty(0)));T3) ^
isMaxTime(TMax) ^ T3 > T2 ^ T3 < TMax:
and given a deadline of 6 \time units" to the completion of the protocol, the execution
of the proof returns the following compliant history:
HAPg1 = f
H(send(a;i;content(key(ki);agent(a);nonce(na)));1);
H(send(i;a;content(key(ka);nonce(na);nonce(nb)));TA);TA 2 [2::5];
H(send(a;i;content(key(ki);nonce(nb);empty(0)));TB);TB 2 [3::6];TB > TA
g,
while given the goal g2, representing the last step of a protocol run between i and b:
g2 Ã E(send(i;b;content(key(kb);nonce(nb);empty(0)));6);
and again a range of 6 \time units" to the completion of the protocol (from time 1
to time 6), it is possible to obtain a compliant history such as the following:
HAPg2 = f
H(send(a;i;content(key(ki);agent(a);nonce(na)));TC);TC 2 [1::3];
H(send(i;a;content(key(ka);nonce(na);nonce(nb)));TD);TD 2 [2::5];TD > TC
H(send(a;i;content(key(ki);nonce(nb);empty(0)));TE);TE 2 [3::6];TE > TD150
H(send(i;b;content(key(kb);agent(i);nonce(na)));TB);TB 2 [2::4];TB > TC
H(send(b;i;content(key(ki);nonce(na);nonce(nb)));TA);TA 2 [3::5];TA > TB
H(send(i;b;content(key(kb);nonce(nb);empty(0)));6)
g.
It is worthwhile noticing that HAPg2 contains two possibly interleaved communi-
cation sessions (one between a and i and another between i and a) which do not
represent an attack to the protocol. In fact, it is not the case that trustX(Y;W) and
:trustW(Y;X), for all X, Y and W. What happens is, i uses to communicate with
b the content of the nonce na obtained from a (but does not pretend to be himself
a). This is in fact perfectly allowed by the protocol and does not contradict the
assumptions on the generation of nonces speci¯ed by the constraints of Spec. 4.6.1.
Generation of Lowe's attack
A second important result, which shows how the g-SCIFF can e®ectively be used
for protocol veri¯cation, is the generation of Lowe's attack. The property that we
want to disprove is Ptrust de¯ned as trustB(X;A) ! X = A, i.e., if B trusts that
he is communicating with A, then he is indeed communicating with A. We obtain a
problem which is symmetric in the variables A, B, and X. In order to check if we
have a solution we can ground Ptrust and de¯ne its negation :Ptrust as a goal, g3,
where we choose to assign to A, B, and X the values a, b and i:
g3 Ã isNonce(NA);NA 6= nb;
E(send(b;i;content(key(ka);nonce(NA);nonce(nb)));3);
E(send(i;b;content(key(kb);nonce(nb);empty(0)));6):
Besides de¯ning g3 for three speci¯c agents, we also assign de¯nite time points (3
and 6) in order to improve the e±ciency of the proof.151
Running the g-SCIFF on g3 results in a compliant history:
HAPg3 = f
h(send(a;i;content(key(ki);agent(a);nonce(na)));1);
h(send(i;b;content(key(kb);agent(a);nonce(na)));2);
h(send(b;i;content(key(ka);nonce(na);nonce(nb)));3);
h(send(i;a;content(key(ka);nonce(na);nonce(nb)));4);
h(send(a;i;content(key(ki);nonce(nb);empty(0)));5);
h(send(i;b;content(key(kb);nonce(nb);empty(0)));6)
g,
which is indeed Lowe's attack on the protocol. HAPgL represents a counterexample
of the property Ptrust.152
4.6.2 NetBill Transaction Protocol
NetBill [53] is a security and transaction protocol optimized for the selling and delivery
of low-priced information goods, like software, journal articles or songs/videos. The
protocol rules transactions between two peers: the seller of the good, namely the
Merchant, and the client, namely the Customer.
A NetBill server is used to deal with ¯nancial issues such as those related to credit
card accounts of customer and merchant. In this example, we focus on the NetBill
protocol version designed for non zero-priced goods, and do not consider the variants
that deal with zero-priced goods. A typical protocol run is composed of three phases:
1. Price Negotiation. The customer requests a quote for a good identi¯ed by
Product Id (PrId) priceRequest(PrId) and the merchant replies with the re-
quested price priceQuote(PrId;Quote)
2. Good Delivery. The customer requests the good goodRequest(PrId;Quote)
and the merchant delivers it in an encrypted format
deliver(crypt(PrId;Key);Quote)
3. Payment. The customer issues an Electronic Payment Order
(EPO) to the merchant, for the amount agreed for the good
payment(epo(C;crypt(PrId;K);Quote))); the merchant appends the de-
cryption key for the good to the EPO, signs the pair and forwards it to the
NetBill server endorsedEPO(epo(C;crypt(PrId;K);Quote);M); the NetBill
server deals with the actual money transfer and returns the result to the mer-
chant signedResult(C;PrID;Price;K), who will, in her turn, send a receipt
for the good and the decryption key to the customer receipt(PrId;Price;K).153
The Customer can withdraw from the transaction until she has issued the EPO
message; the Merchant can withdraw from the transaction until she has issued the
endorsedEPO message.
NetBill protocol speci¯cation based on IC.
In Table 4.6.1 the speci¯cation of the Netbill protocol is presented: ICs [1 ¡ 6] are
backward ICs (i.e.,integrity constraints that state that if some set of event happens,
then some other set of event is expected to have happened before), while ICs [7 ¡ 8]
are forward ICs.
IC1, for example, imposes that if M has sent a priceQuote message to C, stating
that M's quote for the good identi¯ed byPrId is Quote, in the interaction identi¯ed by
Id, then C is expected to have sent to M a priceRequest message for the same good, in
the same interaction, at an earlier time; IC7 instead, imposes that an endorsedEPO
message from M to the netbill server be followed by a signedResult message, with
the corresponding parameters.
Note that we only impose forward constraints from the endorsedEPO message
onwards, because both parties (merchant and customer) can withdraw from the trans-
action at the previous steps: hence the uttering of messages in the ¯rst part of the
protocol does not lead to any expectation to utter further messages.
Veri¯cation of a NetBill property
In this example, we show the veri¯cation of the following property:154
Table 4.6.1 NetBill protocol speci¯cation
[IC1] H(tell(M;C;priceQuote(PrId;Quote);Id);T)
! E(tell(C;M;priceRequest(PrId);Id);T2) ^
T2 < T:
[IC2] H(tell(C;M;goodRequest(PrId;Quote);Id);T)
! E(tell(M;C;priceQuote(PrId;Quote);Id);Tpri) ^
Tpri < T:
[IC3] H(tell(M;C;goodDelivery(crypt(PrId;K);Quote);Id);T)
! E(tell(C;M;goodRequest(PrId;Quote);Id);Treq) ^
Treq < T:
[IC4] H(tell(C;M;payment(C;crypt(PrId;K);Quote);Id);T)
! E(tell(M;C;goodDelivery(crypt(PrId;K);Quote);Id);Tdel) ^
Tdel < T:
[IC5] H(tell(netbill;M;signedResult(C;PrId;Quote;K);Id);Tsign) ^
M ! = netbill
! E(tell(M;netbill;endorsedEPO(epo(C;PrId;Quote);K;M);Id);T) ^
T < Tsign:
[IC6] H(tell(M;C;receipt(PrId;Quote;K);Id);Ts)
! E(tell(netbill;M;signedResult(C;PrId;Quote;K);Id);Tsign) ^
Tsign < Ts:
[IC7] H(tell(M;netbill;endorsedEPO(epo(C;PrId;Quote);K;M);Id);T)
! E(tell(netbill;M;signedResult(C;PrId;Quote;K);Id);Tsign) ^
T < Tsign:
[IC8] H(tell(netbill;M;signedResult(C;PrId;Quote;K);Id);Tsign)
! E(tell(M;C;receipt(PrId;Quote;K);Id);Ts) ^
Tsign < Ts:155
\As long as the protocol is respected, the merchant receives the payment
for a good G if and only if the customer receives the good G."
(Good Atomicity Property)
Since the SCIFF deals with (communicative) events and not with the states of the
peers, we need to express the properties in terms of happened events. To this purpose,
we can assume that merchant has received the payment once the NetBill server has
issued the signedResult message, and that the the customer has received the good if
she has received the encrypted good (with a deliver message) and the encryption key
(with a receipt message).
Thus, the property we want to verify can be expressed as
H(tell(netbill;M;signedResult(C;PrId;Quote;K);Id);Tsign)
() H(tell(M;C;goodDelivery(crypt(PrId;K);Quote);Id);T)
^H(tell(M;C;receipt(PrId;Quote;K);Id);Ts)
(4.6.1)
whose negation is
(:H(tell(netbill;M;signedResult(C;PrId;Quote;K);Id);Tsign)
^H(tell(M;C;goodDelivery(crypt(PrId;K);Quote);Id);T)
^H(tell(M;C;receipt(PrId;Quote;K);Id);Ts))
_
(H(tell(netbill;M;signedResult(C;PrId;Quote;K);Id);Tsign)
^:H(tell(M;C;goodDelivery(crypt(PrId;K);Quote);Id);T)
_
(H(tell(netbill;M;signedResult(C;PrId;Quote;K);Id);Tsign)
^:H(tell(M;C;goodDelivery(crypt(PrId;K);Quote);Id);T))
(4.6.2)156
In other words, an history that entails Eq. (4.6.2) is a counterexample of the property
that we want to prove. In order to search for such a history, we de¯ne the SCIFF
goal as follows:
g ÃEN(tell(netbill;M;signedResult(C;PrId;Quote;K);Id);Tsign);
E(tell(M;C;goodDelivery(crypt(PrId;K);Quote);Id);T);
E(tell(M;C;receipt(PrId;Quote;K);Id);Ts)):
g ÃE(tell(netbill;M;signedResult(C;PrId;Quote;K);Id);Tsign);
EN(tell(M;C;goodDelivery(crypt(PrId;K);Quote);Id);T):
g ÃE(tell(netbill;M;signedResult(C;PrId;Quote;K);Id);Tsign);
EN(tell(M;C;goodDelivery(crypt(PrId;K);Quote);Id);T))
(4.6.3)
and run g-SCIFFwith the integrity constraints showed in Spec. 4.6.1.
The result of the call is a failure. This suggests that there is no history that entails
the negation of the property while respecting the protocol, i.e., the property is likely
to hold if the protocol is respected.
If we remove IC8 (which imposes that a signedResult message be followed by a
receipt message), then the following history is generated:
h(tell(_E,_F,priceRequest(_D),_C),_M),
h(tell(_F,_E,priceQuote(_D,_B),_C),_L),
h(tell(_E,_F,goodRequest(_D,_B),_C),_K),
h(tell(_F,_E,goodDelivery(crypt(_D,_A),_B),_C),_J),
h(tell(_E,_F,payment(_E,crypt(_D,_A),_B),_C),_I),
h(tell(_F,netbill,endorsedEPO(epo(_E,_D,_B),_A,_F),_C),_H),
h(tell(netbill,_F,signedResult(_E,_D,_B,_A),_C),_G),
_I<_H, _H<_G,
_L>_M, _K>_L, _I>_J, _J>_K,
The receipt event is missing, hence proving (by means of the counter-example gen-
erated) that the protocol step envisaged by IC8 was necessary in order to guarantee
the good atomicity property.157
4.7 Related Works
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ¯rst comprehensive and fully operational
approach addressing both types of veri¯cation (property veri¯cation, presented in
this chapter, and compliance veri¯cation, Section 3.1), and using the same protocol
de¯nition language in both cases.
Although the property veri¯cation is about properties of any kind, in security
research ¯eld this issues has acquired an enormous importance, and a huge literature
is available on the topic. In the following, we discuss some related logic-based ap-
proaches to automatic veri¯cation of security properties. Note however that security
protocols and their proof of °awedness are, in g-SCIFF viewpoint, instances of the
general concepts of interaction protocols and their properties.
Russo et al. [128] discuss the application of abductive reasoning for analyzing
safety properties of declarative speci¯cations expressed in the Event Calculus. In
their abductive approach, the problem of proving that, for some invariant I, a domain
description D entails I (D j= I), is translated into an equivalent problem of showing
that it is not possible to consistently extend D with assertions that particular events
have actually occurred (i.e., with a set of abductive hypotheses ¢), in such a way that
the extended description entails :I. In other words, there is no set ¢ such that D [
¢ j= :I. They solve this latter problem by a complete abductive decision procedure,
thus exploiting abduction in a refutation mode. Whenever the procedure ¯nds such
a set ¢, the assertions in ¢ act as a counterexample for the invariant. Our work
is closely related: in fact, in both cases, goals represent negation of properties, and
the proof-procedure attempts to generate counterexamples by means of abduction.
However, we rely on a di®erent language (in particular, ours can also be used for158
checking compliance on the °y without changing the speci¯cation of the protocol,
which is a demanding task) and we deal with time by means of CLP constraints,
whereas Russo et al. employ a temporal formalism based on Event Calculus.
In [30] the authors present a new approach, On-the-Fly Model Checker, to model
check security protocols, using two concepts quite related to our approach: the con-
cept of lazy data types for representing a (possibly) in¯nite transition system, and
the use of variables in the messages that an intruder can generate. In particular, the
use of unbound variables reduces the state space generated by every possible mes-
sage that an intruder can utter. Protocols are represented in the form of transition
rules, triggered by the arrival of a message: proving properties consists of exploring
the tree generated by the transition rules, and verifying that the property holds for
each reachable state. They prove results of soundness and completeness, provided
that the number of messages is bounded. Our approach is very similar, from the
operational viewpoint. The main di®erence is that the purpose of our language is
not limited to the analysis of security protocols: their approach instead is deeply
focused on the security issues (e.g., the presence of an intruder is mandatory for
each protocol speci¯cation, and it is not possible to avoid it). Moreover, we have
introduced variables in all the messages, and not only in the messages uttered by the
intruder; we can pose CLP constraints on these variables, whereas OFMC can only
generate equality/inequality constraints. On the downside, OFMC provides state-of-
the-art performance for security protocol analysis; our approach instead su®ers for
its generality, and its performance is de¯nitely worse than the OFMC.
A relevant work in computer science on veri¯cation of security protocols was done159
by Abadi and Blanchet [35, 1]. They adopt a veri¯cation technique based on logic pro-
gramming in order to verify security properties of protocols, such as secrecy and au-
thenticity in a fully automatic way, without bounding the number of sessions. In their
approach, a protocol is represented in extensions of pi calculus with cryptographic
primitives. The protocol represented in this extended calculus is then automatically
translated into a set of Horn clauses [1]. To prove secrecy, in [35, 1] attacks are mod-
eled by relations and secrecy can be inferred by non-derivability: if attacker(M) is
not derivable, then secrecy of M is guaranteed. More importantly, the derivability of
attacker(M) can be used, instead, to reconstruct an attack. This approach was later
extended in [34] in order to prove authenticity. By ¯rst order logic, having variables
in the representation, they overcome the limitation of bounding the number of ses-
sions. We achieve the same generality of [35, 1], since in their approach Horn clause
veri¯cation technique is not speci¯c to any formalism for representing the protocol,
but a proper translator from the protocol language to Horn clause has to be de¯ned.
In our approach, we preferred to directly de¯ne a rewriting proof-procedure (SCIFF)
for the protocol representation language. Furthermore, by exploiting abduction and
CLP constraints, also in the implementation of g-SCIFF transitions themselves, in
our approach we are able to generate proper traces where terms are constrained when
needed along the derivation avoiding to impose further parameters to names as done
in [1]. CLP constraints can do this more easily.
Armando et al. [23] compile a security program into a logic program with choice
lp-rules with answer set semantics. They search for attacks of length k, for increasing
values of k, and they are able to derive the °aws of various °awed security protocols.
They model explicitly the capabilities of the intruder, while we take the opposite160
viewpoint: we explicitly state what the intruder cannot do (like decrypting a message
without having the key, or guessing the key or the nonces of an agent), without
implicitly limiting the abilities of the intruder.
Our protocol speci¯cations can be seen as intensional formulations of the possible
(i.e., compliant) traces of communication interactions. In this respect, our way of
modeling protocols is very similar to the one of Paulson's inductive approach [120].
In particular, our representation of the events is almost the same, but we explicitly
mention time in order to express temporal constraints. In the inductive approach,
the protocol steps are modeled as possible extensions of a trace with new events and
represented by (forward) rules, similar to our ICs. However, in our system we have
expectations, which allow us to cope with both compliance on the °y and veri¯cation
of properties without changing the protocol speci¯cation. Moreover, ICs can be con-
sidered more expressive than inductive rules, since they deal with constraints (and
constraint satisfaction in the proof), and disjunctions in the head. As far as veri¯ca-
tion, the inductive approach requires more human interaction and expertise, since it
exploits a general purpose theorem prover, and has the disadvantage that it cannot
generate counterexamples directly (as most theorem prover-based approaches). In-
stead, we use a specialized proof-procedure based on abduction that can perform the
proof without any human intervention, and can generate counterexamples.
Millen and Shmatikov [113] de¯ne a sound and complete proof-procedure, later
improved by Corin and Etalle [52], based on constraint solving for cryptographic
protocol analysis. g-SCIFF is based on constraint solving as well, but with a di®erent
°avour of constraint: while the approaches by Millen and Shmatikov and by Corin
and Etalle are based on abstract algebra, our constraint solver comprises a CLP(FD)161
solver, and embeds constraint propagation techniques to speed-up the solving process.
In [140], Song presents Athena, an approach to automatic security protocol anal-
ysis. Athena is a very e±cient technique for proving protocol properties: unlike other
techniques, Athena copes well with state space explosion and is applicable with an
unbounded number of peers participating in a protocol, thanks to the use of theorem
proving and to a compact way to represent states. Athena is correct and complete
(but termination is not guaranteed). Like Athena, the representation of states and
protocols in g-SCIFF is non ground, and therefore general and compact. Unlike
Athena's, the g-SCIFF's implementation is not optimized, and su®ers from the pres-
ence of symmetrical states. On the other hand, a clear advantage of our approach is
that protocols are written and analyzed in a formalism which is the same used for
run-time veri¯cation of compliance.
Ä Ozkohen and Yolum [117] propose an approach for the prediction of exceptions in
supply chains which builds upon the well-known commitment-based approach for pro-
tocol speci¯cation (see, for instance, Yolum and Singh [155]); their approach is related
in many aspects to our on-the-°y veri¯cation. They represent the expected agent be-
haviour by means of commitments between agents; commitments have timeouts, i.e.,
they must be ful¯lled by a deadline, and can be composed by means of conjunction
and disjunction. In this perspective, commitments are similar to our expectations,
which can have deadlines represented by CLP constraints, and which are composed in
disjunctions of conjunctions in the head of the social integrity constraints. However,
our expectations can regard any kind of events expected to happen, not only those
that can be represented as a commitment of a debtor towards a creditor; and we
can also represent negative expectations. Operationally, in [117] the reasoning about162
commitments is centralized in a monitoring agents; in our framework, a similar task
in performed by the social infrastructure.
One way to prove/disprove the security of the protocols is the cryptographic ap-
proach, whose security de¯nitions are based on complexity theory. Such an approach
have been used for proofs by hand [87] or, more recently, automatically [25]. Theo-
rem provers, such as Isabelle/HOL [115] have also been applied to such a task, also
together with tools for graphically representing and de¯ning the protocols [150]. An-
other viewpoint is to embody a possible intruder and plan for an attack [5]: if a
planner succeeds in developing such a plan, then the protocol is, clearly, °awed.
Dixon et al. [65], specify security protocols in KL(n), a language for representing
the Temporal Logic of Knowledge. KL(n) contains both a linear-time temporal logic
and a modal connective for representing what the various agents know. They use
clausal resolution to automatically prove properties of security protocols. As an
example, they give the speci¯cations of the Needham-Schroeder protocol in KL(n),
then they show how to apply clausal resolution for proving formal properties. In
a technical report [66], they de¯ne a proof system based on resolution rules in a
sequent style notation, and a temporal resolution algorithm, then applied to the
mentioned protocol. They then show the derivation of some properties of the protocol,
for example, that an intruder does not know the sensitive information exchanged
by other agents following the protocol. Finally, they show Lowe's attack on the
protocol, and state that, if they do not assume that an agent A can send a message
to an agent B only encrypted with B's public key, the previous properties (on the
intruder's ignorance) cannot be proven. [122] also use a temporal logic enriched with
epistemic connectives for representing the agents' knowledge, but exploit e±cient data163
structures (namely, Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams) to improve the e±ciency.
[90] propose a framework for the synthesis of security protocols. Their framework
employs SVO logic to express the initial conditions od a protocol run, the goals that
the protocol is wanted to achieve and the e®ect of message exchanges (in terms of
the principals' knowledge and beliefs). An e±cient (according to a ¯tness function)
protocol is synthesized by simulated annealing in the space of the protocols that
achieve the goal starting from the initial conditions. By using g-SCIFF, we can
synthesize a history that satis¯es a given goal; if we view the synthesized history as a
protocol run, the result of a computation can be seen as a synthesized protocol that
achieves a given goal. However, we do not use a logic for expressing secrecy and trust
properties in terms of exchanged messages; and we have not yet researched e±cient
search strategies for generating one of the possible histories.
Among other approaches to security protocols veri¯cation we cite those devel-
oped using hereditary Harrop formulas [55], process-algebraic languages [119], model-
checking with pre-con¯guration [101], proof-theory [56].
We terminate the discussion on related works by citing [136], where Shanahan also
introduces a concept of expectation: a robot moves in an o±ce, and has expectations
about where it is standing, based on the values obtained by sensors. Both this work
and ours share the idea of abducing expectations. The di®erence is that Shanahan
uses the expectations to elaborate plans for the future moves of the robot, while we
use them to elaborate all the possible histories and prove properties.164Chapter 5
A-priori Conformance: the
ALLOWS Framework
The AlLoWS (Abductive Logic Web-service Speci¯cation) Framework aims to verify
the a-priori compliance conformance of peers w.r.t. global protocols, i.e. the Type 1
veri¯cation presented in Section 1.2. This veri¯cation type is of the utmost impor-
tance in modern systems.
The a-priori conformance is a required step to achieve the \o®-the-shelf compo-
nents" business model. Although heterogeneities between di®erent hardware/software
components has been solved by introducing standards (like, to cite one, the Web Ser-
vice approach), at the application level a solution is still missing. The desired goal is
to take o®-the-shelf components, test a-priori their compliance with existing systems,
and in case of positive answer safely introduce the new entities in the old system
(hence substituting an older component or extending the system).
The approach we propose here is to assume that each component is described by
its behavioural interface: in particular, we propose to describe both the component
external behaviour and the global protocol using the same formalism, based on the
SCIFF Language discussed in Section 2.3.
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Then we provide de¯nitions of conformance (feeble and strong), and discuss how
it is possible to exploit the SCIFF and the g-SCIFF proof procedure to verify the
conformance. Hence, using the single framework SCIFF and its extension g-SCIFF,
our solution addresses the a-priori conformance issue within a uni¯ed SCIFF based
framework.
Note that the framework name derives from the fact that we have applied it for
the ¯rst time to the Web Services/Choreography scenario, where the interoperability
issues is heavily studied. However, our approach can be seamlessly used in other
application scenarios.
Contribution of the Author. The author contributed in a substantial way to the
presented results. In particular, the ¯rst architecture was proposed by the author,
together with its colleague; Marco Gavanelli spotted some limits of that solution
and proposed an extended version. The actual framework is the result of a further
extensions applied by the author (of course by following the supervisor hints).
Chapter Organization. The chapter is organized as follow: in Section 5.1 we
introduce the language for specifying both the behavioural interface and the global
protocol (actually, a subset of the SCIFF language).
In Section 5.2 we provide e declarative semantics to the AlLoWS language, to-
gether with de¯nitions of Feeble Conformance and Strong Conformance. In Section
5.3 then we de¯ne the operational semantics of AlLoWS.
In Sections 5.4 and 5.5 we present some simple examples, and then a more complex
(and real) example of how our approach can be used, and what are the outcomes.
Finally, in Section 5.6 we discuss some related issues.167
5.1 The ALLOWS Speci¯cation Language
The speci¯cation language used in the AlLoWS framework is a subset of the SCIFF
language presented in Section 2.3. In particular, negative expectations and explicit
negation have been removed from the entities of the language. This simpli¯cation
has been possible because, as many other do in the literature, we assume a closed
model interaction, as discussed in Section 2.2.2. As consequence, EN atoms are not
necessary.
In the AlLoWS Framework the same notation used in [27] is adopted: a message
is described by the term mx(Sender;Receiver;Content), where mx is the type of
message, and the arguments retain their intuitive meaning. We sometimes simplify
the notation, and omit some of the parameters when the meaning is clear from the
context. Note that this notation is equivalent to the one adopted in the SCIFF
Framework (Section 2.1).
As in SCIFF, happened events are represented as H(Message;Time), where
Message has the syntax previously de¯ned, and Time is an integer, representing
the time point in which the event happened. As we will see in the following, the
H predicate can be abduced, when making hypotheses on the possible interactions
(as we do in Chapter 4. In other phases, they are considered as given a priori, thus
considered as a de¯ned predicate (as in Chapter 2.
We represent expectations with the predicate
EX(Message;Time)
expressing the fact that the corresponding event is expected to happen, in order to
ful¯l the coherent evolution, from the viewpoint of X (where X might be either the168
global protocol or a peer public policy).
Note that, w.r.t. the SCIFF, here we explicitly state the expectation viewpoint:
in fact, since we are using the same language for de¯ning both the global protocol
and the peer policy, we need to distinguish between protocol expectations Eprot and
the peer expectations Epeer.
5.1.1 Speci¯cation of a Protocol
A protocol describes, from a global viewpoint, what are the patterns of communica-
tion, or interactions, allowed in a system that adopts such protocol [28]. The protocol
speci¯cation de¯nes the messages that are allowed: it is not possible to exchange other
messages except the ones explicitly speci¯ed. The protocol usually also enlists the
participants, the roles the participants can play, and other knowledge about the peer
interaction. Note that we are adopting a closed interaction model, as described in
Section 2.2.2.
As in SCIFF, we specify a protocol by means of an abductive logic program [95].
A protocol speci¯cation Pchor is de¯ned by the triple:
Pprot ´ hKBprot;Eprot;ICproti
where:
² KBprot is the Knowledge Base,
² Eprot is the set of E atoms and abducible predicates, and
² ICprot is the set of Integrity Constraints.
The syntax of the SOKB is reported in Equation (5.1.1).169
SOKB ::= [Clause]?
Clause ::= Atom Ã Cond
Cond ::= ExtLiteral [ ^ ExtLiteral ]?
ExtLiteral ::= LiteraljExpectationjAbduciblejConstraint
Expectation ::= Eprot(Term [;T])
Abducible ::= AtomLiteral ::= Atom j :Atom j true
(5.1.1)
The abducible predicates are those that can be hypothesized (abduced) in our
framework, namely happened events (denoted by the functor H), expectations (de-
noted by the functor Eprot), and generic abducibles predicates.
Integrity Constraints ICprot are the usual forward rules, of the form Body ! Head,
whose Body can contain literals and (happened and expected) events, and whose Head
can contain (disjunctions of) conjunctions of expectations. In Eq. (5.1.2) we report
the formal de¯nition of the grammar.
ICprot ::= [IC]?
IC ::= Body ! Head
Body ::= (EventjExpect) [^BodyLit]?
BodyLit ::= EventjExpectjLiteraljConstraint
Head ::= Disjunct [ _ Disjunct ]?jfalse
Disjunct ::= ExpectjAbducible [ ^ (ExpectjAbduciblejConstraint)]?
Expect ::= Eprot(Term [;T])
Event ::= H(Term [;T])
Literal ::= Atom j :Atom
(5.1.2)
The syntax of ICprot is a simpli¯ed version of the introduced in Section 2.3. In
particular in AlLoWS we do not need negative expectations and explicit negation.170
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Figure 5.1: Graphical representation of a simple protocol
In Fig. 5.1 a multi-party interaction is shown, expressed by the set of Integrity Con-
straints in Speci¯cation 5.1.1: the depicted scenario is about a User that wants to
buy a °ight ticket from a Flight Service, and pay by sending a payment order to a
Bank.171
Speci¯cation 5.1.1 The speci¯cation of the protocol shown in Fig. 5.1.
H(request(User;FS;Flight);Tr)
!Eprot(o®er(FS;User;Flight;Price);To)
_Eprot(notAvailable(FS;User;Flight);Tna)
(5.1.3)
H(o®er(FS;User;Flight;Price);To)
!Eprot(ackO®er(User;FS;Flight;Price);Ta)
_Eprot(nAckO®er(User;FS;Flight;Price);Ta)
(5.1.4)
H(ackO®er(User;FS;Flight;Price);Ta)
!Eprot(payment(User;Bank;Price;FS);Tf)
_Eprot(cancel(User;FS;Flight);Tf)
(5.1.5)
H(ackO®er(User;FS;Flight;Price);Ta)
^ H(notifyPayment(Bank;FS;Price);Tp)
!Eprot(°ightTicket(FS;User;Flight);Tf)
_Eprot(°ightCancelled(FS;User;Flight);Tf)
(5.1.6)
H(cancel(User;FS;Flight);Ta)
!Eprot(°ightCancelled(FS;User;Flight);Tf)
(5.1.7)
H(payment(User;Bank;Price;Creditor);Tp)
!Eprot(notifyPayment(Bank;Creditor;Price);Tn)
(5.1.8)172
5.1.2 Representing the peers
In an analogous way as we de¯ne the speci¯cation of a peers, we describe the interface
behaviour of a peer by means of an Abductive Logic Program. In particular, we
restrict our analysis to the communicative aspects of the interface behaviour. A Web
Service Interface Behaviour Speci¯cation Pws is an Abductive Logic Program [95],
represented with the triple
Ppeer ´ hKBpeer;Epeer;ICpeeri
where:
² KBws is the Knowledge Base of the peer,
² Ews is the set of abducible predicates, and
² ICws is the set of Integrity Constraints.
The Knowledge Base (KBper) speci¯es the knowledge of a peer. In KBpeer, clauses
may contain in their body literals de¯ned in KBpeer, expectations about the behaviour
of the web service peer, or messages that peer expects to receive from other partic-
ipants. It has the same syntax as the protocol's knowledge base, except for the
expectations, that are indicated with the functor Epeer instead of Eprot.
Epeer is the set of abducible predicates. Similarly to the choreography speci¯ca-
tion, this set consists of both expectations (denoted by Epeer), happened events (H),
and normal abducibles. In the protocol speci¯cation the expectations are used for
representing the global viewpoint of how things should go, hence all the expectations
have the same meaning. In the peer speci¯cation instead we are expressing how it173
\perceives" the interaction: the viewpoint is local, and the expectations assume a
slightly di®erent meaning depending on who is expected to do what. More in detail:
² Expectations about messages where peer is the sender are intended as the pos-
sible messages that peer can indeed utter. Intuitively, expectations of the form
Epeer(mx(ws;Any;Content)) represent the \active" behaviour of peer, i.e. the
actions that it could perform. Hence they represent the \outgoing" communica-
tive behaviour of peer. The conformance test should ensure that every possible
message that peer could utter, is indeed envisaged by the protocol.
² Expectations about messages where other participants are the senders and peer
is the receiver, can be intended instead as the messages that peer is able to
understand. They are of the form Epeer(mx(Any;ws;Content)), with Any 6=
peer.
² Abducibles predicates, that represents extra hypotheses about the interaction
(see, for example, Section 5.4.5).
Integrity Constraints ICpeer are forward rules, and they are identical to the ICprot
(except for the fact that expectations are from the peer's viewpoint: Epeer instead
of Eprot). While in the protocol speci¯cation we use them to specify the desired
behaviour of the participants, ICpeer are used instead to describe the communication
aspects of the interface behaviour of a peer.
In Fig. 5.2(b) the communicative part of the interface behaviour of a peer is
represented. The corresponding translation in terms of ICws is given in Speci¯cation
5.1.2.174
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Figure 5.2: Example of behavioural interfaces175
Speci¯cation 5.1.2 The interface behaviour speci¯cation of the web service shown
in Fig. 5.2.
H(request(User;fs;Flight);Tr)
!Efs(o®er(fs;User;Flight;Price);To)
_Efs(notAvailable(fs;User;Flight);Tna)
(5.1.9)
H(o®er(fs;User;Flight;Price);To)
!Efs(User;fs;ackOffer(User;fs;Flight;Price);Ta)
_Efs(User;fs;nAckOffer(User;fs;Flight;Price);Ta)
(5.1.10)
H(notifyPayment(Bank;fs;Price);Tp)
!Efs(°ightCancelled(fs;User;Flight);Tc)
^ Tp > Ta + ± ^ Tc > Tp
_Efs(°ightTicket(fs;User;Flight);Tt)
^ Tt > Tp
(5.1.11)
H(ackO®er(User;fs;Flight;Price);Ta)
!Efs(notifyPayment(Bank;fs;Price);Tp)
_Efs(User;fs;cancel(User;fs;Flight);Tc)
(5.1.12)
H(cancel(User;fs;Flight);Ta)
!Efs(°ightCancelled(fs;User;Flight);Tf)
(5.1.13)176
As for the choreographies, also peer speci¯cations can be goal directed, by specify-
ing a goal Gpeer, with the same syntax (Cond in Eq. 5.1.1), in which the expectations
are Epeer instead of Eprot.177
5.2 Declarative semantics
Intuitively, conformance is the characteristics of a peer to comply to a protocol, pro-
vided that the other peers will behave according to the protocol. From the declarative
semantics viewpoint, the test of conformance requires to assume further hypotheses
about events peer expects to utter, and events that the protocol speci¯cation expects
other peers to utter. Both can be mapped into constraints, provided that we consider
the predicate H as abducible. We use the peer's interface behaviour Ppeer to foresee
the messages the peer will send in every possible situation, provided that the other
peers behave as speci¯ed by the protocol. Formally, all the messages the peer expects
to send will be executed, i.e.:
Epeer(mx(peer;R;C);T) ! H(mx(peer;R;C);T) (5.2.1)
Symmetrically for the messages exchanged by other peers as prescribed by the
protocol speci¯cation Pprot:
Eprot(mx(S;R;C);T);S 6= peer ! H(mx(S;R;C);T) (5.2.2)
The possible interactions amongst the peer and the other peers will be the sets
HAP
¤ satisfying equations 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. Note also that some extra hypotheses
could be made by the peer or by the choreography speci¯cation: such hypothesis set
(¢A) must be consistent.
De¯nition 5.2.1 Given the abductive program hKBU, EU, ICUi, where:
² KBU , KBprot [ KBpeer178
² EU , Eprot [ Epeer
² ICU , ICprot [ ICpeer
a possible interaction amongst a peer in a protocol prot is a triple (HAP
¤,EXP
¤,¢A)
such that:
KBU [ HAP
¤ [ EXP
¤ [ ¢A j= GU (5.2.3)
KBU [ HAP
¤ [ EXP
¤ [ ¢A j= ICU (5.2.4)
KBU [ HAP
¤ [ EXP
¤ j= (5:2:1) [ (5:2:2) (5.2.5)
(where by Eq. 5.2.5 we mean that equations 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 must hold). The set
HAP
¤ is also called possible history.
When the goal GU is true, the empty set is typically one of the possible histories.
The empty history is often of little (or no) interest for proving conformance. When
the interesting histories are only those containing at least one event, the expectation
of such event can be inserted as the goal GU. Typically, we use as goal the expectation
(both from the peer's viewpoint, Epeer and from the protocol's viewpoint, Eprot) of
the ¯rst event of an interaction. This poses no serious restriction on the types of
protocols that can be tested, as if there is not a unique starting event, a dummy
event can be inserted as initiation of the protocol.
Example 5.2.1 Suppose a choreography prescribes the following protocol:
H(ask(peer;R;X)) ! Eprot(answer(R;peer;X)) (5.2.6)
H(answer(R;peer;X)) ! Eprot(ack(peer;R;X))179
while the peer's integrity constraints contain only the ¯rst rule
H(ask(peer;R;X)) ! Epeer(answer(R;peer;X)):
Let GU = Epeer(ask(peer;other;X)); Eprot(ask(peer;other;X)). Given the goal GU,
the peer has the intention to send an ask message to the other, so all the possible
histories for GU will contain the event H(ask(peer;other;X)). The other's behaviour
is simulated through the rules in the protocol speci¯cation. Since the protocol has an
expectation (generated by rule 5.2.6) Eprot(answer(other;peer;X)), this will become
a happened event in all the possible histories: H(answer(other;peer;X)). Now, the
second rule provides a protocol's expectation about the third message: the peer is
supposed to send an ack message. But, as we can see from the peer's speci¯cation,
ws does not have an expectation to send such message, so the simulation will not
suppose it will comply to the protocol's expectation. So, the (only) possible history
for the goal GU is
HAP
¤ = fH(ask(peer;other;X));H(answer(other;peer;X))g: (5.2.7)
In a possible history, the messages uttered by the peers comply by de¯nition to
the protocol. However, the messages uttered by the peer under test might be non
conformant. The peer is conformant if all the possible histories (together with the
hypotheses made) are conformant. Also, peer should be able to understand all the
messages in a possible history, otherwise there might be requests of other peers in the
given choreography which peer is unable to serve. We require that all the possible
histories satisfy both the protocol and the peer expectations.180
De¯nition 5.2.2 (Feeble Conformance). A possible history HAP
¤ is Feeble Con-
formant if there exists a pair (EXP;¢A) such that1
KBU [ HAP
¤ [ EXP [ ¢A j= G (5.2.8)
KBU [ HAP
¤ [ EXP [ ¢A j= ICU (5.2.9)
HAP
¤ [ EXP j= Epeer(X) ! H(X) (5.2.10)
HAP
¤ [ EXP j= Eprot(X) ! H(X) (5.2.11)
A peer is feeble conformant if all the possible histories are feeble conformant. A
triple (HAP
¤;EXP;¢A) is a Feeble Conformant Interaction if HAP
¤ is a feeble
conformant history, and EXP and ¢A satisfy equations (5.2.8-5.2.11) (and EXP is
minimal with respect to set inclusion).
Example 5.2.2 Consider again the situation in Example 5.2.1. Given the possible
history of Equation 5.2.7, the expectation of the protocol for the third message (ask)
remains not ful¯lled, so the peer peer is clearly non conformant.
Feeble conformance ensures that the peer peer will utter all the messages requested
by the protocol, but it still does not require peer to avoid the messages forbidden by
the protocol. We extend feeble conformance to a stronger version in the following.
A possible history is strong conformant if (it is feeble conformant and) all the
happened events were expected both by the protocol and the interacting peer, and the
hypothesis set ¢A is consistent. We include in this concept only the communications
that involve the peer under observation (the other events, e.g., messages exchanged
1Note the di®erence between Equations (5.2.10-5.2.11) and Equations (5.2.1-5.2.2): Equa-
tion (5.2.10) is used as a test, and requires all the expectations of the peer to be ful¯lled, while
Equation (5.2.1) is used to generate the behaviour of the peer and imposes only the ful¯lment of the
expectations the peer has about itself. Analogously for Equations (5.2.11) and (5.2.2).181
by other peers in a multi-party interaction, are always considered conformant). Also,
by de¯nition the messages sent by the peer comply to its own speci¯cations, and
symmetrically the messages sent by the other peers comply to the protocol.
De¯nition 5.2.3 (Strong Conformance). A feeble conformant interaction
(HAP
¤, EXP;¢A) is also a Strong Conformant Interaction if the following con-
ditions hold:
H(mx(peer;R;C)) $ Eprot(mx(peer;R;C)) (5.2.12)
H(mx(S;peer;C)) $ Epeer(mx(S;peer;C)): (5.2.13)
A Strongly Conformant History is a history for which there exists a strongly con-
formant interaction. A peer is Strongly Conformant if all the possible histories are
strongly conformant.
Example 5.2.3 Let us change in the previous example the speci¯cations of the pro-
tocol and of the peer, i.e., the peer speci¯cation is
H(ask(peer;R;X)) ! Epeer(answer(R;peer;X))
H(answer(R;peer;X)) ! Epeer(ack(peer;R;X))
and the protocol is
H(ask(peer;R;X)) ! Eprot(answer(R;peer;X)):
In this case, the peer has the intention to send the ack, so it will indeed send it in
all the possible histories. The protocol does not prescribe this third message. The
possible history becomes
HAP
¤
2 = fH(ask(peer;other;X));
H(answer(other;peer;X));
H(ack(peer;other;X))g:182
All the expectations of the protocol are ful¯lled by one message of peer, so it is feeble
conformant. However, peer will also send an unrequested message ack, that might
confound other, undermining the interoperability. There exists no expectation from
the protocol for the ack message, therefore peer is non strong conformant.183
5.3 Operational semantics
The operational semantics is based on the SCIFF proof procedure, presented in Sec-
tion 2.5, and on the g-SCIFFproof procedure, discussed in 4.4.
In order to prove conformance, we apply the two proof procedures to the two
phases implicitly de¯ned in the previous section. We decompose the proof of feeble
conformance into a generative phase and a test phase. In the generative phase, we
generate, by means of g-SCIFF, all the possible histories. Of course, those histories
need not be generated as ground histories (the set of ground histories can be in¯nite),
but intensionally: the H events can contain variables, possibly with constraints µ a la
Constraint Logic Programming [91].
In the test phase, we check with SCIFF the compliance of the generated histories
both with respect to the peer and the protocol speci¯cations. If all the histories are
conformant, the peer is feeble conformant to the protocol. Otherwise, if there exists
at least one history that is not conformant, the peer is not (feeble) conformant.
Finally, we can prove strong conformance by checking that all the happened events
were indeed expected both by the protocol and by the peer. This can in principle be
done by using a version of SCIFF that does not have abducibles, but it can also be
performed during the second phase (SCIFF) by adopting the same technique used
in the ful¯lment transition: if a H event matches both with an Epeer and a Eprot
expectation, it is labelled expected; after the application of the closure transition, all
events that were not expected are considered unexpected, showing that the peer was
not strongly conformant.184
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Figure 5.3: AlLoWS architecture
5.4 Examples
Baldoni et al. [27, 26] show various examples of conformance and non-conformance
of a web service to a choreography, and propose a framework based on Finite State
Automata, to prove conformance. We show how their examples are addressed in
AlLoWS, based on Computational Logics. In particular, we will consider a chore-
ography speci¯cation as a global protocol, and as interacting peers we will consider
di®erent Web Services.
5.4.1 Web service with more capabilities
The ¯rst example taken by [27] is the following. The choreography speci¯cation
de¯nes only one allowed interaction: ws sends a message m1 and the other peer will
reply with m2:
H(m1(ws;X)) ! Echor(m2(X;ws))
The web service speci¯cation is wider: after the ¯rst message the web service
accepts as reply either m2 or m3:
H(m1(ws;X)) ! Ews(m2(X;ws)) _ Ews(m3(X;ws))185
Ews=chor(m1(ws;X))
H(m1(ws;X))
Echor(m2(X;ws))
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Figure 5.4: g-SCIFF derivation for Example 5.4.1
In this case, Baldoni et al. state that the web service is conformant. In fact, in a
legal conversation the message m3 will never be received by ws, so the interoperability
is ensured.
The g-SCIFF proof procedure is started with the goal containing the expectation,
both from the web service's and from the choreography's viewpoint, of the ¯rst event:
GU = Ews(m1(ws;X)) ^ Echor(m1(ws;X)). g-SCIFF in this case derives that there
exists one possible history: fm1;m2g. A simpli¯ed representation of the derivation2
is reported in Fig. 5.4. There are two alternative sets of expectations from the web
service viewpoint, fEws(m1); Ews(m2)g and fEws(m1), Ews(m3)g, but in the ¯rst
phase the correspondence between expectations and happened events is not required
(open derivation). In the second phase, the (only) generated history is checked; since
there exists one set of expectations that is ful¯lled by the generated history, the web
service is considered feeble conformant. Since in the generated history there are no
unexpected events, the web service is also strong conformant.
2The derivation does not report all the events and expectations, but for each node it gives
only those that are added. We use Ews=chor to indicate that the event is expected both by the
choreography and by the web service.186
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H H H H H H H
Echor(m2(X;ws))
H(m2(X;ws))
Success: H(m1);H(m2)
Echor(m4(X;ws))
H(m4(X;ws))
Success: H(m1);H(m4)
Figure 5.5: g-SCIFF derivation for Example 5.4.2
5.4.2 Missing capability
The second example by Baldoni et al. is dual to the ¯rst: the web service accepts as
reply only m2
H(m1(ws;X)) ! Ews(m2(X;ws))
while the choreography de¯nes as valid two interactions
H(m1(ws;X)) ! Echor(m2(X;ws)) _ Echor(m4(X;ws))
In this case, g-SCIFF provides two possible histories: fH(m1), H(m2)g and
fH(m1);H(m4)g. In the second phase, SCIFF detects non conformance of the history
fH(m1);H(m4)g, because the web service's expectation Ews(m2(S;ws;C)) remains
unful¯lled in all possible derivation paths. This means that the web service is blocked
waiting for message m2, and will not process other messages, so it is non (feeble) con-
formant.187
Ews=chor(m1(X;ws))
H(m1(X;ws)
©©©©©©© ©
H H H H H H H H
Ews(m2(ws;X))
Hws(m2(ws;X))
Success: fH(m1);H(m2)g
Ews(m3(ws;X))
Hws(m3(ws;X))
Success: fH(m1);H(m3)g
Figure 5.6: g-SCIFF derivation for Example 5.4.3
5.4.3 Wrong reply
In the third example the web service assumes to have the freedom to reply either m2
or m3 to a question m1
H(m1(X;ws)) ! Ews(m2(ws;X)) _ Ews(m3(ws;X))
while the choreography does not grant such a freedom: only m2 is legal
H(m1(X;ws)) ! Echor(m2(ws;X))
This case is judged non conformant by Baldoni et al, as there might be paths in which
the web service utters the forbidden message m3. g-SCIFF computes two possible
histories (fH(m1);H(m2)g and fH(m1);H(m3)g). The ¯rst is compliant, according
to SCIFF, while in the second the choreography's expectation Echor(m2) remains
pendent.
5.4.4 Prede¯ned answer
The dual of example 5.4.3 is when the choreography lets the web service choose to
reply m2 or m3 to a question m1,188
Ews=chor(m1(X;ws))
H(m1(X;ws))
Ews(m2(ws;X))
H(m2(ws;X))
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H H H H H H H
Echor(m2(ws;X))
Success: H(m1);H(m2)
Echor(m3(ws;X))
Success: H(m1);H(m2)
Figure 5.7: g-SCIFF derivation for Example 5.4.4
H(m1(X;ws)) ! Echor(m2(ws;X)) _ Echor(m3(ws;X))
while the web service sticks to the reply m2
H(m1(X;ws)) ! Ews(m2(ws;X)):
Again, AlLoWS provides a correct proof: g-SCIFF gives one possible history,
which is reported (feeble and strong) conformant by SCIFF in the second phase.
Thus, in all the examples by Baldoni et al., AlLoWS provides the same answer
proposed in [27].
5.4.5 Web services taking early decisions
In [26] Baldoni et al. have identi¯ed also conformance issues due to particular branc-
nhing structures in the protocol/behavioural de¯nitions.
In Figure 5.8 it is shown one of the possible situations. The Web Service be-
havioural interface states that, as soon as the message m0 is sent out, the ws will
decide to choose between the two di®erent paths m1;m2 and m1;m3. This choice is189
Figure 5.8: Message branching in the Web Service Speci¯cation
made (presumably) on the basis on some internal, private policy that ws does not
make public. The choreography instead specify that, from the global viewpoint, the
decision between m2 and m3 is taken after m1. This situation is considered by the
Baldoni et al. as a conformant one.
The issue not clearly stated in [26] is that the behavioural interface of ws intro-
duces two di®erent paths, and the choice between them is made upon some internal
policy. We map this situation by introducing, in the ws speci¯cation, a further ab-
ducible, whose meaning is to map this internal choice made at a early stage (in this
case the predicate p):
H(m0(ws;X)) ! EWS(m1(ws;X)) ^ p
_ EWS(m1(ws;X)) ^ not p
H(m1(ws;X)) ^ p ! EWS(m2(ws;X))
H(m1(ws;X)) ^ not p ! EWS(m3(ws;X))
In the choreography speci¯cation instead, it is not needed to introduce a further
predicate, since the paths can be all distinguished from each other in any moment.
Hence the choreography speci¯cation will be like:
H(m0(ws;X)) ! Echor(m1(ws;X))
H(m1(ws;X)) ! Echor(m2(ws;X))
_ Echor(m3(ws;X))190
Figure 5.9: Message branching in the Choreography Speci¯cation
The g-SCIFF generates only two histories:
HAP1 = fH(m0);H(m1);p;H(m2)g
HAP2 = fH(m0);H(m1);:p;H(m3)g
The SCIFF recognize both the histories, hence the web service is considered as
being strong conformant.
5.4.6 A choreography that takes an early decision
The dual case of the situation presented in Section 5.4.5 is when the choreography
speci¯cation provides two di®erent paths (possibly distinguished from each other only
later), while the web services choose a di®erent path only later. Such situation is
graphically represented in Figure 5.9.
This case is not considered as conformant, since ws could choose to utter message
m3 at a later moment, while the choreography expects ws to send, for example, m2.
As we did before, we use an abducible predicate to distinguish the di®erent paths
chosen (this time at the choreography level). ws can be speci¯ed as:
H(m0(ws;X)) ! EWS(m1(ws;X))
H(m1(ws;X)) ! EWS(m2(ws;X))
_ EWS(m3(ws;X))
The choreography instead is speci¯ed as:191
H(m0(ws;X)) ! Echor(m1(ws;X)) ^ p
_ Echor(m1(ws;X)) ^ not p
H(m1(ws;X)) ^ p ! Echor(m2(ws;X))
H(m1(ws;X)) ^ not p ! Echor(m3(ws;X))
This time the g-SCIFF generates four di®erent histories:
HAP1 = fH(m0);H(m1);H(m2);pg
HAP2 = fH(m0);H(m1);H(m2);:pg
HAP3 = fH(m0);H(m1);H(m3);pg
HAP4 = fH(m0);H(m1);H(m3);:pg
However, ws results to be not feeble conformant: taking, for example, the history
HAP2, it is possible to see that (since p has been abduced), the choreography has
an expectation about a message m3 that will not ful¯lled by ws.
We would like to note, however, that this situation appears quite strange and in
contrast with the same meaning of choreography. In fact, the speci¯cation states that
a choice is taken, without any criteria, and without any possibility of understanding
(until is too late) which path is desired at a global level. In our opinion, this contradict
the goal for which choreographies were introduced: i.e., to ease and properly rule the
interaction between di®erent peers.
5.4.7 Web service that decides too early to wait for a message
A similar situation to the one discussed in Section 5.4.5 is the one depicted in Figure
5.10. In this situation however, ws decides to wait for a message m2 or m3 when
before sending the message m1 (at a previous interaction step). Note that the only
di®erence w.r.t. the situation presented in Section 5.4.5 is that ws waits (instead of
sending) a message.192
Figure 5.10: Message branching in the Web Service Speci¯cation - waiting case
Again, we use an abducible predicate to represent such situation. Hence, ws is
speci¯ed as follow:
H(m0(ws;X)) ! EWS(m1(ws;X)) ^ p
_ EWS(m1(ws;X)) ^ not p
H(m1(ws;X)) ^ p ! EWS(m2(X;ws))
H(m1(ws;X)) ^ not p ! EWS(m3(X;ws))
The choreography speci¯cation instead is not di®erent form the previous one:
H(m0(ws;X)) ! Echor(m1(ws;X))
H(m1(ws;X)) ! Echor(m2(X;ws))
_ Echor(m3;(X;ws))
Although the situation is very similar to the one discussed in Section 5.4.5, in this
case Baldoni et al. state that the ws is not conformant to the choreography. In fact,
it might happen that the ws, following some internal policy, choose at a certain point
to wait for a message m2, while the choreography still leave this choice open. Later,
the peer X is still free to send m3 rather than m2: if this is the choice, ws will wait
for a message that no one will ever utter.193
This time the g-SCIFF generates four di®erent histories:
HAP1 = fH(m0);p;H(m1);H(m2)g
HAP2 = fH(m0);:p;H(m1);H(m2)g
HAP3 = fH(m0);p;H(m1);H(m3)g
HAP4 = fH(m0);:p;H(m1);H(m3)g
If we consider the history HAP2, we can note that :p has been abduced. This
means that ws will wait for message m3. Unfortunately, this message will never be
uttered. ws is not (feeble) conformant w.r.t. the choreography speci¯cation.
5.4.8 Choreography that decides early to wait for a message
to be received by ws
The dual case of the situation discussed in Section 5.4.6 is shown in Figure 5.11. In
this case, however, the choreography states that the path is chosen before ws sends
out m1. Note that this time m2 and m3 are expected to be received by ws, and note
sent as in Section 5.4.6
Figure 5.11: Message branching in the Choreography Speci¯cation - waiting case
The ws can be speci¯ed as:
H(m0(ws;X)) ! EWS(m1(ws;X))
H(m1(ws;X)) ! EWS(m2(X;ws))
_ EWS(m3(X;ws))194
The choreography instead is speci¯ed by introducing also an abducible predicate
p, used to discriminate the di®erent path chosen in the interaction:
H(m0(ws;X)) ! Echor(m1(ws;X)) ^ p
_ Echor(m1(ws;X)) ^ not p
H(m1(ws;X)) ^ p ! Echor(m2(X;ws))
H(m1(ws;X)) ^ not p ! Echor(m3(X;ws))
This time the early choice taken in the choreography speci¯cation does not un-
dermine the conformance: in fact ws is still capable to process both the message m2
and m3.
The g-SCIFF generates two di®erent histories:
HAP1 = fH(m0);H(m1);H(m2);pg
HAP2 = fH(m0);H(m1);H(m3);:pg
Both HAP1 and HAP2 are compliant (by SCIFF), hence ws is strong conformant
w.r.t. the choreography speci¯cation.
5.4.9 Forbidden message
In all the previous cases, feeble and strong conformance coincide. However, there
might be instances in which the choreography assumes that the interaction has ¯n-
ished, while the web service continues sending messages. For example, the choreog-
raphy expects only one message:
Gchor = Echor(m1(X;ws))
while ws will send back a message m2:
H(m1(X;ws)) ! Ews(m2(ws;X)):195
In this case, the only possible history is HAP
¤ = fH(m1), H(m2)g. This history
does not leave any pending expectations, both from the choreography and from the
web service's viewpoints, so ws is judged feeble conformant. However, the message
m2 was not expected by the choreography, and ws is not strong conformant.
5.4.10 Mutual exclusion
Many protocols include mutual exclusion between choices: for instance a choreog-
raphy might prescribe that if a given condition on a message m1 holds, a message
m2 should be exchanged, otherwise another message m3 should be sent. In AlLoWS,
conditions can be expressed by means of constraints (either the ones prede¯ned in the
underlying solver, i.e., CLP(FD), or user-de¯ned) or by means of de¯ned predicates.
As a simple example, consider the following: the choreography prescribes to reply
either m2 or m3, depending on the content of the previous message m1:
H(m1(X;ws;C)) ! Echor(m2(ws;X;C2));C > 0
_ Echor(m3(ws;X;C3));C · 0
while the web service always replies m2:
H(m1(X;ws;C)) ! Ews(m2(ws;X;C2))
g-SCIFF generates two possible histories, with variables and constraints upon the
variables (Fig 5.12). In both the messages m1 and m2 are generated, but while in the
¯rst the proof procedure assumes that C takes a value greater than 0, in the second C
is non positive. In the second phase, SCIFF takes as input both the happened events
and the constraint store, and accepts as conformant the ¯rst history, while discarding
as non-conformant the second.
Notice that constraints scope is not restricted only to variables in the content,
but might involve all the variables in the message, including time. The choreography196
Ews=chor(m1(X;ws;C))
H(m1(X;ws;C))
Ews(m2(ws;X;C2))
H(m2(ws;X;C2))
©©©©©©© ©
H H H H H H H H
Echor(m2(ws;X;C2))
Success: H(m1(X;ws;C));
C > 0
H(m2(ws;X;C2))
Echor(m3(ws;X;C3))
Success: H(m1(X;ws;C));
C · 0
H(m2(ws;X;C2))
Figure 5.12: g-SCIFF derivation for Example 5.4.10
might contain conditions on deadlines (if you receive a message within 5 minutes
answer ok, otherwise reply too late)), or on participants (if the sender is authorized,
etc.).
5.4.11 Deadlines
Suppose that the choreography speci¯es a deadline for the receipt of a given message
m2:
H(m1(X;ws;C1);T1) ! Echor(m2(ws;X;C2);T2)
^ T2 < T1 + ±chor
The web service ws, however, replies within a deadline that might be di®erent:
H(m1(X;ws;C1);T1) ! Ews(m2(ws;X;C2);T2)
^ T2 < T1 + ±ws:
In this case, the only possible history is
HAP
¤ = f H(m1(X;ws;C1);T1);
H(m2(ws;X;C2);T2);T2 < T1 + ±ws g197
Applying SCIFF to the generated history, we get the expectation
Echor(m2(ws;X;C2);T2) ^ T2 < T1 + ±chor
; this expectation matches with the second item of the HAP
¤ history if a further
condition holds: T2 < T1 +±chor. Coherently with the philosophy of Constraint Logic
Programming, SCIFF provides this constraint in output, as a conditional answer:
the web service is conformant provided that the answer arrives before the deadline
in the choreography speci¯cation. Depending on the propagation performed by the
adopted constraint solver, the information provided could be even more signi¯cant.
For example, if the two values ±ws and ±chor are ground, a CLP(FD) solver would
provide the conditional answer only if necessary, i.e., if ±chor < ±ws, (the deadline
imposed by the choreography is more tight than the one the web service will meet).198
5.5 A test conformance example
In this section we exemplify the proposed approach by using a very simple choreogra-
phy speci¯cation, shown in Fig. 5.1. The interaction is initiated by a User that asks
the Flight Service FS to book a °ight. If there are seats available on the plane, the
FS will reply with °ightO®er, specifying the Price of booking the seat. Otherwise,
the FS replies with notAvailable.
The offer can be accepted (with ackO®er) or refused (with nAckO®er) by the
User. If the o®er is accepted, the °ight company will book the seat. The User, after
booking, has still the freedom to Cancel the booking. Otherwise, it will issue a pay-
ment oder (payment) to the Bank, that will send the noti¯cation (notifyPayment)
to the creditor, the FS.
When the FS has received both the booking order (ackO®er) and the payment
(notifyPayment), it will normally issue the flightTicket to the User; however, the
FS retains the right to refuse the ticket and send a flightCancelled message in case
of problems (e.g., overbooking or other error conditions).
Fig. 5.2 shows the behavioural interface of a Flight Server web service; the speci¯-
cation in terms of ICs is in Spec. 5.1.2. The FS establishes that the late payment is
an error condition, and will cancel the booking if the payment noti¯cation does not
arrive within ± time units after the booking.
In next section, we show how the conformance of fs is proven in AlLoWS.
5.5.1 Conformance of the Flight Service
The test of conformance of the Flight Service fs is performed by generating, through
g-SCIFF, the set of the possible histories. The g-SCIFF derivation provides ¯ve199
possible histories:
HAP
¤
1 = fH(request(U;fs;F);Tr);
H(o®er(fs;C;F;P);To);
H(ackO®er(C;fs;F;P);Ta);
H(payment(C;B;P;fs);Tp);
H(notifyPayment(B;fs;P));Tn) ^ Tn > Ta + ±
H(°ightCancelled(fs;C;F);Tc)g;
HAP
¤
2 = fH(request(U;fs;F);Tr);
H(o®er(fs;C;F;P);To);
H(ackO®er(C;fs;F;P);Ta);
H(payment(C;B;P;fs);Tp);
H(notifyPayment(B;fs;P));Tn) ^ Tn · Ta + ±
H(°ightTicket(fs;C;F);Tt)g;
HAP
¤
3 = fH(request(U;fs;F);Tr);
H(o®er(fs;C;F;P);To);
H(ackO®er(C;fs;F;P);Ta);
H(cancel(C;fs;F);Tc);
H(°ightCancelled(fs;C;F))g;200
HAP
¤
4 = fH(request(U;fs;F);Tr);
H(o®er(fs;C;F;P);To);
H(nAckO®er(C;fs;F;P);Ta)g;
HAP
¤
5 = fH(request(U;fs;F);Tr);
H(notAvailable(fs;C;F;P);Tn)g:
Two of the histories include time constraints. All the possible histories are trivially
conformant: they satisfy both the expectations of the choreography, and those of the
web service fs. Thus, fs is feeble conformant. Moreover, all the generated events
are expected, and this shows that fs is also strong conformant.
5.5.2 Conformance of the User web service
Suppose now that the user web service has the behavioural interface in Spec. 5.5.1.
Note that the User implements a policy for deciding whether to accept (ackO®er)
or refuse (nAckO®er) the o®er of the FS: if the Price is less than a max quota,
then the o®er is accepted (and declined otherwise). Also, this User web service does
not have expectations on the Bank's reply: in fact, in this choreography, the Bank
does not need to notify the User about the payment. Finally, User always expects
to receive a ticket after paying.
Invoked with the goal Echor(request) ^ Euser(request), g-SCIFF generates the201
Speci¯cation 5.5.1 The behavioural interface of a web service that is not conformant
for the role of User
H(request(user;FS;Flight);Tr)
!Euser(o®er(FS;user;Flight;Price);To)
_Euser(notAvailable(FS;user;Flight);Tna)
(5.5.1)
H(o®er(FS;user;Flight;Price);To)
!Euser(ackO®er(user;FS;Flight;Price);Ta) ^ Price · max
_Euser(nAckO®er(user;FS;Flight;Price);Ta) ^ Price > max
(5.5.2)
H(ackO®er(user;FS;Flight;Price);Ta)
!Euser(payment(user;Bank;Price;FS);Tf)
_Euser(cancel(user;FS;Flight);Tf)
(5.5.3)
H(ackO®er(user;FS;Flight;Price);Ta)
^ H(payment(user;Bank;Price;FS);Tp)
!Euser(°ightTicket(FS;user;Flight);Tf)
(5.5.4)
H(cancel(user;FS;Flight);Ta)
!Euser(°ightCancelled(FS;user;Flight);Tf)
(5.5.5)
H(payment(User;Bank;Price;Creditor);Tp)
!Echor(notifyPayment(Bank;Creditor;Price);Tn)
(5.5.6)
possible histories, that in this case are:
HAP
¤
1 = fH(request(U;fs;F);Tr);
H(o®er(fs;C;F;P);To);
H(ackO®er(C;fs;F;P);Ta) ^ P · max;
H(payment(C;B;P;fs);Tp);
H(notifyPayment(B;fs;P));Tn);
H(°ightCancelled(fs;C;F);Tc)g;202
HAP
¤
2 = fH(request(U;fs;F);Tr);
H(o®er(fs;C;F;P);To);
H(ackO®er(C;fs;F;P);Ta) ^ P · max;
H(payment(C;B;P;fs);Tp);
H(notifyPayment(B;fs;P));Tn);
H(°ightTicket(fs;C;F);Tt)g;
HAP
¤
3 = fH(request(U;fs;F);Tr);
H(o®er(fs;C;F;P);To);
H(ackO®er(C;fs;F;P);Ta) ^ P · max;
H(cancel(C;fs;F);Tc);
H(°ightCancelled(fs;C;F);Tfc)g;
HAP
¤
4 = fH(request(U;fs;F);Tr);
H(o®er(fs;C;F;P);To) ^ P · max;
H(nAckO®er(C;fs;F;P);Ta)g;
HAP
¤
5 = fH(request(U;fs;F);Tr);
H(notAvailable(fs;C;F;P);Tn)g:
However, in the second phase, SCIFF applied to the history HAP
¤
1 signals that
the user's expectation Euser(°ightTicket(FS;user;Flight);Tt) remains unful¯lled,
proving that user is not (feeble) conformant. In fact, this user web service under-
mines the interoperability with other web services conformant with the same chore-
ography. As an example, we can easily see that in case the Bank does not provide the
notifyPayment within the deadline imposed by fs (Spec. 5.1.2), the two web services
are unable to complete the choreography.203
5.6 Related Works
A number of languages for specifying service choreographies and testing \a priori"
and/or \run-time" conformance have been proposed in the literature. Two examples
of these languages are represented by state machines [33] and Petri nets [63].
Our work is highly inspired by Baldoni et al. [27]. We adopt, like them, a Multi-
agent Systems point of view, in de¯ning a priori conformance in order to guarantee
interoperability. As in [27], we give an interpretation of the a-priori conformance
as a property that relates two formal speci¯cations: the global one determining the
conversations allowed by the protocol and the local one related to the single peer. But,
while in [27] a global interaction protocol is represented as a ¯nite state automation,
we adopt the formalisms and technologies developed in SCIFF and g-SCIFF. For
example, a di®erence between our work and [27] can be found in the number of parties
as they can manage only 2-party protocols while we do not impose any limit. We
also manage concurrency, which they do not consider at the moment.
Another similar work is described in [33]. In this work, authors focus on two-party
choreographies involving each one a requester and a provider (named service conver-
sations) and formulate some requirements for a modelling language suitable for them.
The requirements include genericity, automated support, and relevance. The authors
argue that state machines satisfy these requirements and sketch an architecture of a
service conversation controller capable of monitoring messages exchanged between a
requester and provider in order to determine whether they conform to a conversation.
An example of use of Petri nets for the formalization of choreographies is dis-
cussed in [63]. Four di®erent viewpoints (interface behaviour, provider behaviour,
choreography, and orchestration) and relations between viewpoints are identi¯ed and204
formalised. These relations are used to perform (global) consistency checking of multi-
viewpoint service designs thereby providing a formal foundation for incremental and
collaborative approaches to service-oriented design. Our proposal is limited to a deep
analysis of the relation between choreographies and behaviour interfaces but deal with
both \a priori" and \run-time" conformance.
Endriss et al. [68, 70] apply a formalism based on computational logic to the
a-priori conformance in the MAS ¯eld. Their formalism is similar to the one we pro-
pose, but they restrict their analysis to a particular type of protocols (named shallow
protocols). Doing this, they address only 2-party interactions, without the possibility
of expressing conditions over the content of the exchanged messages, and without con-
sidering concurrency. While the two works agree on the notion of strong/exhaustive
conformance, we have dual notions of feeble/weak conformance: in [68, 70] weak
conformant is an agent that does not perform forbidden actions, but we have no
knowledge on its capability to perform requested actions. Dually, in this work, we
call feeble conformant an agent that does execute all the required actions, but there
is no knowledge on its ability to avoid forbidden actions.
The use of abduction for veri¯cation was also explored in other work. Note-
worthily, Russo et al. [128] use an abductive proof procedure for analysing event-
based requirements speci¯cations. Their method uses abduction for analysing the
correctness of speci¯cations, while our system is more focussed on the check of com-
pliance/conformance of a set of web services.
In [100], the authors tackle the problem of verifying (general and speci¯c) prop-
erties of a Service obtained from the composition of many web services. Each web205
service speci¯cation (written in BPEL4WS) is translated in a labelled state transi-
tion system; then, by applying a composition operator, they get the state transition
system representing the composed service. Finally, model checking techniques are
applied to this latter model, to the end of verifying the properties. Note that, by
appropriately de¯ning and extending the validity of the composed STS, they tackle
di®erent communication models (synchronous, ordered asynchronous and unordered
asynchronous communications) that appear to be quite common in real cases.
Both our work and [100] focus on verifying interoperability, but while we concen-
trate on the interoperability issue of a single peer w.r.t. a global protocol, in [100]
the authors address the interoperability of a group of web services, referring only to
the interface behavior of each web service. However, we share the same intuition
that \the situation where some messages can be emitted without being ever consumed
should not occur in valid composition.". The authors address also the problem of
proving properties about the possible interactions between a group of inter-operating
web services, by means of model checking techniques. We are discuss our results in
this veri¯cation type in Chapter 4.206Chapter 6
Protocol Executability: the SCIFF
Agent Architecture
As already introduced in Section 1.1, the idea behind the Executability is to re-use
the speci¯cation of an interaction protocol, in order to ease the implementation of
the software peers that should interact using such a protocol.
When implementing the peers that use an interaction protocol, several problems
could arises; to cite some:
² the chosen protocol might not be speci¯ed enough: e.g., the TCP protocol spec-
i¯cation [124] does not specify a minimum time interval before a syn message
can be retransmitted;
² the speci¯cation of the chosen protocol could contain ambiguities (due, for ex-
ample, to the use of natural language);
² the implementation of a peer could contain software bugs;
² if a reference implementation is missing, it would be hard also to run any test
of functionality for the implementation of new peers;
207208
Executability is a property related to both the interaction protocol as well as to
the speci¯cation language used to de¯ne such a protocol. It is related to the protocol
itself since quite frequently (especially in the MAS scenario) a protocol allows a peer
for several di®erent actions (communicative actions in MAS). These actions, from the
protocol viewpoint, can be preferred non-deterministically by the peer: typically, the
choice of an action is made by the peer on the basis of some (possibly private and
internal) policy.
The executability property is related also to the speci¯cation language, that should
be able to support, somehow, the peer developing process. For example, a speci¯ca-
tion given in the natural language would be easier for a human reader, but probably
useless for automatizing the development process of a peer. On the other hand, a
more formal speci¯cation of the same protocol would be useful for rapid prototyping
a software peer, but it might result of di±cult comprehension for a human software
developer.
In this chapter we present an extension of an existing agent architecture, where
the single agents are programmed by directly using a protocol speci¯cation. The
existing agent architecture (JADE, [31]) provides the communication facilities, as
well as an entire agent infrastructure compliant with the FIPA speci¯cations [75].
The \mind" of the agent instead is realized by means of the SCIFF Proof Procedure;
it takes as input the protocol speci¯ed in the SCIFF Language, plus some additional
information, and computes an agent behaviour.
Contributions of the author. The author contributed in a substantial way to
the contents presented in this chapter. However the ideas presented and the obtained
results are also consequence of the fruitful discussions with the colleagues and the209
senior researchers.
Chapter organization. This section is organized as follow. In Section 6.1 we pro-
vide an overview of the agent proposed architecture, where beside the SCIFF Agent,
we have introduced the possibility of checking compliance through the SOCS-SI tool.
In Section 6.2 we present the SCIFF Agent and its internal architecture, showing how
a protocol speci¯cation can be used as a base for programming the behaviour of a
single agent. In Section 6.3 instead we discuss which syntactic restrictions, if applied
to the protocol de¯nition, can guarantee that the SCIFF Agent enjoy the property
of being conformant (w.r.t. the protocol). Finally, in Section 6.4 we present some
implementation details while in Section 6.5 we discuss the related works.210
6.1 The SCIFF Agent Platform
Figure 6.1: Overview of the SCIFF agent platform architecture.
The SCIFF agent platform, represented in Figure 6.1, has been implemented on
top of the JADE agent platform [31]. All the components have been implemented
as JADE agents, thus exploiting the capabilities of this powerful agent platform.
The single components can be used also separately, and in conjunction with other
JADE-compliant agents.
In Figure 6.1 two di®erent components have been depicted: the SOCS-SI tool (see
Section 3.1), that has been extended to the JADE platform, and the SCIFF Agent:
both components use the SCIFF Proof Procedure as the reasoning engine, but they
perform di®erent tasks. SOCS-SI \captures" at run-time the messages exchanged by
the agents through the communication platform, and verify the conformance of the
dialogues w.r.t. a given protocol speci¯cation. The SCIFF Agent instead uses the
SCIFF Proof Procedure to compute, for each step of the interaction, which is its next
action (communicative action, in this case).211
6.2 The SCIFF Agent
The SCIFF agent is a generic agent whose behaviour is determined by its speci¯-
cation, provided by means of the SCIFF language, as explained later. The agent
communication language used by the SCIFF agents is based on the ACL used in
JADE (and de¯ned by FIPA [75]). An important di®erence however is that the
SCIFF agent is not restricted to use the pre-de¯ned set of FIPA message performa-
tives: the agent designer can use any desired performative. If this is the case, the
semantics of such performatives should be always expressed by providing, besides the
agent speci¯cation, a proper protocol, thus providing a social semantics, and possibly
by means of the SCIFF language. Of course, careful considerations must be taken
when introducing such new performatives, since inter-operability with other agent
implementations is not guaranteed anymore, unless it is known a-priori that they
support non-FIPA performatives.
6.2.1 Speci¯cation of the agent behaviour
The main purpose of the SCIFF Agent is to provide an implementation of a peer
playing a certain role in a given interaction protocol. The idea is to specify the
agent behaviour by means of the same protocol speci¯cation (given using the SCIFF
Language).
The protocol speci¯cation is used in the following way: given a set of happened
events, it is possible to query the SCIFF Proof Procedure in the open modality (i.e.
considering that new events can still happen). The SCIFF Proof Procedure is used to
compute all the abductive answers ¢i, for which the given history is compliant w.r.t.
the protocol. Each set ¢i represent a possible allowed behaviour of the peers. This212
behaviour is expressed in terms of expectations about the events. In this scenario, all
the events are message exchanges (i.e., we restrict to the communicative acts).
The SCIFF Agent chooses one of the ¢i and try to behave as he is expected to.
Practically, all the expectations about the agent to send a message to another agent
are considered mandatory, and such messages are e®ectively sent out. Expectations
about other agents to send messages to the SCIFF Agent instead are considered
as expectations about the future: they might be con¯rmed by the arrival of the
messages, as well as discon¯rmed because no message arrives. If the latter is the case,
depending on how the protocol has been de¯ned, the SCIFF Agent could perform
some reasoning in order to recover from such situation.
Formally, an agent speci¯cation is de¯ned as follows:
De¯nition 6.2.1 (Agent speci¯cation). An Agent Speci¯cation Pag is an Abduc-
tive Logic Program
Pag ´ hKBag;Eag;ICagi
where:
² KBag is the Knowledge Base of the agent,
² Eag is the set of abducible predicates, and
² ICag is the set of Integrity Constraints of the agent.
KBag and ICag are the protocol speci¯cation, given in terms of an abductive
speci¯cation S = hKBag;ICagi (see Section 2.3).
Eag is the set of abducible predicates: it contains both expectations (positive
and negative) and normal abducibles. Positive expectations can be divided into two
signi¯cant subsets:213
² expectations about messages where ag is the sender (of the form
E(mx(ag;A;Content))); these expectation are interpreted as actions that agent
ag intends to do;
² expectations about messages uttered by other participants to ag (of the form
ought(mx(A;ws;Content)), with A 6= ag), which can be intended as the mes-
sages that ag is able to understand.
In Speci¯cation 6.2.1 it is shown the query-ref protocol [75, 77]. Intuitively, the
¯rst IC means that if agent A sends to agent B a query ref message, then B is expected
to reply with either an inform or a refuse message by TD time units later, where TD
is de¯ned in the Social Knowledge Base by the qt deadline predicate (in the shown
speci¯cation the value of TD would be 10). The second IC means that, if an agent
sends an inform message, then it is expected not to send a refuse message at any
time.
Note that the speci¯cation is still from the global viewpoint of both the partici-
pants. In order to make it speci¯c for the single agent ag, three steps must be applied
to the generic speci¯cation:
² the role(s) that agent ag should play must be clearly speci¯ed;
² possibly non-determinisms due to several allowed answers (for a given role)
should be solved;
² possibly non-determinisms due to non-speci¯ed content of the answers should
be solved.214
Speci¯cation 6.2.1 Speci¯cation of the query ref interaction protocol.
ICs :
H(mx(A;B;query ref(Info));T) ^
qr deadline(TD)
! E(mx(B;A;inform(Info;Answer));T1) ^
T1 < T + TD
_ E(mx(B;A;refuse(Info));T1) ^
T1 < T + TD
H(mx(A;B;inform(Info;Answer));Ti)
! EN(mx(A;B;refuse(Info));Tr)
SOKB :
qr deadline(10):
6.2.2 Role Speci¯cation
Usually, a protocol depicts the interaction rules for several players, each one playing
a role within the protocol. Hence a protocol speci¯cation describes the rules for
di®erent roles, from a single and global (social) viewpoint. In order to use such
a protocol speci¯cation as the agent speci¯cation, it is necessary to specify which
role(s) the agent should play.
Specifying a role within a protocol speci¯cation consists, in our view, to specify in
which actions the role is involved, i.e. in which actions the agent (playing that role)
is the sender or the receiver of a communicative act.
Example 6.2.1 In Speci¯cation 6.2.2 it is shown how the protocol described in the
Spec. 6.2.1 can conceptually instantiated for a speci¯c role. Whenever the role is
taking part to a certain protocol step (i.e. it appears to be the sender or the receiver215
of a message), the keyword me has been inserted instead of a generic variable. In this
example, the selected role is the one of the agent that provides the information.
Speci¯cation 6.2.2 query ref interaction protocol, speci¯ed for a particular role.
ICsag :
H(mx(A;me;query ref(Info));T) ^
qr deadline(TD)
! E(mx(me;A;inform(Info;Answer));T1) ^
T1 < T + TD
_ E(mx(me;A;refuse(Info));T1) ^
T1 < T + TD
H(mx(me;B;inform(Info;Answer));Ti)
! EN(mx(me;B;refuse(Info));Tr)
SOKBag :
qr deadline(10):
Note that the process of specifying the role for an agent ag by substituting the
variables of sender/receiver with a speci¯c keyword (e.g., in the Speci¯cation 6.2.2
has been used the keyword me) is not practical, since it could require a human
supervision.
To provide a simpler method for specifying the role that agent ag should play,
in the SCIFF Agent a predicate my name/1 has been reserved for this purpose. The
idea is to exploit a characteristics of the JADE platform: each agent is given a name
that, at runtime, is unique w.r.t. the currently running platform. Each sent/received
message brings as sender/receiver identi¯er this unique name. As a consequence, each
happened event has a sender and a receiver speci¯ed by ground terms.216
Given the happened events, the SCIFF Proof Procedure elaborates all the possible
abductive explanations (the sets ¢i). In particular, since we are using the protocol
speci¯cation, each set will contain the expectations about the behaviour of all the
agents involved in the interactions. The following situations could happen:
1. some expectations are about the agent to send to some other agent a certain
message (i.e., the sender is set to be the agent name, as given by the JADE
platform);
2. some expectations are about the agent to receive a message (i.e., the receiver is
set to be the agent name);
3. some expectations are about other agents, speci¯ed by their name, or not spec-
i¯ed at all (i.e., the sender or the receiver are still an unbounded variable).
To understand which are the expectations regarding the role that agent ag should
play, it is su±cient to specify in the SOKBag the agent name ( by means of the
predicate my name/1. In this way it is possible to automatically ¯lter and select all
the expectations about ag sending certain messages.
This very practical solution permits to automatically select all the expectations
regarding ag, but introduces a problem: in case of protocols with many roles, a
malicious agent could involve ag to play a di®erent role. This can be avoided by
explicitly stating (through the de¯nition of the goal in the SOKBag) which are the
negative expectations: in such a way, the SCIFF Proof Procedure will compute, for
ag, only the expectations that ag can e®ectively ful¯ll.
Example 6.2.2 In Speci¯cation 6.2.3 it is shown how the SOKB should be extended
in order to specify the role that an agent ag should play, in the query ref protocol.217
Speci¯cation 6.2.3 query ref interaction protocol, speci¯ed for a particular role.
ICsag :
H(mx(A;B;query ref(Info));T) ^
qr deadline(TD)
! E(mx(B;A;inform(Info;Answer));T1) ^
T1 < T + TD
_ E(mx(B;A;refuse(Info));T1) ^
T1 < T + TD
H(mx(A;B;inform(Info;Answer));Ti)
! EN(mx(A;B;refuse(Info));Tr)
SOKBag :
society goal:-
EN(mx(A;B;query ref(Info));T):
qr deadline(10):
my name(me):
Note that the ICshas remained the same w.r.t. the Speci¯cation 6.2.1, and only the
SOKB has been extended to specify the role. In particular, it is assumed that the
agent ag will have the name \me", and that it will not play the role of the enquirer
(ag can never send a query ref message).
6.2.3 Protocol Non-Determinism
Interaction protocols quite often allows for a peer to behave in several di®erent al-
ternative ways: e.g., in the TCP opening phase, the requested peer can answer to an
initial syn message with a syn/ack message or rather with a syn message. Another
simple example is given in the query-ref protocol: the queried agent can answer with
inform or with refuse.218
When SCIFF Proof Procedure is applied to such protocols, it happen that di®er-
ent abductive answers ¢i are generated, each one corresponding to the alternatives
enlisted by the protocol. In order to execute the protocol speci¯cation, the agent
programmer should provide a way for selecting one amongst the possible behaviours.
Example 6.2.3 (Protocol Non-Determinism). In the Speci¯cation 6.2.1, after a
query message is received, an agent can answer with the inform or with the refuse
message. Given the following happened events:
HAP = fH(mx(anAgent;me;query ref(trainTable(tr1234)));5)g
the abductive explanations computed by the SCIFF Proof Procedure are the follow-
ing:
¢1 =fE(mx(me;anAgent;inform(trainTable(tr1234);12:25);T1)) ^ T1 < 15g
¢2 =fE(mx(me;anAgent;refuse(trainTable(tr1234)));T1) ^ T1 < 15g
In order to decide which answer should be given, a predicate symbol select behaviour/2
has been reserved. This predicate, that must be de¯ned by the agent developer, re-
ceives as ¯rst parameter the list of the possible behaviours, and provide as output
(in the second parameter) the selected behaviours (i.e., the list of expectations that
agent will try to ful¯ll).
6.2.4 Messages non-Determinism
In the majority of the cases, protocols rule the type of the messages that can be
sent by a certain peer, but do not specify other parameters related to the message
itself. E.g., the query-ref protocol shown in Speci¯cation 6.2.1 does not rule what
the content of the Info parameter should be.219
In order to successfully execute the protocol speci¯cation, the agent developer
should provide (by means of the SOKB) a way for specifying the message content.
This can be done by de¯ning the predicate message grounder/2 that receives as
input the selected expectation containing variables, and provide as output the same
expectation with all the variables substituted by ground terms.220
6.3 Conformance property of the SCIFF Agent
In the research literature it is possible to ¯nd several de¯nitions of conformance. Here
we will restrict our considerations to the de¯nitions given by Endriss et al. [68, 70],
and to the de¯nitions we provide in Section 5.2. Both the works use the same term
conformance: however, in [68] the terms are weak, exhaustively and robust confor-
mance, while in our approach (Chapter 5) we de¯ne feeble and strong conformance.
The interested reader can refer to Section 5.6 for a comparison between the di®erent
de¯nitions.
Weak, Exhaustively and Robust Conformances
The SCIFF Agent uses the protocol speci¯cation for elaborating the allowed (and
expected) messages it should send. Given that an agent is weak conformance to a
protocol P i® it never utters any illegal dialogue move, we can state the following
theorem:
Proposition 6.3.1 (Weak Conformance). A SCIFF Agent is always weak con-
formant.
Proof. The predicates my name, select behaviour and message grounder can select
only messages that are allowed from the protocol speci¯cation.
Note that, while in [68] the weak conformance property is restricted to the shallow
protocols 1 class, we do no need to restrict to such set.
1In [68] shallow protocols are de¯ned as protocols that can be translated into if-then rules where
a single happening event is present on the left side of each rule. Shallow protocols corresponds to
deterministic ¯nite automatas where it is possible to determine the next state of the dialogue on the
sole basis of the previous event.221
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that any allowed answer will be ever ut-
ter. It might be the case that the functions (de¯ned by the developer) for solving
the non-determinism issues, does not select any allowed answer at all. However, if
such hypothesis is assumed, SCIFF Agent also enjoy the Exhaustive Conformance
property.
Proposition 6.3.2 (Exhaustive Conformance). Given a SCIFF Agent, if:
1. for every interaction step the set of possible allowed answers ¢ is not empty,
and
2. for each possible set ¢ of allowed answers, the functions my name,
select behaviour and message grounder always select at least one answer
Then the SCIFF Agent is Exhaustive Conformance.
Proof. Proposition 6.3.1 already states the weakly conformance. Condition 1 and 2
guarantee that at least one allowed answer will be chosen amongst all the possible
answers envisaged by the protocol. Hence the agent will always utter a message.
We end the considerations about the conformance by noting that, for what re-
gards the Robust conformance, the SCIFF Agent can not guarantee that property,
unless it is the protocol speci¯cation itself that de¯nes the behaviour of answering a
default message (such as not-understood in response to any received and not allowed
message.
Feeble and Strong Conformances
The conformance as de¯ned in the AlLoWS framework can be simply proved by
applying the framework directly on the SCIFF Agent speci¯cation, considering the222
part of the protocol (related to the particular role) as the behavioural interface of the
agent.
However, we would like to notice that this operation is not necessary, since it
means to check a protocol speci¯cation against a subset of the speci¯cation itself. As
for the previous section, the only problem arises in the selection functions, that do
not guarantee that any message will be ever selected to be sent out.
Proposition 6.3.3 (Strong Conformance). Given a SCIFF Agent, if:
1. for every interaction step the set of possible allowed answers ¢ is not empty,
and
2. for each possible set ¢ of allowed answers, the functions my name,
select behaviour and message grounder always select at least one answer
Then the SCIFF Agent is Strong Conformance.
Proof. Naively, by construction of the SCIFF Agent. In fact every possible answer
that the agent will utter, is generated by a subset of the rules de¯ning the global
protocol, and therefore such messages are always allowed.223
6.4 SCIFF Agent Implementation
The SCIFF agent has been modeled on the basis of the Kowalsky-Sadri cycle for
intelligent agents [102]:
1. Observe
2. Think
3. Act
In particular, the phases of observe and act have been implemented directly in Java,
by extending a JADE agent. The think phase instead has been realized using the
SCIFF proof procedure, that provides instructions on the basis of the happened
events.
A schematic representation of the blocks composing the SCIFF agent is shown in
Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.2: Schematic diagram of the SCIFF Agent224
More in detail, the observation step consists on analyzing all the events that
happened since the observation step of the previous cycle. All the events are registered
in an Event Bu®er, a repository that keeps trace of the new events. Three types of
events are considered:
i) Events corresponding to received messages.
ii) Events corresponding to sent messages.
iii) Events corresponding to internal state changes.
The \think" step consists of using the SCIFF proof procedure to elaborate the
happened events, and to generate a set of alternative expected behaviours. By
applying the selection functions de¯ned by the developer (predicates my name/1,
select behaviour/2 and message grounder/2), only one behaviour is selected, and
a grounding of the messages that should be sent is passed on to the execution block.
Finally, the execution step consists on interpreting the expected behaviour gener-
ated by the SCIFF proof procedure. The expectations about the behaviour of other
agents will not be considered (it will be a task of the SCIFF procedure to understand
if such expectations have been satis¯ed or not, possibly providing further behaviours).
Instead, expectations that regards actions to be done by the agent itself, will be in-
terpreted as orders to be executed. If the expectation, e.g., is about sending a certain
message, then the execution block will send such message. Then, for each action
executed, the execution block generates a corresponding event and updates the bu®er
of the happened events: in this way it is possible to use the SCIFF procedure for
reasoning also about the agent' act, beside the other agent acts.225
6.5 Related Works
The main objective of the SCIFF Agent is not to provide a new agent architecture,
but rather to show how a protocol speci¯cation based on logic programming can be
directly used to program the agent behaviour. This would introduce many advantages:
in particular it would simplify the developer job of programming the agents and, as
seen in Section 6.3, for particular protocol classes it would also entail a conformance
property.
The protocol speci¯cation however is not enough: as discussed in Section 6.2.1,
some extra information is needed. In the literature, this extra information is often
referred as the private policy of the agent, in contrast to the public policy, ruled by
the protocol.
Many agent frameworks have been proposed in the MAS research ¯eld. However,
to the best of our knowledge, only Endriss et al. [68, 70] addressed the issue of
using a protocol speci¯cation (given by means of computational logic) to directly
specify the agent behaviour. Our work has been mainly inspired by their works: our
approach and their proposal share many points: e.g., both the approaches de¯ne
the protocol by means of forward rules, where the antecedent are given in terms of
happened events, and the consequences in terms of expectations about the behaviours.
However, our formalism is de¯nitely more expressive and powerful, while they restrict
their formalism and focus their analysis to simpler class of shallow protocols: such
class in fact does not allow for interactions between many peers (more than 2) at the
same time and, moreover, it does not allow for concurrent dialogues.226Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Works
7.1 Summary
In this thesis we have presented the SCIFF framework and its extensions (the g-SCIFF
the AlLoWS Frameworks and the SCIFF Agent Platform). The SCIFF Framework
allows to specify interaction protocols, by means of a formal language supported by
a clear declarative semantics. Then, through the SCIFF Proof Procedure it is pos-
sible to reason about such speci¯cations: soundness, termination and completeness
properties of this procedure have been demonstrated. The SOCS-SI exploits the
proof procedure to test the compliance veri¯cation of peers interactions against the
protocols.
The g-SCIFF Framework extend the SCIFF approach, and allows to statically
prove protocol properties: di®erently by the many existing approaches, it is not fo-
cussed on a speci¯c application domain, but it rather permits to specify any generic
property. The AlLoWS Framework instead permits to verify a-priori if a component,
whose behaviour is described by a public behavioural interface, is complaint with a
protocol speci¯cation. Finally we have discussed the SCIFF Agent Platform, that
ease the task of developing agents by directly using the protocol speci¯cation itself
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as a part of the agent.
A very important advantage of our approach is that several di®erent issues (from
speci¯cation to veri¯cation and execution) are addressed within a single framework:
the immediate advantage is that the same protocol speci¯cation can be used to per-
form the various tasks, without the need of translating it in various formalisms. Other
advantages of our approach are given by the declarative °avor of the speci¯cation lan-
guage, that makes it suitable to be used by human operators; at the same time, its
rigorous formal semantics makes it suitable also for automated reasoning.
The language has been shown to be highly expressive, thanks also to the possibility
of expressing CLP constraints over the variables; moreover the explicitly treatment of
the time makes the framework suitable to perform also time-related reasoning tasks
(such as deadline veri¯cation, for example, or planning). Furthermore, the presence
of positive and negative expectation allows to easy represent open as well as closed
interaction models.
However such expressive power, and the possibility of applying our approach to
almost any application domain, have a price in terms of performances: for example,
the time required to perform the properties veri¯cation task is some orders higher
than the time required by any model checking approach. Anyway, it's our opinion
that this is a reasonable price to be paid for such a powerful framework.
7.2 Future Works
It is our opinion that, starting from the work presented in this thesis, there are many
possible research directions.
For what concern the SCIFF Framework and the other derived frameworks, an229
interesting extension could be to consider the Run-time Responsibility Identi¯cation,
and the strictly related Culprit Identi¯cation. One actual limit of the framework is
that, although a wrong (w.r.t. a protocol) behaviour can be detected by the presented
tools, it might be di±cult to identify which peer has been responsible of the violation.
Another interesting extension could regard the types of violation detected: actu-
ally, if a wrong behaviour is detected, a violation is raised. It could be worthy to
investigate if di®erent types of violation could be de¯ned and detected. For exam-
ple, in certain situation do not performing an expected action could be viewed as
a \lighter" violation, w.r.t. performing a prohibited action. Moreover, it could be
very interesting to allow recovery mechanisms in case of violations. Also, preferences
between di®erent expectations could be desirable.
Then, from the protocol viewpoint, it could be very interesting to investigate
the protocols resulting by the composition of di®erent protocol speci¯cations. The
method for composing such speci¯cation is already a research topic that, we believe,
it is worth to be investigated.
Finally, considering the applications domain, we believe that our approach can
be extended in many other application ¯elds. For example, in the speci¯cation of
business rules and business process, as well as in the work°ow management systems.230Published papers
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